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Often firms lack the necessary internal resources to pursue all profitable investment
opportunities at their disposal. One of the most important roles of financial markets is to
allocate resources from different economic agents to the firms that will better employ
them, thereby enabling productive investment to take place. However, there are
informational and incentive-related problems in financial markets that result in agency
costs. These costs can hinder the efficient allocation of capital across the economy and, as
a result, can impact economic growth. This thesis examines the mechanisms that investors
and managers use to reduce the agency costs of outside financing and the impact of such
costs on firms’ investment decisions and value. The first chapter shows that the voluntary
disclosure of information can help overcoming the informational asymmetry between
managers and investors. The second chapter provides evidence that institutional
ownership of firms can improve firm decisions and increase firm value when coupled with
the appropriate incentives. In particular, we show that stock illiquidity is a key incentive in
this setting. The last chapter examines the impact of accessing the public debt market on
corporate investment. The findings support the hypothesis that firms adjust their
investment decisions to offset an increase in agency costs, which in turn enables them to
access outside financing on more favorable terms. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Corporate finance is the subfield of economics that studies the choices made by corporations
to finance their investments. Paradoxically, its origin as an academic field can be traced back
to the seminal article of Modigliani and Miller (1958) showing that, in a frictionless market,
firms’ financing decisions do not impact corporate value, and corporate finance is thus largely
irrelevant. Ever since, researchers in finance have focused on identifying the frictions that exist
in capital markets which make firm value and firm investment depend on financing choices,
having as ultimate goal the mitigation of the negative impact of these frictions in the economy.
The possibility of increasing economic output by addressing the impact of market frictions on
firm value and investment is what makes academics, corporations, governments, and investors
care about corporate finance.
Relevant frictions in capital markets include the intervention of the government in the
form of taxes, either at the corporate level (Modigliani and Miller (1963)) or at the personal
level (Miller (1977)), and the existence of bankruptcy costs (Robichek and Myers (1966)) and
adjustment costs (Jalilvand and Harris (1984)). However, what has long drawn the most in-
terest from the academic community is the impact of information asymmetry. The difference
in the information set of different parties can lead to adverse selection problems, in which the
supplier of financing provides financing to corporations in terms that would be different in
case it had access to managers’ own private information. Adverse selection is behind perva-
sive economic phenomena such as credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)), and can lead, in
extreme cases, to a complete market breakdown (Akerlof (1970)). Information asymmetry is
also the underlying mechanism of, although not strictly necessary to, agency costs of outside
financing, which are a market friction on their own. Agency costs arise from the separation of
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ownership and control occurring when a firm obtains financing from external sources, giving
rise to a classical moral hazard problem: managers do not act in the best interests of investors
but rather take the actions that maximize their own utility (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
Agency costs of outside financing include the perks consumed by management or the costs
associated with inefficient investment decisions that arise from the separation of ownership
and control, such as underinvestment (Bertrand and Mullainath (2003); Myers (1977)), em-
pire building (Jensen (1986)), risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), and short-termism
(Stein (1989)). They also include the expenses undertaken in order to make outside financing
possible (or less costly). The latter include monitoring costs, which are incurred by investors
to ensure that their investment generates the expected returns (e.g., control systems such as
debt covenants), and bonding costs, which are incurred by the firm to attract outside capital
at a lower price (e.g., contractual commitment to hire auditors). Jensen and Meckling (1976)
show that all the agency costs of outside financing are ultimately borne by the firm in the form
of costlier access to outside finance, and it is thus in its interest to reduce them.
This thesis examines the mechanisms that are used by investors and managers to reduce
the agency costs of outside financing and the impact of such costs on the investment decisions
and value of firms. We use takeovers as the testing ground in the first two essays because
they are often associated with concerns that managers are maximizing their utility rather than
firm value (Morck et al. (1990)), taking advantage of being much better informed than outside
shareholders (Moeller et al. (2007)). In chapter 2 we examine the use of voluntary disclosure
as a tool to bridge the information gap between corporate insiders and shareholders. We con-
tribute to an extensive literature in financial accounting that describes the motivations behind
managerial disclosures by examining a specific context that has received little attention so far:
the disclosure of synergy estimates in the context of mergers and acquisitions. In chapter 3 we
focus on another tool to reduce agency costs of outside financing: monitoring by institutional
owners. Despite a considerable literature on the intersection between ownership structure,
corporate decision making, and firm value, the question of how incentives may affect large
shareholders’ monitoring and, consequently, managerial actions, remains largely unanswered.
We aim at filling this gap in the literature by examining how stock liquidity, working as a
monitoring incentive, impacts takeover decisions. Finally, in chapter 4 I study how the access
to a new source of financing, through the issuance of publicly traded debt, affects corporate
investment decisions. Agency costs are an important component of the total cost of outside
financing, especially when the financing is obtained from dispersed investors, and I analyze
whether the firm adjusts its investment policies taking such costs into account. In the remain-
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der of this chapter, I will describe in more detail each of these studies.
1.1 Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry
A potential solution to the problem of asymmetric information between managers and providers
of capital is the voluntary disclosure of inside information. By sharing their private informa-
tion with the market, managers can mitigate investors’ concerns with moral hazard. However,
in order for it to be effective, disclosure needs to be credible. Furthermore, it is not costless:
there is the risk of revealing proprietary information to competitors (Dye (1986)) and of in-
creased shareholder litigation in case any forecast that is disclosed does not materialize (Healy
and Palepu (2001)).
In chapter 2 of this thesis we study the role of voluntary disclosure in mitigating informa-
tion asymmetry by examining the motivations for bidding firms to disclose a synergy forecast
when announcing a merger or acquisition. M&A is a setting in which the imbalance of infor-
mation between managers and investors is more pronounced and in which agency concerns are
of first-order importance (Moeller et al. (2007); Morck et al. (1990)). As such, managerial dis-
closure is likely to have an important role in this context. Our sample consists of 1,990 M&A
deals over the period 1995 to 2008, of which 345 announce quantifiable synergy estimates.
Our results suggest that managers are more likely to disclose an estimate of the synergies
expected from a deal when they have more precise information about it. More specifically,
bidding firms are more likely to disclose synergy forecasts when the target firm operates in
the same industry, when there have been more deals in the same industry in the recent past,
when the deal is non-hostile, when there is less asymmetric information about the target’s
value, or when the target is domestic. This result is consistent with the theory of Verrecchia
(1990) that, as the precision of information increases, the market exerts more pressure on the
manager to disclose the information by discounting stock prices more sharply in the event the
information is withheld. In addition, we find that disclosure is less likely when litigation risk
is higher. Finally, we find that synergy disclosure is more likely to occur for equity-financed
deals, supporting the hypothesis that managers resort to disclosure in order to alleviate the
adverse selection problem that arises from using equity as the method of payment in a deal
(Myers and Majluf (1984); Travlos (1987)).
We test the credibility of the disclosure by examining its impact on stock prices at the time
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of the announcement of the takeover. After controlling for the endogeneity of the disclosure
decision, synergy forecast disclosures result in approximately 5% higher bidder stock returns.
This result is consistent with a signalling perspective of disclosure in which managers, by dis-
closing their synergy estimates, mitigate concerns with moral hazard being the driver behind
their takeover decisions. Furthermore, we show that the market reaction to announcement is
increasing on the synergy value that is disclosed, suggesting that the market is at least partly
taking into account the estimates given by managers when assessing the value of the merged
firm.
This chapter contributes to a small but growing literature on managerial synergy fore-
casts. Previous studies focus on the credibility of managerial synergy forecasts (Houston et al.
(2001); Bernile and Bauguess (2011)) or on the association of forecasted synergy values with
certain deal characteristics (Ismail (2011)), while our key research question is what drives the
managers’ decision to release synergy forecasts in the first place. On a broader level, our
findings contribute to the literature on voluntary managerial disclosure by extending previous
studies of managerial earnings forecasts to a type of disclosure that is a rare event in the life
of a firm and that occurs at moments when the resolution of information asymmetry problems
is of even greater importance.
1.2 Institutional Monitoring and Moral Hazard
An alternative mechanism that can be used to mitigate moral hazard and its implications in
accessing external financing is monitoring by institutional shareholders. Ownership concen-
tration by institutions that monitor managers can be a solution to the standard agency problems
by reducing the free-riding problems that exist amongst dispersed shareholders (Shleifer and
Vishny (1986)). However, there is little evidence on the role of monitoring incentives in the
relation between institutional ownership and firm decisions and value (Becht et al. (2003)). In
chapter 3 we study the role of stock liquidity as an incentive for monitoring following the large
theoretical literature exploring this relation (Bhide (1993); Maug (1998); Edmans (2009)).
We use a sample of 2,601 acquisitions announced between January 1998 and December
2008 involving U.S. based firms and a publicly-listed bidder. We test the effect of stock liquid-
ity on institutional monitoring by examining merger announcement returns. If stock liquidity
works as an incentive (Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004)) or as an impediment (Bhide (1993))
for institutional monitoring, we should see a relation between it and the quality of the acquisi-
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tions made by firms. To ensure that our results are not contaminated by revelations about the
stand-alone value of bidders (Savor and Lu (2009)) or by the short-selling pressure of merger
arbitrageurs (Mitchell et al. (2004)), we exclude acquisitions for public targets financed with
equity.
We find that acquiring firms with lower stock liquidity earn higher abnormal returns at
the announcement of a takeover, especially when institutions are more likely to collect private
information on the firm’s actions. This effect is concentrated on firms with potentially higher
agency costs, as measured by lower managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and
lower product market pressure (Titman and Wessels (1988)). These results are consistent with
the view of Bhide (1993) that stock liquidity reduces the incentives for institutions to moni-
tor management because it makes exit less costly relative to intervening in the firm, thereby
allowing managers to make less value-creative acquisitions.
Further evidence is given by our ex-post analysis of the acquiring firm. We find that
the probability of withdrawal of a deal is decreasing on announcement returns and is higher
when there is a negative announcement return, as expected if managers "listen to the market"
(Luo (2005)). However, this relation only holds in the subsamples with lower stock liquidity,
consistent with our hypothesis that for those firms there is a stricter monitoring of managers
by institutions. Further, we find that the negative relation between announcement returns and
CEO turnover reported by Lehn and Zhao (2006) is also only present in the subsample with
lower stock liquidity. Finally, we report that stock liquidity is negatively associated with the
operating performance of the firm after the takeover. Overall these results provide strong
evidence that ex-post monitoring by institutions is dependent on the firm’s stock liquidity.
We contribute to a growing literature on the role of stock liquidity on firm value and
shareholders’ monitoring. Fang et al. (2011) find, consistent with our study, that higher stock
liquidity leads to a decrease in firm innovation through an increase in stock ownership by non-
active institutions, who have a short-term focus. Contrasting results are obtained by Bharath
et al. (2010), who, using a different setting, show that there is a positive relation between
stock liquidity and firm value in the presence of blockholders. They argue that the reduction
in the cost of exit by blockholders caused by an increase in stock liquidity puts more pressure
on managers to exert more effort ex-ante and avoid such exit. This chapter is different from
their paper in that we focus on a specific managerial action (takeovers), where we believe that
monitoring is of greater importance. Furthermore, we show that the importance of monitoring
also depends on the context of the firm and on its governance. Edmans et al. (2011) find that
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an increase in stock liquidity is associated with an increase in the probability that hedge funds
acquire a stake in a firm, and that such purchase triggers positive abnormal stock returns.
However, conditional on having purchased a stake in the firm, they find that higher stock
liquidity is associated with a lower likelihood of direct intervention by the hedge fund, which
is consistent with our finding of a negative relation between stock liquidity and institutional
monitoring.
1.3 Source of Financing and Corporate Investment
In the previous two chapters we focus on mechanisms that can be used to mitigate agency
costs of outside financing. In chapter 4 I instead examine how firm investment changes when
there is an increase in the agency costs of outside financing. I do so by studying the relation
between the level of corporate investment and a firm’s use of the public debt market.
I use a panel of U.S. firms between the beginning of 1986 and the end of 2008 and I
collect information on their access to the bond market. The main sample consists of 84,556
firm-year observations. I measure level of investment by looking at both capital expenditures
and corporate takeovers. Nini et al. (2009) show that creditors are averse to firms’ investments,
as these investments can be made to increase equityholders’ expected payoff at the expense
of debtholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Given that, as explained before, equityholders
ultimately bear the agency costs of debt, it is in their interest to commit ex-ante not to expro-
priate debtholders’ wealth, thereby ensuring better access to financing in the future (Almeida
et al. (2011)). Consequently, I hypothesize that firms accessing the bond market reduce their
level of investment in order to encourage relatively uninformed investors to hold their debt
on more favorable terms. This change in firm behavior might be necessary because alterna-
tive mechanisms to reduce agency costs of debt, such as monitoring, become weaker when
switching from borrowing from financial intermediaries to borrowing from financial markets
(Chava and Roberts (2008); Diamond (1991)). The alternative hypothesis is that firms having
access to the bond market increase their investment level because of a reduction in financial
constraints (e.g., Whited (1992)).
I find that accessing the public debt market is associated with a significant reduction in
the level of capital expenditures and takeovers, especially for firms with higher credit risk.
Firms tapping the bond market also become less likely to violate debt covenants, reduce the
level of payouts to equityholders, and increase cash holdings. The evidence is consistent with
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the hypothesis that firms adjust their decisions when borrowing repeatedly from less-informed
investors in order to reduce agency costs of debt and guarantee future access to financing.
This chapter adds to the recent literature on the importance of debtholders in corporate
governance, which has so far focused on bank debt as a result of its stricter covenants and
easier renegotiation (Chava and Roberts (2008); Nini et al. (2009); Nini et al. (2010)). I
provide evidence that, in a contracting framework with less monitoring and higher information
asymmetry, the existence of debt claims held by dispersed investors leads the firm to change
its investment decisions. This self-imposed change in behaviour is meant to reduce agency
costs of debt, and is aimed at encouraging uninformed investors to hold the firm’s debt on
more favourable terms. In a broader sense, this chapter extends to debt financing the analysis
made by Asker et al. (2011) of the differences in investment behavior between private firms
and stock market listed firms. Similarly to them, I find that firms with publicly-listed securities
have lower levels of investment and have a weaker relation between investment and investment
opportunities. While Asker et al. (2011) show that in equity markets it is managerial myopia
the main driver of the change in investment behavior, I offer evidence that in debt markets
it is the agency costs of debt that lead to the lower investment level of the firms with traded
securities.

Chapter 2
Synergy Disclosures in Mergers and
Acquisitions∗
2.1 Introduction
When engaging in a merger or acquisition, managers have the option to publicly release a fore-
cast of the synergies associated with their planned deal. Approximately one-fifth of the deal
announcements between U.S. public firms over the period 1995 to 2008 include a forecasted
synergy value released by bidder management. This chapter investigates the factors driving
bidders’ decision to release a synergy value estimate at the time of the deal announcement.
A key finding of the M&A literature is that, while takeovers are beneficial for target-firm
shareholders, wealth effects for bidding-firm shareholders are on average zero or negative.1
One possible explanation for negative bidder announcement returns is that bidding firms tend
to overpay for the target, either due to agency problems (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen
(1986)) or behavioral biases (Roll (1986)). We hypothesize that bidder managers use synergy
forecast announcements to signal their shareholders that they are not overpaying for the deal,
and as such obtain a more favorable stock price reaction upon the deal announcement. We
∗This chapter is based on Dutordoir et al. (2012). We thank Mathijs van Dijk, Ingolf Dittmann, Mara Faccio,
Dennis Fok, Renhui Fu, Ulrich Hege, Abe de Jong, Tomas Mantecon, Richard Paap, Buhui Qiu, Rui Shen, Fred-
erik Schlingemann, Elvira Sojli, Sudi Sudarsanam, Marno Verbeek, David Yermack, and seminar participants
at Catholic University of Louvain, Rotterdam School of Management, University of Twente, the Portuguese Fi-
nance Network Meeting in Ponta Delgada, the FMA Meeting in New York, and the FMA European Meeting
in Hamburg for their helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and the
Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam for financial support.
1Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and Eckbo (2009) provide literature surveys on target and bidder an-
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therefore predict that synergy disclosures are more often used when there is higher information
asymmetry between shareholders and managers about the synergy value of an announced deal.
The literature on voluntary disclosure suggests a number of other factors that may influ-
ence bidders’ decisions to disclose synergy information. Verrecchia (1990) argues that man-
agers’ threshold for disclosing information is lower when the available information is more
precise. The underlying intuition of this "information quality" rationale is that, as the preci-
sion of information increases, the market exerts more pressure on the manager to disclose the
information by discounting stock prices more sharply in the event the information is withheld.
We therefore predict synergy disclosures to be more likely when managers are able to calculate
synergies more accurately. Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1986) argue that disclosure decisions
may be affected by firms’ reluctance to harm their competitive position. Projected synergy
values may provide valuable information to competitors regarding the bidder’s intended post-
merger strategy. Shareholder litigation risk can also reduce incentives to provide disclosure of
forward-looking information (Healy and Palepu (2001)). We thus predict a negative impact of
proprietary costs and of shareholder litigation risk on bidders’ propensity to disclose synergy
estimates.
We examine these predictions using a sample of 1,990 M&A deals involving U.S. pub-
lic bidder and target firms over the period 1995 to 2008. We hand-collect publicly-disclosed
information related to each of these deals, and find that 345 or 17% of the transaction an-
nouncements are accompanied with a synergy estimate provided by bidder management. We
henceforth label these deals "disclosing deals". Our empirical analysis consists of two parts.
In the first part, we examine the deal and firm characteristics driving the synergy disclosure
decision through a set of probit regressions. In the second part, we examine the impact of syn-
ergy disclosures on bidder stock returns around deal announcements. If synergy disclosures
are able to mitigate shareholders’ concerns regarding bidder overpayment, we should observe
a positive impact of synergy disclosures on bidder stock returns. Alternatively, if sharehold-
ers perceive synergy disclosures as cheap talk by managers trying to motivate an overpriced
deal, we may observe a neutral or even negative impact of synergy disclosures. The impact of
synergy disclosures on bidder stock returns is therefore an empirical question.
The probit analysis of synergy disclosure determinants provides little evidence consistent
with our signaling hypothesis. That is, we do not find that synergy disclosures are more likely
when there is high information asymmetry about synergy value. Instead, consistent with Ver-
recchia (1990) information quality rationale, our findings suggest that managers’ likelihood
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to disclose synergy forecasts increases significantly with the level of precision with which
they can predict synergies. More particularly, bidding firms are more likely to disclose syn-
ergy forecasts when the target firm operates in the same industry, when there have recently
been more deals in the same industry, when the deal is non-hostile, and when there is less
asymmetric information about the target’s value. An extension of our analysis to cross-border
transactions corroborates this intuition. Synergy disclosures are significantly less likely in
cross-border transactions, which tend to be surrounded with high uncertainty for bidding-firm
managers.
As predicted, we also find that firms’ propensity to disclose is negatively influenced by
shareholder litigation risk. Moreover, our results indicate that disclosing deals are significantly
more likely to be financed with equity. Equity financing is consistently found to induce sig-
nificantly more negative bidder announcement returns than cash financing, since it may signal
that the bidding firm is overvalued (Travlos (1987)). Thus, while we obtain little evidence of
higher asymmetric information related to synergy values, our probit results do suggest that
disclosing deals may suffer from higher adverse selection problems related to bidding-firm
value, and are as such likely to induce more negative bidder announcement returns ex ante.
Bidding firms may use synergy forecasts to alleviate these predicted negative announcement
returns.
Our analysis of bidder announcement returns corroborates this intuition. After control-
ling for the endogeneity of the synergy disclosure decision, we find that synergy disclosures
significantly reduce the negativity of bidder announcement returns. To give a sense for magni-
tude, combining deal announcements with a synergy forecast announcement results in approx-
imately 5% higher bidder announcement returns. We also find that bidder stock price reactions
are increasing in the amount of the forecasted synergies accruing to bidding-firm shareholders,
suggesting that shareholders consider the forecasted information value relevant and credible.
An analysis of long-term buy-and-hold returns indicates that shareholders do not over- or
under-react to synergy disclosures. Together, the probit and announcement returns analyses
suggest that synergy disclosures mainly serve to obtain a more favorable market reception for
deals that would otherwise induce highly negative bidder announcement returns. The main de-
terrents of managerial synergy disclosures are lack of precise information on synergy values,
and shareholder litigation risk.
This chapter contributes to a small but growing literature on managerial synergy forecasts.
Using a sample of 41 large U.S. bank mergers, Houston et al. (2001) examine the impact of
12 Chapter 2
synergy forecasts on announcement-period stock returns and analysts’ reports. Their evidence
suggests that costs savings projections are considered credible, while this is not the case for
revenue enhancement projections. Bernile and Bauguess (2011) examine 3,935 M&A deals
between U.S. public bidder and target firms, of which 23% are combined with insider pro-
jections of synergies. Their key question is whether these projections reflect real operational
synergies. Their analysis suggests that announcement-period stock returns are more favorable
for deals including forecasts, with the magnitude of the reaction increasing in both the pre-
dicted and the surprise component of the forecasted synergy value. Ismail (2011) analyzes the
impact of the magnitude of synergy forecasts on takeover premiums and payment form. He
uses a sample of 336 M&A deals between U.S. public bidder and target firms, all of which
are accompanied by managerial synergy forecasts. His results indicate that, whereas synergy
values do not explain takeover premiums, larger projected synergy values result in a larger
equity fraction in the payment offered. While these studies focus either on the credibility of
managerial synergy forecasts (Houston et al. (2001); Bernile and Bauguess (2011)) or on the
association of forecasted synergy values with certain deal characteristics (Ismail (2011)), our
key research question is what drives bidder management’s decision to release synergy fore-
casts in the first place.
This chapter is also related to Devos et al. (2009), who analyze Value Line synergy fore-
casts for 264 large mergers. Their evidence suggests that mergers mainly generate gains by
improving resource allocation, rather than by reducing tax payments or increasing the market
power of the combined firm. We differ from this study by analyzing the determinants of syn-
ergy value disclosures directly provided by bidder management, rather than the components
of synergy forecasts provided by analysts.
On a broader level, our findings contribute to the literature on voluntary managerial dis-
closure. Previous studies use disclosure ratings or self-constructed disclosure measures, which
may be subject to endogeneity issues (Healy and Palepu (2001)). Some studies examine man-
agerial earnings forecasts (e.g., Lennox and Park (2006)). Similar to management earnings
forecasts, voluntary synergy forecasts present the advantage that the exact timing of the dis-
closure can be identified, which enables us to conduct powerful tests of motivations for, and
consequences of, voluntary disclosure. However, while managerial earnings forecasts are typ-
ically recurring events, synergy forecasts are rare events in the life of a firm, involve a long
forecasting horizon, and occur at moments when the resolution of information asymmetry
problems is very important.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses our testable
predictions on the determinants of voluntary synergy disclosures, and motivates the associated
empirical proxies. Section 2.3 describes the data set. Section 2.4 provides empirical results on
the determinants of voluntary synergy disclosures. Section 2.5 analyzes the impact of synergy
disclosure on bidder stock returns. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Testable Predictions and Empirical Proxies
In this section, we discuss the different determinants of synergy disclosures suggested by the
literature and develop the empirical proxies for each determinant.
2.2.1 Synergy Disclosure as a Signal of Synergy Value
Our research topic lies at the intersection of two strands of literature: the M&A literature,
and the literature on voluntary disclosure. Within the M&A literature, it is a stylized fact
that bidder announcement returns tend to be neutral or negative in acquisitions of public tar-
gets (see Martynova and Renneboog (2008) and Eckbo (2009) for reviews of the literature).
One often-cited reason for these observed bidding-firm announcement returns is that the stock
market perceives M&A deals as neutral or bad investments (Jarrell and Poulsen (1989)). Ra-
tional shareholders know that bidder managers may be overpaying because they pursue objec-
tives other than shareholder value maximization (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen (1986);
Morck et al. (1990); Moeller et al. (2005)), or because they overestimate their ability to man-
age the target firm (Roll (1986)). We hypothesize that bidding-firm managers use synergy
disclosures to signal that they are not overpaying for the deal, and as such obtain a more
favorable stock price reaction upon the deal announcement.
This "signaling" hypothesis relies on the assumption that bidding-firm managers aim to
maximize short-term stock prices. If not, they could simply wait until the market understands
the true value of the synergies. Verrecchia (2001) states several reasons for managers to be
concerned with their firms’ current stock prices. First, executive compensation contracts are
incomplete. It is easier to reward managers based on current stock price performance. More-
over, managers may not be around to reap the benefits of long-term stock price increases.
Second, the firm may intend to issue equity(-linked) securities in the near future. Third, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that maximizing current stock prices may simply be heuristic behav-
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ior on the manager’s part. The signaling hypothesis yields the prediction that the synergy
disclosure decision is positively influenced by information asymmetry about synergy values
between bidder managers and shareholders. Higher information asymmetry increases bidder
managers’ need to mitigate a highly negative stock market reception of the deal by closing the
information gap with their shareholders.
To capture bidders’ need for signaling synergy values through voluntary synergy disclo-
sures, we construct a set of proxies for shareholders’ uncertainty about the true synergy value.
Appendix A includes a detailed description of all explanatory variables used in this chapter.
In line with Servaes and Zenner (1996), we assume that the information asymmetry prob-
lem is smaller for deals between firms in the same industry. For such deals, it may be easier
for shareholders to evaluate the associated synergies. We also expect information asymmetry
about synergy values to be smaller when the deal has been preceded by a large number of other
deals targeted at the same industry. Observing these previous deals could make it easier for
bidder shareholders to evaluate the synergy values associated with the proposed transaction.
To capture uncertainty regarding synergy value faced by bidder shareholders, we therefore
include a Same Industry dummy variable equal to one for deals between firms in the same
industry, and an Industry Liquidity Index measuring the number of M&A transactions in the
target’s industry over the year prior to the transaction (calculated as in Schlingemann et al.
(2005)).
Although voluntary synergy disclosures are hypothesized to reduce asymmetric informa-
tion with respect to the value of synergies rather than with respect to stand-alone company
values, we also test whether the level of asymmetric information related to target and bidder
values influences the disclosure decision. The reason is that information asymmetry regarding
the stand-alone values of the involved companies can make it harder for shareholders to evalu-
ate the benefits resulting from combining these two entities. We use two widely-adopted mea-
sures for information asymmetry about firm value, i.e., stock return volatility (Target Volatility
and Bidder Volatility) and firm size (Target Total Assets and Bidder Total Assets). Asymmet-
ric information should be higher for target and bidder firms with a higher volatility and smaller
total assets.
To obtain further insights on synergy disclosure motives, we also analyze the impact of
synergy disclosures on bidder stock returns around the deal announcement date. If bidders use
synergy disclosures as a signaling tool, and the signal is credible, we expect bidder announce-
ment returns to be positively influenced by the synergy disclosure decision, and increasing in
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the value of the projected synergies. However, shareholders may also perceive synergy disclo-
sures as cheap talk used by managers to motivate overpaid deals.2 As such, synergy disclosure
may have no impact, or even a negative impact, on bidder announcement returns. The impact
of synergy disclosures on bidder announcement returns is thus an empirical question.
2.2.2 Synergy Disclosure and Information Quality
While the M&A literature suggests a signaling motive for firms to engage in voluntary synergy
disclosures, theoretical models on voluntary information disclosure suggest that information
quality may guide firms’ decision to disclose synergies.3 Early disclosure models (Grossman
and Hart (1980); Milgrom (1981)) imply that, when shareholders have rational expectations,
managers should fully disclose all available information that can be credibly communicated.
The reason is that shareholders equate withheld information with the worst possible informa-
tion, and discount stock prices accordingly. A number of subsequent models identify factors
that may induce cross-sectional variations in voluntary disclosure policies. Verrecchia (1990)
argues that managers’ threshold for disclosing is lower when the information is of higher
quality. Higher quality information is defined as information with lower variance, i.e., higher
precision. The market knows the quality of the information, but not its type (good or bad). As
the quality of the information increases, the market exerts more pressure on the manager to
disclose the information by discounting stock prices more sharply in the event more precise
information is withheld.
Based on the model of Verrecchia (1990), we predict bidder managers’ likelihood of dis-
closing synergy forecasts to increase in the quality of the information available to calculate
synergy values. We expect bidder management to use both publicly available information and
inside, "soft" information as inputs for synergy forecasts. The set of variables used to measure
the precision of relevant publicly available information largely overlaps with that used for
measuring the uncertainty about synergies faced by bidder shareholders. More particularly,
2The business press provides ample illustrations of synergy forecasts being used as cheap talk to motivate
controversial deals. As argued by Warren Buffett (Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report, 1997): "If a CEO is
enthused about a particularly foolish acquisition, both his internal staff and his outside advisers will come up
with whatever projections are needed to justify his stance. Only in fairy tales are emperors told that they are
naked."
3The relevant theoretical models for our research purpose focus on the decision whether or not to disclose
information. A range of other models deal with the question on when to disclose information. This timing
question is less relevant for our analysis, as all synergy disclosures are included together with, or shortly after,
the deal announcement. Dye (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) provide an overview of studies on disclosure timing.
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we expect it to be easier for managers to obtain an accurate synergy value estimate if the deal
is targeted at a company in the same industry (Same Industry dummy variable equal to one), if
there have been many previous deals in that same industry (higher Industry Liquidity Index),
and if there is more precise information on the stand-alone value of the target (lower Target
Volatility, and larger Target Total Assets). Since the signaling hypothesis and the information
quality hypothesis of Verrecchia (1990) yield opposite predictions regarding the influence of
these variables on the disclosure decision, their impact on bidder management’s likelihood to
disclose synergy estimates is an empirical issue. To proxy for management’s inside informa-
tion on synergy values, we include a dummy variable equal to one for Hostile deals. In hostile
deals, it may be harder for bidder management to receive inside, "soft" information relevant
for determining synergy values from target management. The Hostile dummy may thus act
as an inverse proxy for the quality of the non-public information available to the bidder man-
agement, leading us to expect a negative impact of this dummy variable on the likelihood of
synergy disclosures.
2.2.3 Synergy Disclosure and Proprietary Costs
The disclosure decision may also be influenced by product-market competition concerns. As
argued by Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1986), the release of private information can damage
a firm’s competitive position in product markets. Synergy forecasts may provide competitors
with information on the sources of value creation resulting from the merger, and as such result
in a substantial loss of proprietary information for the bidding firm. In line with the literature,
we label the costs associated with the adverse impact of voluntary disclosures on the firm’s
competitive position "proprietary costs".
Following Bamber and Cheon (1998), we include growth opportunities as a proxy for
proprietary information. Growth opportunities indicate availability of profitable investments
such as new product introductions and capacity expansion projects. The more valuable the
growth options, the more managers put at stake by releasing any information that could dissi-
pate the value of these opportunities. We use the bidder’s market to book ratio (Bidder Market
to Book) as a measure for its growth opportunities. Also according to Bamber and Cheon,
firms’ actions (among which information disclosures) are more likely to affect competitors’
actions in highly concentrated product markets. We therefore also include the Bidder Industry
Concentration Ratio as a proprietary costs measure. We expect a negative impact of Bidder
Market to Book and of Bidder Industry Concentration Ratio on bidders’ propensity to disclose
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synergies.
2.2.4 Synergy Disclosure and Shareholder Litigation
Litigation by shareholders can also reduce incentives to provide disclosure of forward-looking
information if managers believe that the legal system penalizes forecasts made in good faith
because it cannot distinguish between unexpected forecasts errors and those due to deliber-
ate management bias (Skinner (1997); Healy and Palepu (2001)). According to Rule 10b-5
of the U.S. Security Exchange Act of 1934, a deliberately misleading synergy disclosure is
unlawful, even if it happens under the safe harbor provision of the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995. Over the past years, a number of firms have been sued for making
supposedly unrealistic synergy estimates (e.g., SunTrust has been sued by First Union Corp.
and Wachovia). Other companies (among which Hewlett-Packard in its merger with Compaq)
had to demonstrate in-court how they obtained their synergy estimate. The mere possibility of
incurring legal costs resulting from the release of a synergy estimate might work as a deterrent
of voluntary disclosures.
Based on Johnson et al. (2000) and Johnson et al. (2001), we use a dummy variable equal
to one for firms in the computer hardware, software, or pharmaceuticals industry and equal to
zero otherwise as a proxy for litigation risk. Firms in these high-technology industries have
been reported to be at much higher risk of shareholder litigation than other firms (e.g., Field
et al. (2005)). We expect a negative impact of this Litigation Risk dummy variable on firms’
likelihood to disclose synergies.
2.2.5 Other Determinants of Synergy Disclosure
We include a number of control variables in our analysis. Bidder management needs to obtain
the approval of their shareholders through voting when the firm expects to issue shares corre-
sponding to more than 20% of the pre-bid outstanding shares to finance the acquisition (Bethel
et al. (2009)). Bidder managers may be more likely to resort to voluntary synergy disclosures
to convince shareholders in such cases. We therefore include a Shareholder Approval variable
equal to one for deal types in which bidder shareholders need to express their approval by
voting, and equal to zero otherwise.
We also control for the Takeover Premium (calculated as outlined in Appendix A). A
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higher takeover premium may be perceived by the market as a signal of overpayment, and
thus result in a stronger managerial need to convince shareholders of the synergies associated
with the deal. However, shareholders may also perceive the takeover premium as an indicator
of the magnitude of estimated deal synergies rather than of overpayment. Thus, the predicted
impact of Takeover Premium on the likelihood of synergy disclosures is unclear.
We also include an Equity Payment dummy variable equal to one for deals that include a
portion of equity financing. Equity-financed mergers are widely documented to induce more
negative bidder announcement returns than cash-financed bids (Travlos (1987); Moeller et al.
(2007)). A common explanation for this observation is that equity financing signals bidder
overvaluation (Travlos (1987)). Despite this negative signal, bidders may have no other op-
tion than to resort to equity payments, for example due to limited cash availability (Martin
(1996)). While synergy disclosures may not mitigate shareholder concerns regarding bidding-
firm overvaluation (i.e., they pertain to synergy value rather than to bidding-firm value), bid-
ding firms may still be more likely to resort to synergy disclosures for equity-financed deals,
in order to alleviate the expected negativity of the announcement returns associated with these
deals. We thus expect a positive impact of the Equity Payment dummy on the likelihood of
synergy disclosures. Firms are more likely to disclose information on events that are material
to them. To capture the importance of the deal for the bidding firm, we include the ratio of the
deal value to the bidding firm’s market capitalization (Relative Size).
In addition, we control for changes in shareholders’ information environment resulting
from the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in October 2000.4 Under Regulation
FD, managers can no longer make selective disclosures of material information to analysts
and other investment professionals. As such, this rule may induce firms to disclose more
information through public channels, resulting in a positive impact on voluntary synergy dis-
closures.
Finally, we control for corporate governance quality of the bidder firm by including the
Gompers et al. (2003) governance quality index (Bidder GIM Index). In firms with a poor
governance structure in place, as reflected by a higher GIM Index value, shareholders may be
more skeptical about the value-creating potential of M&A deals, thereby increasing the need
to signal synergy value through synergy disclosures. Alternatively, self-serving managers in
firms with poor governance may use inflated synergy value estimates to motivate a potentially
4An extensive literature examines the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the level of information asym-
metry between managers and shareholders (e.g., Heflin et al. (2003); De Jong and Apilado (2009)).
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value-destructive deal. Thus, irrespective of whether bidder management aims to maximize
shareholder value, we expect voluntary synergy disclosures to be more likely for firms with
poor corporate governance in place.
2.3 Sample
We obtain a sample of mergers and acquisitions between U.S. public firms announced between
January 1st 1995 and December 31st 2008 from the Securities Data Company’s Mergers and
Acquisitions Database (henceforth SDC). We exclude minority stake repurchases, acquisitions
of remaining interest by majority owners, privatizations, leveraged buyouts, spinoffs, recapi-
talizations, self tenders, exchange offers, and repurchases. We also exclude utilities (SIC codes
starting with 49) because these firms may have to pass on part of the synergies to their con-
sumers and as such have different incentives for synergy disclosures (Seshadri et al. (2007)).
In line with Betton et al. (2008), we eliminate deals involving target firms with a share price
below one dollar 22 trading days before the offer is publicly announced. We require that all
necessary accounting data for both bidder and target are available in the Compustat Funda-
mentals Annuals database, and that stock price information for bidder and target is available
in the Center of Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
Our final sample consists of 1,990 M&A transactions, of which 1,719 are completed deals.
We obtain deal-related data from SDC, institutional ownership information from the Thom-
son Reuters CDA/Spectrum s34 database, and GIM indices from the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC). Following Ali et al. (2009), we obtain industry concentration ratios
from the U.S. Census. All explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level
to reduce the influence of outliers.
To identify bidding firms releasing synergy forecasts, we search the Factiva database for
all newspaper articles and press releases related to the acquiring firm on the deal’s announce-
ment date (retrieved from SDC), as well as on the preceding and following five trading days.
We verify that the synergy forecast is provided by a chief executive of the acquiring firm, and
not by other parties such as analysts or journalists. We identify 345 disclosing deals. In all
disclosing deals, the synergy forecast is released on the same date as the announcement of the
deal (i.e., either together with the announcement, or a few hours later). In the vast majority of
cases (88%), the disclosure of synergies is included in a news article or press release issued by
the acquiring firm. In the remaining 12% of the observations it is announced in a conference
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call, and then reproduced by the media. Table 2.1 shows that the use of voluntary synergy
disclosures has increased over time. While in 1995 only 8% of the deals are accompanied by
a synergy forecast, in 2008 this percentage amounts to 37%. Deals with disclosed synergy
values account for 42% of the total deal value between 1995 and 2008.
Table 2.1
Yearly Distribution of Disclosing and Non-Disclosing Deals
This table presents the number and relative value of disclosing and non-disclosing deals per year.
Disclosing deals are deals in which bidding-firm managers publicly disclose a forecast of the value
of the synergies they expect to achieve. The sample consists of M&As between public firms over the
period 1995 to 2008 obtained from SDC. Synergy forecasts are hand-collected from Factiva. Deal
values are obtained from SDC.
Year Disclosure Non-Disclosure Disclosing Deals Value of Disclosing
as Fraction of Deals as Fraction of
All Deals Total Deal Value
1995 13 156 8.33% 45.49%
1996 13 148 8.78% 21.70%
1997 25 215 11.63% 17.09%
1998 38 202 18.81% 44.47%
1999 25 191 13.09% 37.25%
2000 35 143 24.48% 48.56%
2001 20 127 15.75% 58.04%
2002 14 58 24.14% 17.95%
2003 24 80 30.00% 30.06%
2004 34 72 47.22% 27.20%
2005 21 75 28.00% 54.51%
2006 30 65 46.15% 58.10%
2007 36 67 53.73% 51.68%
2008 17 46 36.96% 76.83%
Total 345 1645 20.97% 42.28%
2.4 Determinants of Synergy Disclosures
2.4.1 Univariate Results
Table 2.2 provides the results of a univariate comparison of potential synergy disclosure deter-
minants between disclosing and non-disclosing deals. We find that the Same Industry dummy
variable, Target Volatility, and Target Total Assets are significantly different between disclos-
ing and non-disclosing deals. The signs of the differences indicate that managers are more
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likely to disclose synergies when they are able to calculate synergy values with more preci-
sion. This finding is consistent with the information quality hypothesis of Verrecchia (1990),
and inconsistent with our signaling hypothesis. We also find that bidders are significantly
more likely to make synergy disclosures when they have lower Bidder Volatility and larger
Bidder Total Assets. These results are also inconsistent with our signaling hypothesis, to the
extent that shareholders find it easier to assess deal synergies when there is less information
asymmetry about the stand-alone value of the bidding firm.
As predicted, disclosing deals have significantly smaller Market to Book ratios, which we
interpret as reflecting lower proprietary costs. But the Bidder Industry Concentration ratio,
another proxy for proprietary costs, is not significantly different between both deal types.
Also in line with our predictions, Litigation Risk is significantly smaller for disclosing deals,
while Shareholder Approval and Equity Payment are significantly higher for the disclosing
subsample. The findings regarding the impact of payment type hold regardless of whether we
measure equity payment as a dummy variable equal to one whenever the payment includes a
portion of shares (Equity Payment) or as a continuous variable capturing the actual percentage
of shares involved in the payment (Equity Payment %). In the remainder of the analyses,
we only report results with the Equity Payment dummy explanatory variable, but findings are
robust to using the Equity Payment % variable.
Takeover Premium is significantly smaller for disclosing deals. We do not have a clear
prediction on this variable. As predicted, disclosing deals have a significantly larger Relative
Size. Finally, there are significantly more synergy disclosures in deals completed on or after
the adoption of Regulation FD in October 2000. We do not find significant differences in the
Hostile Deal frequency or in bidder corporate governance quality, as captured by the Bidder
GIM Index, across the two subsamples.
2.4.2 Probit Results
We subsequently analyze whether these univariate results hold in a multivariate setting by
conducting a probit analysis with a Synergy Disclosure dummy variable equal to one for dis-
closing deals as dependent variable. Table 2.3 presents the results. All regressions reported
throughout this chapter include industry and year fixed effects. z-statistics are based on stan-
dard errors robust to industry clustering. Industry fixed effects and clustering are based on
two-digit SIC codes.
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Table 2.3
Probit Analysis of the Determinants of Synergy Disclosure Decisions
This table presents a probit analysis of the determinants of the synergy disclosure decision. The
dependent variable is equal to one for disclosing deals, and equal to zero for non-disclosing deals.
Disclosing deals are deals in which bidding-firm managers publicly disclose a forecast of the value
of the synergies they expect to achieve. The sample consists of M&As between public firms over
the period 1995 to 2008 obtained from SDC. Synergy forecasts are hand-collected from Factiva.
All explanatory variables are described in Appendix A. All models include year and industry dummy
variables, the latter based on the bidder’s two-digit SIC code obtained from SDC. z-statistics (reported
in brackets) are computed using robust standard errors clustered per industry. N denotes the number
of observations for which the analysis can be executed. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Synergy Disclosure Synergy Disclosure Synergy Disclosure
Same Industry 0.183* 0.360*** 0.179*
(1.76) (2.96) (1.74)
Industry Liquidity Index 0.683** 0.657
(2.14) (1.47)
Target Volatility -0.117 -0.343
(-0.44) (-0.90)
LN(Target Total Assets) 0.436*** 0.365*** 0.459***
(7.96) (5.65) (8.57)
Bidder Volatility -0.451 0.026
(-1.23) (0.04)
LN(Bidder Total Assets) -0.093* -0.070 -0.083**
(-1.73) (-0.89) (-2.06)
Hostile Deal -0.324** -0.415** -0.302*
(-2.08) (-2.25) (-1.73)
Bidder Market to Book -0.059 -0.033 -0.062*
(-1.43) (-0.74) (-1.66)
Bidder Ind. Concentration Ratio 0.009** 0.012* 0.008*
(2.09) (1.93) (1.86)
Litigation Risk -0.456* -0.540* -0.480**
(-1.90) (-1.71) (-2.22)
Bidder GIM Index 0.022
(0.86)
Shareholder Approval 0.271*** 0.450*** 0.246***
(4.43) (4.98) (3.93)
Takeover Premium -0.188** -0.046
(-2.00) (-0.34)
Equity Payment 0.325*** 0.231* 0.284***
(3.60) (1.94) (3.73)
Relative Size 0.097 0.249* 0.113
Continued on the next page
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(1.28) (1.93) (1.44)
Fair Disclosure 0.252 0.07 0.116
(1.14) (0.30) (0.44)
Cross-Border -0.387***
(-3.53)
Intercept -3.407*** -3.544*** -4.391***
(-9.54) (-5.34) (-15.36)
Mc Fadden R-Squared 30.02% 32.49% 29.59%
N 1,990 1,188 2,171
Model (1) includes all variables from Table 2.2 except for the Bidder GIM Index, which
is only available for a subset of observations (1,188 out of 1,990). A pairwise analysis of
correlations reveals that multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue in our data. The highest
Pearson’s correlation, 0.63, is between Bidder and Target Volatility. All other correlations are
well below 0.60. Overall, while some of the results on individual parameters differ from the
univariate findings, the probit results yield largely the same conclusions. We obtain strong
evidence for Verrecchia (1990) information quality argument for voluntary disclosure. More
particularly, consistent with this rationale, we find a significant positive impact of Same In-
dustry, Industry Liquidity Index, and Target Total Assets, and a significant negative impact of
the Hostile dummy variable on the likelihood of synergy disclosures.
In contrast with the univariate results, and consistent with the signaling hypothesis, Bidder
Total Assets has a significant negative impact on the disclosure decision. We furthermore find
a significant positive impact of the Bidder Industry Concentration ratio, which goes against the
prediction that bidders with higher proprietary costs are more likely to engage in synergy dis-
closures. Market to Book, our alternative proprietary costs proxy, does not have a significant
impact. Consistent with the univariate results, we find a significant negative impact of Litiga-
tion Risk and Takeover Premium, and a significant positive impact of Shareholder Approval
and Equity Payment. Relative Size and Fair Disclosure are no longer significant.
In Model (2), we add the Bidder GIM Index. We find that this variable has an insignificant
regression coefficient, suggesting that bidder corporate governance does not play an important
role in the synergy disclosure decision. The results for the other explanatory variables are
largely similar to those in Model (1). Model (3) extends our analysis to disclosures made by
U.S. bidders involved in cross-border deals (271 transactions). Cross-border deals tend to be
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surrounded by more uncertainty than domestic deals, due to geographical distance and dif-
ferences in accounting standards and regulations, language, and culture (Eckbo and Thorburn
(2000); Moeller and Schlingemann (2005)). These deals may therefore be characterized by
higher uncertainty about synergy values, both for bidding-firm shareholders and managers.
Whether synergy disclosures are more likely for cross-border deals thus depends on the rel-
ative importance of bidding-firm managers’ need to reduce the information gap by signaling
deal quality to their shareholders, versus bidding-firm managers’ reluctance to release impre-
cise information. We collect accounting data for the cross-border targets from WorldScope.
Due to restrictions in data availability, we only include a subset of the explanatory variables
in Model (3).5 We find that the dummy variable capturing cross-border deals is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level, which again supports the information quality rationale
for synergy disclosures. Further corroborating this rationale, unreported analyses indicate that
disclosure is significantly more likely when the target is domiciled in a country that is more
similar to the U.S (i.e., Canada, Common Law countries, or countries with English as official
language).
Together, the univariate and probit results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide evidence that
bidding-firm managers are more likely to disclose synergies when they possess more precise
information for synergy value calculations. Litigation costs play an important role as well. We
find only unsystematic evidence on the impact of proprietary costs on the synergy disclosure
decision. Furthermore, the significant positive impact of the Equity Payment dummy vari-
able, which is consistent throughout our univariate and probit regression tests, suggests that
managers may be more likely to disclose synergies when they expect a more negative market
reception of the deal due to adverse selection problems. In Section 2.5, we explore this intu-
ition more formally by analyzing the impact of synergy disclosures on bidder announcement
returns.
2.5 Impact of Synergy Disclosures on Bidder Stock Returns
We examine the impact of synergy disclosures on bidder stock returns to provide further in-
sights into the motivations for firms to make these disclosures. We measure bidding-firm
cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) using the market model based on the CRSP value-
5More particularly, we leave out the Industry Liquidity Index, Target and Bidder Volatility, Bidder GIM Index,
and Takeover Premium.
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weighted index over the period [-3, +3] relative to the deal’s announcement date (obtained
from SDC). The estimation period ranges from trading days -243 to -43. To mitigate the effect
of different probabilities of deal completion on abnormal returns, we only include completed
deals in the event-study analysis.
The average (median) CAR over the window [-3, +3] equals -2.65% (-2.59%) for dis-
closing deals, while the average (median) CAR is -1.99% (-1.45%) for non-disclosing deals.
Differences in CARs between both subsamples are not statistically significant (t-statistic for
differences in means equals -1.21). This result does not necessarily imply that voluntary syn-
ergy disclosures have no impact on bidder stock returns. As documented earlier, characteris-
tics of disclosing deals are substantially different from those of non-disclosing deals. If we
want to obtain a clean estimate of the impact of synergy disclosure on stock returns, we need
to control for these differences. We therefore perform a regression of bidding-firm CARs mea-
sured over the window [-3, +3] on the Synergy Disclosure dummy defined earlier, and on a
variable labeled "Synergy Ratio". The Synergy Disclosure dummy captures the discrete de-
cision of releasing a synergy forecast, while the Synergy Ratio captures the magnitude of the
forecasted synergies accruing to bidding-firm shareholders. Appendix B provides a detailed
description of how we calculate Synergy Ratio. As control variables, we include the same ex-
planatory variables as those included in the probit analysis of the synergy disclosure decision.
In line with Martynova and Renneboog (2008), we also control for Bidder Leverage (defined
as outlined in the Appendix A).
Model (1) of Table 2.4 shows the OLS regression results. The coefficient on the Synergy
Disclosure dummy variable is not statistically significant. However, one concern with the cur-
rent model specification is that unobserved deal or firm characteristics may have an impact
both on the decision to disclose and on bidder CARs. Such endogeneity problem would cause
the error term of the CAR analysis to be correlated with the disclosure dummy, leading to
biased inferences on the impact of synergy disclosures on stock returns. To correct for this po-
tential bias, we use a two-step Heckman (1979) estimation procedure, as in Campa and Kedia
(2002) and Kisgen et al. (2009). In the first step, we run the probit regression on the decision
to disclose using the explanatory variables specified in Model (1) of Table 2.3. From the probit
results we derive an Inverse Mills ratio, and include this ratio in the second-stage regression on
the bidder CAR. The inclusion of the Inverse Mills ratio controls for the correlation between
the error term in the probit regression and the CAR regression, thus allowing us to estimate
the CAR regression as a simple OLS model. We adjust standard errors following the lines of
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Greene (2003).6
Table 2.4
Regression Analysis of the Impact of Synergy Disclosures on Bidder Stock Returns around
M&A Announcements
This table presents the a regression analysis of cumulative abnormal stock returns
over the window [-3,+3] surrounding the M&A announcement date, estimated using
the market model based on the CRSP value-weighted market index. Models (1) and
(2) use bidder abnormal stock returns as dependent variable, while Model (3) uses
the weighted abnormal stock returns of the bidder and target firm as dependent vari-
able. As weighting variables we use the bidder’s and target’s market capitalizations
measured four days before the deal announcement date. Disclosing deals are deals
in which bidding-firm managers publicly disclose a forecast of the value of the syn-
ergies they expect to achieve. The sample consists of M&As between public firms
over the period 1995 to 2008 obtained from SDC. We set Synergy Ratio equal to zero
if the acquirer’s management does not publicly disclose a forecasted synergy value.
The Inverse Mills ratio is obtained from the probit regression specified in Model (1)
of 2.3. All other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix A. All models in-
clude year and industry dummy variables, the latter based on the bidder’s two-digit
SIC code obtained from SDC. t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors
clustered per industry. z-statistics are computed using standard errors calculated as
suggested in Greene (2003). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Bidder CAR Bidder CAR Combined CAR
[-3; +3] [-3; +3] [-3; +3]
Synergy Disclosure -0.001 0.049** 0.059***
(-0.24) (2.31) (3.06)
Synergy Ratio 0.052** 0.051*** 0.045***
(2.22) (3.25) (3.18)
Same Industry 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.11) (-0.25) (-0.04)
Industry Liquidity Index -0.005 -0.011 -0.008
(-0.28) (-0.60) (-0.44)
Target Volatility -0.003 -0.005 -0.025**
(-0.18) (-0.48) (-2.50)
LN(Target Total Assets) -0.002 -0.006** -0.001
(-0.87) (-2.24) (-0.60)
Bidder Volatility -0.041** -0.033* -0.006
(-2.12) (-1.89) (-0.41)
LN(Bidder Total Assets) -0.003* -0.002 -0.009***
Continued on the next page
6We rely on the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio to achieve identification in the two-step Heckman
(1979) procedure (see Li and Prabhala (2007) for a detailed discussion of this approach).
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(-1.86) (-1.27) (-4.96)
Hostile Deal 0.008 0.016 0.022*
(0.70) (1.24) (1.87)
Bidder Market to Book -0.003** -0.003** -0.004***
(-2.84) (-2.12) (-3.62)
Bidder Ind. Concentration Ratio 0 -0.000 -0.000
(0.18) (-0.24) (-0.28)
Litigation Risk -0.022** -0.018* -0.015*
(-2.15) (-1.76) (-1.65)
Shareholder Approval -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.011**
(-3.79) (-4.27) (-2.10)
Takeover Premium -0.005 -0.002 0.024***
(-0.75) (-0.41) -4.63
Equity Payment -0.014** -0.017*** -0.021***
(-2.65) (-3.01) (-4.10)
Relative Size -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.015***
(-4.38) (-5.61) (-2.93)
Fair Disclosure 0.01 0.004 0.004
(0.55) (0.20) (0.26)
Bidder Leverage 0.007*** 0.007** 0.007***
(2.88) (2.30) (2.56)
Inverse Mills -0.030** -0.032***
(-2.49) (-2.90)
Intercept 0.102*** 0.114*** 0.131***
(6.62) (4.09) (5.22)
Adjusted R2 11.30%
Wald Chi-Squared 624.66*** 581.59***
N 1,719 1,719 1,719
Model (2) of Table 2.4 reports the results of the second-stage OLS regression. The Syn-
ergy Disclosure dummy now has a significantly positive regression coefficient. Thus, once
controlled for the endogeneity of the disclosure decision, the market does react more posi-
tively to disclosing deals. This finding is consistent with synergy disclosures being able to
alleviate shareholder concerns about deal overpayment. The coefficient size of Synergy Dis-
closure suggests that, everything else equal, deals accompanied with synergy disclosures result
in approximately 5% higher bidder announcement returns.
The coefficient on the Inverse Mills ratio is significant, implying that it is important to
control for endogeneity in this context. Its sign is negative, suggesting that unobservable char-
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acteristics inducing bidders to disclose synergies (positive error term in the probit analysis)
have a negative impact on bidder stock returns (negative error term in the CAR analysis). This
result is consistent with our signaling hypothesis, which predicts that it is more important for
managers to signal deal quality when shareholders are more likely to react negatively to the
deal announcement.
As predicted, we find that bidder stock returns are increasing in the value of the projected
synergies, as reflected by Synergy Ratio. This finding suggests that shareholders consider the
disclosed synergy amount to be value relevant and at least partly credible. With respect to
the control variables, our results largely confirm those of existing studies. In line with Officer
(2003), we find more negative announcement returns for bidders with higher Stock Volatility.
Consistent with most other studies, we also find a significant negative impact of the Equity
Payment dummy variable and of Relative Size (e.g., Morck et al. (1990)), and a significant
positive impact of Bidder Leverage. Remarkably, we also find a significant negative impact of
Litigation Risk and Shareholder Approval.
In Model (3), we regress the combined abnormal stock returns of bidder and target firm
over the window [-3, +3], weighted by their market capitalizations four days before the an-
nouncement, on the same set of explanatory variables. Our findings on the impact of synergy
disclosures on stock price reactions to deal announcements remain largely similar to those in
the previous two models.
Overall, the analysis of announcement returns suggests that bidding firms can obtain a
significantly better stock market reception of the deal when including a synergy forecast esti-
mate. Our announcement returns analysis also confirms that bidder announcement returns are
significantly more negative for equity-financed deals. The latter result corroborates our earlier
interpretation of the positive impact of the Equity Payment dummy variable on the likelihood
of synergy disclosures: managers are more likely to provide synergy forecasts for equity-
financed deals, since these deals are expected to provoke significantly more negative bidder
announcement returns. It is important to point out that the signal provided by the synergy
forecasts refers to the deal value, while the adverse signal provided by the equity financing
of the deal refers to the bidding-firm value. We do not claim that synergy forecasts undo the
negative signal derived from the payment form. Shareholders interpret equity financing as
a bad signal about bidding-firm value, and synergy disclosures are not able to alleviate that
concern. We instead argue that the positive signal derived from the synergy disclosures results
in significantly less negative announcement returns for deals that would otherwise be received
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very negatively by the market. To formally test whether the synergy disclosure signal inter-
feres with the payment form signal, we include an interaction term of the Synergy Disclosure
dummy variable with the Equity Payment dummy variable in the regression analysis of bidder
announcement returns. The results of this untabulated test indicate no significant impact of
the interaction term on bidder announcement returns, corroborating our interpretation that the
signal provided by synergy disclosures pertains to the deal while the signal provided by equity
payment pertains to the value of the bidding firm.
As discussed earlier, we find that bidder announcement stock returns are significantly
positively affected by both the synergy disclosure decision and the magnitude of the fore-
casts. However, similar to Houston et al. (2001) and Bernile and Bauguess (2011), we obtain
a rather small coefficient size of Synergy Ratio (approximately 5%), indicating that sharehold-
ers only capitalize part of the forecasted synergy gains. Given the uncertainty associated with
forecasted synergies, shareholders may be slow to realize the implications of a given synergy
announcement for future expected cash flows. If this explanation holds, then we should ob-
serve a stronger impact of the Synergy Ratio on CARs measured over an extended window
after the deal announcement. We test this prediction by examining one-year buy-and-hold
stock returns following the M&A deal announcements. Using a calendar-time portfolio ap-
proach (Fama (1998)), we build equally- and value-weighted monthly-rebalanced portfolios
long in stocks of disclosing firms, and regress one-year returns over these portfolios on the
three Fama and French (1993) factors and a Carhart (1997) momentum factor. We retrieve the
returns on the Fama and French (1993) and momentum factors from Kenneth French’s web-
site.7 We also construct portfolios long in disclosing deals and short in non-disclosing deals.
Table 2.5 reports the findings.
We find no evidence that disclosing deals significantly outperform non-disclosing deals
(alphas of the constructed portfolios are always insignificant). Thus, bidding-firm announcement-
period stock returns seem to capture the full impact of the synergy disclosure. Similar to
Houston et al. (2001), we conclude that the small capitalization percentage of the Synergy
Ratio may be attributable to errors or uncertainties associated with the translation of projected
synergy values into firm value gains.8
7http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
8Houston et al. (2001) find that costs savings projections are more credible than revenue enhancement pro-
jections. However, in unreported analyses, we do not find a larger coefficient size of the Synergy Ratio when
leaving out synergy projections that include revenue enhancement forecasts (which constitute a mere 8% of the
disclosure deals).
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2.6 Conclusion
We examine why a substantial percentage of bidding-firm managers include a synergy fore-
cast estimate in their M&A deal announcement. We draw from the M&A and the voluntary
disclosure literature to derive a set of predictions on the determinants of the synergy disclosure
decision.
In the first step of our analysis, we conduct a probit regression of the determinants of the
synergy disclosure decision. Consistent with the information quality framework of Verrecchia
(1990), we find that managers’ willingness to disclose synergies is strongly affected by the
quality of the available information for calculating synergy values. If the available information
is more precise, as is likely to be the case, for example, in same-industry deals and in deals
where there is low asymmetry of information about the target value, managers are significantly
more likely to provide synergy estimates. Conversely, if the information related to synergies
is uncertain, as is likely to be the case, for example, in cross-border deals, managers are more
likely to refrain from disclosing synergies. We also find that managers are significantly less
likely to disclose synergies when there is higher risk of shareholder litigation.
In the second step of our empirical analysis, we examine the impact of synergy disclosures
on bidding-firm stock returns, while controlling for the endogeneity of the synergy disclosure
decision. Our analysis suggests that managers are more likely to make synergy disclosures
when the deal is likely to cause highly negative bidding-firm stock price reactions. Impor-
tantly, we obtain only little evidence that these negative stock price reactions are caused by
perceived overpayment for the deal, as was predicted by our signaling hypothesis. The main
observable reason for disclosing deals to cause a negative stock price reaction seems to be the
fact that these deals are significantly more likely to be financed with equity. We also obtain
evidence that disclosing deals have unobservable characteristics that would result in a more
negative market reception of the deal without offsetting synergy disclosure. Without accom-
panying synergy disclosures, the expected market reaction associated with disclosing deals
would be approximately 5% more negative. Overall, our results suggest that the synergy dis-
closure decision mainly results from a trade-off between the favorable stock price impact of
disclosures, and managers’ reluctance to disclose imprecise information.
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Appendix A # indicates a Compustat data item. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level.
Bidder GIM Index Gompers et al. (2003) governance index for the bidding firm. Ob-
tained from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC),
and measured at year-end before the deal announcement. If the
GIM index value is missing for a given year, we take the value of
the most recent previous year that is covered.
Bidder Industry Bidder industry concentration ratio obtained from U.S. Census
Concentration Ratio data based on the 4-digit NAICS code of the firm (obtained from
SDC). We use the census of 2002 for the period 2000-2008 and
the census of 1997 for the period 1995-1999. We take the changes
in NAICS codes between the 1997 and the 2002 Census into ac-
count, as SDC reports the most recent NAICS code.
Bidder Leverage Ratio of total debt to the market value of equity measured at the
fiscal year-end prior to the announcement of the deal. Debt is
computed by adding long term debt (#LTD) and current liabilities
(#DLC). Market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the
total number of shares outstanding (#CSHO) by the stock price
(#PRCC_F).
Bidder Market to Book Ratio of the market to book value of assets measured at the fiscal
year-end prior to the acquisition announcement date. The market
value of assets is calculated as the book value of total assets (#AT)
minus the book value of equity (#CEQ) plus the market value
of equity, which equals the total number of shares outstanding
(#CSHO) multiplied by the stock price (#PRCC_F).
Bidder Total Assets Book value of the bidder’s total assets (#AT) measured at fiscal
year-end prior to the deal announcement. In regression analyses
we take the natural logarithm (LN) of total assets.
Bidder Volatility Standard deviation of the market-adjusted residuals of bidder
daily stock returns measured over the window [-305, -43] rela-
tive to the announcement date (Moeller et al. (2007)).
Cross-Border Dummy variable equal to one if the target firm is domiciled out-
side the United States (obtained from SDC).
Equity Payment Dummy variable equal to one if the deal is (partly) financed with
equity (obtained from SDC).
Equity Payment (%) Percentage equity financing of the deal (obtained from SDC).
(Continued on the next page)
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Fair Disclosure Dummy variable equal to one if the deal was announced on or
after the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure on October 23,
2000.
Hostile Deal Dummy variable equal to one if the bid is coded as hostile or
unsolicited by SDC.
Industry Liquidity Following Schlingemann et al. (2005), we collect all corporate
Index transactions at the three-digit SIC code level for each sample year
from SDC. The industry’s liquidity index is the ratio of the value
of those corporate control transactions to the total book value of
assets of all the firms in the same three-digit SIC code in that year.
We compute this measure using the target firm’s main SIC code
(obtained from SDC).
Litigation Risk Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder belongs to the com-
puter hardware (SIC codes 3570-3577), computer software (SIC
codes 7371-7379), or pharmaceuticals (SIC codes 2833-2836) in-
dustries (Johnson et al. (2001)).
Relative size Ratio of the deal value reported by SDC to the market value of the
bidder. The market value of the bidder is calculated as bidder total
assets (#AT) minus the book value of equity (#CEQ) plus market
value of equity (#CSHO times #PRCC_F).
Same Industry Dummy variable equal to one if the bidder’s three-digit NAICS
code (obtained from SDC) is the same as the target’s.
Shareholder Approval Dummy variable equal to one if bidder shareholders have to ap-
prove the deal. This is the case if shares corresponding to more
than 20% of the pre-bid outstanding shares are expected to be is-
sued to finance the acquisition (Bethel et al. (2009)).
Synergy Disclosure Dummy variable equal to one if bidder has issued a synergy fore-
cast.
Synergy Ratio Ratio of the present value of the forecasted synergy-related cash
flows minus the takeover premium in dollars, scaled by the mar-
ket value of the bidding firm’s equity measured four trading days
before the announcement date (obtained from CRSP) as defined
as in Appendix B.
(Continued on the next page)
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Takeover Premium Takeover premium in U.S. dollars, calculated by multiplying the
percentage takeover premium with the target market capitaliza-
tion measured four days prior to the takeover announcement. Fol-
lowing Officer (2003), we first compute the percentage premium
using the pay components reported by SDC. If this value is lower
than zero or higher than two, we instead use the premium using
the initial price of the offer as reported in SDC. In line with Offi-
cer (2004), we measure the equity market value four trading days
prior to the announcement. Results are robust if we measure the
market value 22 trading days prior to the announcement instead.
Target Total Assets Book value of target total assets (#AT) measured at fiscal year-
end prior to the deal announcement. In regression analyses we
take the natural logarithm (LN) of total assets.
Target Volatility Standard deviation of the market-adjusted residuals of target daily
stock returns measured over the window [-305, -43] relative to the
announcement date (Moeller et al. (2007)).
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Appendix B
To calculate the present value of the forecasted synergies, we manually collect detailed
synergy information (source of the synergy, value, and timing) for each of the 345 disclosing
deals.9 In line with other studies (Houston et al. (2001); Bernile and Bauguess (2011)), we find
that the reported synergies mainly result from costs savings. In only 8% of the observations the
estimates of the synergy include forecasts of revenue enhancements as a result of the merger.
In these few observations, revenue enhancements amount to 39% of the total disclosed synergy
value. We adjust all disclosed values to after-tax figures by applying a 35% statutory federal
tax rate over corporate income. A small fraction (15%) of the synergy forecast announcements
include a range of synergy values. In such cases, we use the range’s midpoint in subsequent
analyses.
We account for the forecasted timing of synergy-related cash flows by following the pro-
cedure outlined in Houston et al. (2001). In 60% of the observations, managers use a specified
projection horizon for the yearly synergy estimates. If managers do not mention what hap-
pens in intermediate years, we assume a linear increase in yearly synergy forecasts between
the disclosure date and the year in which the manager’s projection ends. For example, in the
acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America announced in 2008, the latter firm mentions
that it expects to achieve "$7 billion in yearly pre-tax expense savings, fully realized by 2012".
In this case, we project (pre-tax) cash flows of $1.75 billion in 2009, $3.5 billion in 2010, $5.25
billion in 2011, and $7 billion in 2012. We assume that all cash flows occur at year-end. In
cases in which managers do not specify in which year they expect the full synergies to be
attained (40% of the observations), we assume that the synergies are fully achieved at the end
of the following calendar year. An example is the merger between SCI Systems and Sanmina
announced in 2001, in which the management discloses that "the two companies expect $100
to $150 million in cost savings" without providing a more detailed projection horizon. In our
calculations, we project a cash flow of $125 million at the end of 2002. We assume that, after
the projection horizon, the value of the synergies grows at the expected long-term inflation rate
prevailing at the time of the announcement of the deal. We obtain this rate from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Following Kaplan and Ruback (1995) and Houston et al. (2001), we use the cost of equity
of the acquiring firm as the discount factor for calculating the present value of the forecasted
9Our sample contains only two cases in which management directly reports the present value of the synergies.
In these cases, we use the managerial estimate as such, without further adjustments.
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cash flows.10 We calculate this cost of equity by multiplying the firm’s adjusted market beta
(computed using daily stock returns over a period of one year prior to the announcement of the
deal, with the estimation period ending six months prior to the deal) by a 7% risk premium, and
adding the yield on a ten-year U.S. Treasury Bond at the time of the announcement (obtained
from Datastream).11
To measure the fraction of synergies accruing to acquirer shareholders, we subtract the
Takeover Premium (measured as outlined in Appendix A) from the present value of the fore-
casted synergies, and scale the result by the bidding-firm’s equity market value. By subtracting
the Takeover Premium from the estimated synergies, we remove the portion of the synergies
accruing to target shareholders. We label the resulting ratio "Synergy Ratio". The average
(median) Synergy Ratio value for disclosing deals is 9.86% (1.92%).
10To obtain a more precise estimate of the total synergies, we should subtract the integration costs forecasted
by managers. However, 77% of the synergy disclosures do not mention these costs. We do not expect the
non-inclusion of these costs to materially affect the results, given the small values usually forecasted for restruc-
turing charges. For example, Houston et al. (2001) find that average integration costs amount to only 1% of the
combined bidder and target equity values in their sample of bank mergers.
11The adjusted market beta corrects for the mean-reversion tendency observed in market betas (Blume (1975)).
It is calculated as 0.333 plus the historical market beta multiplied by 0.666.

Chapter 3
Does Stock Liquidity Affect the Incentives
to Monitor: Evidence from Corporate
Takeovers∗
3.1 Introduction
Despite a considerable literature on the intersection between ownership structure, corporate
decision making, and firm value, the question whether and how stock liquidity affects incen-
tives for shareholder monitoring remains largely unanswered. In this chapter we aim at filling
this gap by analyzing whether stock liquidity provides an incentive or works as an impediment
for institutional monitoring.1 This research question is motivated by two opposing theoretical
views expressed in the existing literature.
Starting with Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1993), several researchers have expressed their
concern that stock liquidity may not be unambiguously beneficial for the firm. Higher stock
liquidity implies that a large shareholder in the firm may exit its position more easily, as its
trading actions have a lower impact on the price of the stock. As such, when confronted with
bad news, the large shareholder may become less likely to exert effort and intervene in the
firm, opting instead to exit its investment. Kahn and Winton (1998) develop a model of the
institutions’ choice between intervening in firms they invest in and trading on the basis of
their private information. In this model, the incentive for an institution to trade based on its
∗This chapter is based on Roosenboom et al. (2012). We thank Leonce Bargeron, Dave Denis, Alex Edmans,
and Buhui Qiu for helpful suggestions.
1We define institutional monitoring as the direct or indirect actions of an institution that lead managers to take
actions more closely aligned with shareholders’ interest.
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superior knowledge of the firm is increasing in the liquidity of the stock if other speculators
have non-uniform costs of gathering information. As a result, the incentive for institutions to
intervene in the firm’s management and to increase firm value is reduced when stock liquidity
is higher.
However, other theoretical articles derive the opposite view on the effect of stock liquidity
on the incentives for institutional owners to monitor firms. Maug (1998) develops a model in
which the creation of concentrated shareholdings is endogenous and shows that higher stock
liquidity helps investors overcome free-riding problems. Stocks with higher liquidity can more
easily be traded without affecting their price, which in turn increases the investors’ incentive
to increase firm value through monitoring, as they can benefit more from the impact of their
actions on prices. Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004) show that a more liquid stock reflects
better the value impact of the institutions’ intervention, thereby increasing their incentive to
monitor the firm.
In addition, recent theoretical research has uncovered another channel through which
stock liquidity may positively impact institutional monitoring. Edmans (2009) and Admati
and Pfleiderer (2009) argue that by making the threat of exit by large shareholders more cred-
ible, stock liquidity increases the ex-ante incentives for managers to maximize shareholders’
wealth. In these models, the large shareholders collect private information on managers’ ac-
tions to trade upon. If they get a negative signal, they sell their stake. Assuming that managers
care about the stock price and want to reduce the probability of exit by large shareholders,
they exert more effort to reduce the likelihood that shareholders receive a negative signal. The
impact of the threat of exit on managers’ actions is increasing in liquidity because higher stock
liquidity allows easier accumulation of shares and reduces the severity of the negative signal
under which the large shareholder sells its position and thereby making selling less costly.
We test these contrasting theoretical predictions on the role of stock liquidity as an incen-
tive for monitoring by analyzing corporate takeovers (Chen et al. (2007); Gaspar et al. (2005);
Qiu (2006)).2 There are several reasons why we choose to focus on takeovers. First, their
announcement date is easily identified, allowing for "cleaner" empirical tests. Second, corpo-
rate takeovers are typically large events that impact the valuation of the companies involved.
Third, it is a setting in which agency problems (and consequently institutional monitoring) are
of large importance as managers’ self-interested actions may have severe consequences for
the firm (Morck et al. (1990)). Finally, besides providing an opportunity to analyze whether
2We use the terms takeovers and acquisitions interchangeably throughout the chapter.
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and how ex-ante monitoring affect takeover valuations, corporate takeovers provide an ideal
setting to complement our analysis with an investigation of how stock liquidity affects ex-post
monitoring efforts with respect to deal completion, CEO turnover, and operational perfor-
mance. When subject to stricter monitoring managers should make better takeover decisions,
resulting in higher announcement returns on average. If stock liquidity impedes institutional
monitoring by facilitating trading over intervention, we should observe a negative relation be-
tween bidder stock liquidity and announcement returns (tradeoff hypothesis). If, on the other
hand, stock liquidity enhances firm value by encouraging monitoring, either directly or indi-
rectly via the threat of exit by institutions, we should find a positive relation between bidder
stock liquidity and announcement returns (complementarity hypothesis).
We use a sample of completed acquisitions announced between January 1998 and Decem-
ber 2008 involving U.S. based firms and a publicly-listed bidder. We exclude equity-financed
acquisitions for public targets because of the potential bias they could introduce in our results.
Mitchell et al. (2004) show that a considerable fraction of the bidder returns in equity-financed
public acquisitions is due to the short-selling pressure of arbitrageurs. The price pressure of
short sales is decreasing on the liquidity of the stock, and thus could induce a positive rela-
tion between announcement returns and stock liquidity that has no connection to institutional
monitoring. Furthermore, announcement returns of equity-financed acquisitions for public
targets are heavily influenced by the market’s perception regarding the stand-alone value of
the bidder, reducing their usefulness as a measure of deal quality (Savor and Lu (2009)). We
show that a selection bias is unlikely to arise from excluding equity-financed acquisitions, as
bidders’ ex-ante stock liquidity is not a significant predictor of the method of payment used.3
Using the Amihud (2002) measure of stock liquidity, we find strong support for the trade-
off hypothesis. More specifically, we find that the relation between stock liquidity and an-
nouncement returns is significantly negative, even after controlling for the main factors im-
pacting bidder announcement returns previously reported in the literature. The impact is also
economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in stock liquidity is associated
with a 0.38% decrease in bidder returns over a window of five trading days around the an-
nouncement date of the acquisition, which average 1.21% for the whole sample. We also find
that more liquid bidders are more likely to announce takeovers that trigger negative announce-
3We acknowledge the important effect that takeover sample selection criteria have on conclusions with respect
to average takeover gains (e.g., Netter et al. (2011)). However, we specifically construct the takeover sample in
ways that provide an ideal background against which we test how stock liquidity plays a key role in institutional
monitoring instead of making inferences with respect to average bidder gains.
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ment returns.
Our main results are consistent with the view of Bhide (1993) that stock liquidity reduces
the incentives for institutions to monitor management, thereby allowing managers to make
less value-creative acquisitions. We conduct further tests on this interpretation by studying the
cross-sectional variation of the impact of liquidity on announcement returns. We hypothesize
that, if liquidity impacts returns through monitoring, its effect should be stronger when insti-
tutions are more likely to collect private information on the firm. In order to test whether this
effect is present in the data, we create a new variable, Bidder Portfolio Share, that captures
the relative importance of a firm in each institution’s portfolio. If a firm has a larger weight in
the portfolios of institutions, these institutions are more likely to engage in costly information
collection about its actions. We partition our sample sorted on the maximum of the Bidder
Portfolio Share at the firm level and find that the effect of stock liquidity on announcement
returns is only present when institutions have a stronger incentive to collect information on the
firm. In the subsample of firms with the lowest importance on institutions’ portfolios we do
not find any significant effect of stock liquidity on announcement returns or on the likelihood
of having a negative CAR. We find similar results when using the ownership concentration by
dedicated institutions as the partitioning variable (Bushee (2001); Chen et al. (2007)).
Given the evidence that stock liquidity affects the ex-ante monitoring by institutional own-
ers, as reflected in the higher announcement returns of deals made by illiquid firms which
institutions are more prone to monitor, it is likely that liquidity also affects their ex-post mon-
itoring efforts. We test whether this effect is present in the data by analyzing the probability
of completion of announced takeovers (Kau et al. (2008); Luo (2005)) and the probability
of CEO turnover (Lehn and Zhao (2006)). We find that the likelihood that managers with-
draw a previously announced deal is decreasing on announcement returns and is higher when
there is a negative announcement return, but only in the subsample with lower stock liquidity.
This result is consistent with institutional owners pressuring managers to drop deals that are
value-destroying in firms for which the illiquidity of the stock gives them a stronger incen-
tive to monitor. Further, we find that the negative relation between announcement returns and
CEO turnover reported by Lehn and Zhao (2006) is also only present in the subsample with
lower stock liquidity, again providing evidence of how ex-post monitoring by institutions is
dependent on the firm’s stock liquidity. In both cases, within the observations with low stock
liquidity the effects are only present when institutions are more likely to monitor those firms
(i.e. firms with a greater weight in institutions’ portfolios). These results are consistent with
an increased role for institutional monitoring in less liquid firms, which forces managers to
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"listen to the market" and drop acquisitions that were not seen as beneficial for the firm or
else face a higher probability of getting fired. We also report that stock liquidity is negatively
associated with the operating performance of the firm after the takeover, especially for the
group of firms which have a higher weight in institutions’ portfolios.
Further, we analyze how the relation between stock liquidity and announcement returns
varies depending on the need for institutional monitoring. Consistent with the view that stock
illiquidity gives an incentive for institutions to engage in monitoring, we find that the relation
between stock liquidity and announcement returns is significantly more negative in the sub-
samples with potentially higher agency costs, as proxied by lower managerial stock ownership
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)) or higher product uniqueness (Titman and Wessels (1988)). In-
stitutional monitoring is of less importance for firms with fewer agency problems, and we see
for those firms a smaller or no effect of stock liquidity on the quality of the takeovers they
make. Finally, consistent with the effect of stock liquidity on both ex-ante and ex-post moni-
toring, we find that the operational performance following a takeover is negatively related to
the bidder’s stock liquidity, and that such effect is stronger for bidders that are more likely to
be monitored by institutions.
We conduct several robustness checks. Our results remain similar when instrumenting for
stock liquidity using the bidder’s level of institutional ownership one year before the takeover
(while controlling for the ownership by dedicated institutions, as defined by Bushee (2001)).
Further, we show that our results are not due to the market pricing the future increase in liquid-
ity after the merger. In addition, an analysis of the long-term returns following the completion
of the takeovers shows that the market does not systematically misprice the announcements
made by less liquid firms. Finally, we show that the negative relation between stock liquid-
ity and announcement returns is also present when using the bid-ask spread as an alternative
measure of stock liquidity.
There are a number of articles closely-related to ours. Fang et al. (2011) find, consistent
with our study, that higher stock liquidity leads to a decrease in firm innovation through an
increase in ownership in the firm by non-active institutions, which have a short-term focus.
Contrasting results are obtained by Bharath et al. (2010), who, using a different setting, show
that there is a positive relation between stock liquidity and firm value in the presence of block-
holders. Based on the exit models of Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009), they
argue that the reduction in the cost of exit by blockholders caused by an increase in stock
liquidity puts more pressure on managers to exert more effort ex-ante and avoid such exit.
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This study is different from theirs in that we focus on a specific managerial action (takeovers),
where we believe that monitoring is of greater importance. Furthermore, we show that the
importance of monitoring also depends on the context of the firm and on its governance. Ed-
mans et al. (2011) study the effect of stock liquidity on hedge fund activism and also find
support for the theoretical models of governance through the threat of exit. They find that an
increase in stock liquidity is associated with an increase in the probability that hedge funds
acquire a stake in the firm and that such purchase triggers positive abnormal stock returns.
However, conditional on having purchased a stake in the firm, they find that higher stock liq-
uidity is associated with a lower likelihood of direct intervention by the hedge fund, which
is consistent with our finding of a negative relation between stock liquidity and institutional
monitoring. Finally, we add to previous work by several authors that examine the role of in-
stitutional monitoring in acquisition decisions of firms. Duggal and Millar (1999) find that
higher levels of institutional ownership are not significantly associated with higher takeover
announcement returns for the acquirer. Chen et al. (2007) report that ownership of the bidder
by independent long-term institutions has a positive impact on the short- and long-term perfor-
mance of acquisitions. Qiu (2006) contends that it is ownership by large public pension funds
that improves the acquisition decisions of firms. We contribute to this literature by showing
that it is necessary to consider the incentives for institutions to engage in monitoring in order
to fully understand their impact on firms’ actions and value.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our hypotheses and section 3.3
the data. In Section 3.4 we present the main results, and in Section 3.5 the robustness tests.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Ownership, Stock Liquidity, and Acquirer
Returns
Early work on agency conflicts in corporations focuses on the relations between managers and
a dispersed group of shareholders, who were implicitly assumed to be too small to directly
interfere in the firm’s management (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). However, soon researchers
started to realize that highly dispersed ownership of firms is not as common as initially thought
and that ownership concentration by institutions could be a solution to the standard agency
problems (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). The impact of concentrated ownership on corpora-
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tions’ actions and value has since been a productive topic of research.4
Institutions are often active investors (Brickley et al. (1988); Gordon and Pound (1993);
Smith (1996)), whose intervention in the firm’s decisions is considered credible (Agrawal
and Mandelker (1990); Gillan and Starks (2000)). As such, institutional monitoring has been
associated with an increase in firm value by improving the quality of the firm’s actions and
by reducing agency costs. Smith (1996) analyzes the intervention of CalPERS on a sample of
firms and shows that shareholder wealth increases when its proposals are accepted by the firm
targeted. Opler and Sokobin (1995) show a significant value improvement in firms targeted by
institutional investors, which may arise from the private relationship that is built between them
and the managers of the firm. Aggarwal et al. (2010) find that higher institutional ownership
triggers governance improvements in the firms. Demiralp et al. (2011) find that institutional
ownership mitigates adverse stock reactions to seasoned equity offerings announcements and
is associated with better post-issue operational and stock price performance. The authors’
findings are consistent with the view that institutions reduce agency costs through monitoring
and that, as a result, their ownership has a positive influence on firm value.
However, institutional investors are a heterogeneous group. Empirical research has shown
that some institutions are more likely to be long-term investors and are thus more active in
monitoring their investments. Bushee (2001) reports that managers are less short-term oriented
when the stock of the firm is held by non-transient institutions, i.e., institutions that hold on
to their shares for longer periods of time. Burns et al. (2010) show a similar pattern with
regards to financial misreporting. Qiu (2006) reports that public pension funds ownership is
associated with a reduction in the probability of the firm making value-destroying acquisitions.
Gaspar et al. (2005) show that firms with short-term focused institutions receive lower takeover
premiums. Gaspar and Massa (2007) find evidence supportive of the view that better informed
institutions improve firm governance and allow for an increase in value-enhancing decisions.
Chen et al. (2007) argue that to understand the impact of institutional monitoring researchers
should focus on measures of ownership concentration by long-term independent institutions.
They find that a higher presence of such institutions in the ownership structure of the bidding
firm is associated with better short-term and long-term performance of mergers.
Despite the large body of evidence on the relation between institutional ownership and
corporate decisions and governance, the role of monitoring incentives on such relation is still
little understood (Becht et al. (2003)). Simply put: What are the factors that influence the
4See Holderness (2003) or Becht et al. (2003) for a survey of this literature.
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institutions’ propensity to engage in monitoring and the effort they put on it? The main focus
of the theoretical literature on the subject has been the relation between monitoring effort and
stock liquidity. Bhide (1993), Coffee (1991), and Kahn and Winton (1998) argue that there
is a tradeoff between stock market liquidity and active monitoring. These authors contend
that stock liquidity reduces the cost of an exit by a large shareholder. Reducing the costs of
exit for a large shareholder reduces its incentive to intervene and improve firm value when
confronted with negative news, as it will sell its position more easily before the market learns
of the negative news. As a result, holding all else equal, higher liquidity may reduce firm value
through its negative impact on monitoring incentives.5
On the other hand, Maug (1998) argues that higher stock liquidity increases monitoring
efforts because it mitigates free-riding problems and thus facilitates the creation of concen-
trated shareholdings, as blocks of shares can be accumulated more cheaply. Faure-Grimaud
and Gromb (2004) claim that an increase in the price informativeness of the stock increases
the incentive for an institutional owner to monitor. A more liquid stock has a price that is more
informative of the institution’s actions, thereby increasing its incentive to monitor the firm in
the first place. As a result, higher liquidity should result in more value-creative monitoring.
Recent theoretical models of governance through exit also derive a positive impact of stock
liquidity on the value created by managerial actions, although the underlying mechanism is
slightly different from direct institutional intervention. Edmans (2009) studies the behavior
of a large shareholder that receives a private signal on the value of the firm and trades on its
basis. He shows that, when the block size held by a shareholder is endogenous, higher stock
liquidity increases firm value by making the trading actions of the large shareholder more
informative of the signal it received in the first place. Since the sale of the stock by a large
shareholder is damaging to managers, ex-ante they will adopt value-increasing actions that
increase the probability of the large shareholder receiving a positive private signal. Admati
and Pfleiderer (2009) develop a similar model with a focus on agency costs and also conclude
that liquidity enhances governance through its role on the exit incentives of large shareholders.
A more liquid stock is associated with lower transactions costs in case of an exit by a large
shareholder, thereby decreasing the threshold at which the large shareholder sells its position.
Managers want to avoid such sale and are thus disciplined by the threat of exit of the large
shareholder. Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) posit that the governance effect of the threat of exit
5In the model of Kahn and Winton (1998) that is only the case if other speculators on the firm’s stock have
differential costs of gathering information. Such assumption seems reasonable as it can be interpreted as other
speculators having different levels of ability.
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is more important in reducing agency problems when these relate to a value-reducing action,
such as a misguided merger. 6
Ultimately, it is an empirical question how the relation between stock liquidity and in-
stitutional monitoring works, a question which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been
studied before.7 We conduct our analysis on the basis of two competing hypotheses. Based on
the view that there is a tradeoff between liquidity and monitoring, we expect that there is less
monitoring by institutional owners the more liquid the firm’s stock is. We refer to this as the
tradeoff hypothesis. Specifically, the tradeoff hypothesis predicts a negative relation between
takeover announcement returns and the liquidity of the stock of the bidder, as firms less subject
to institutional monitoring are likely to make worse acquisitions. Alternatively, based on the
strands of the literature that highlight the positive role of liquidity in the creation of monitoring
incentives for large shareholders, the complementarity hypothesis predicts a positive relation
between takeover announcement returns and the liquidity of the stock of the acquirer. Under
this hypothesis, firms with more liquid stock will make better acquisitions, in terms of value
creation, as a result of the monitoring incentives created by stock liquidity.
Takeovers also provide a unique opportunity to analyze whether and how stock liquidity
affects ex-post monitoring. Therefore, in addition to the tests above, we further investigate
these two competing hypotheses by examining the probability that a deal is withdrawn after
being announced (e.g., Kau et al. (2008); Luo (2005)) and by looking at CEO turnover as
a function of announcement returns (Lehn and Zhao (2006)). Conditional on a more nega-
tive market reaction to the announcement, stock liquidity can have two effects on the like-
lihood of completion of a deal and on CEO turnover. According to the tradeoff hypothesis,
a higher stock liquidity reduces the incentives for institutions to monitor management, and
should therefore result in less pressure for managers to withdraw a bad deal (a deal with more
negative announcement returns) or to be replaced following a bad acquisition. In contrast, the
complementarity hypothesis predicts that in firms with higher stock liquidity institutions are
more active monitors and, as result, are more likely to pressure managers into withdrawing a
6A theoretical study that does not directly study the impact of stock liquidity on monitoring but that examines
the choice between direct intervention and the threat of exit is Edmans and Manso (2011). The authors show
how the number of blockholders in a firm is associated with whether monitoring is conducted through direct
intervention or through the threat of exit. The existence of few blockholders reduces free-riding problems and
thus increases incentives to intervene in the management of the firm. However, multiple blockholders also exert
governance because of their more credible threat to punish managers for negative outcomes by selling their
positions.
7Recent work by Edmans et al. (2011) also studies the relation between monitoring and stock liquidity, but
focuses on hedge fund activism, which is only a subsample of all the instances of institutional monitoring.
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deal that was not viewed favorably by the market or to be fired after its completion.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data Sources
We retrieve from Securities Data Company (SDC) data on all the completed takeovers between
U.S. based firms that involve a public acquirer. Our sample period is from January 1998 to
December 2008. We exclude acquisitions for less than 50% of the equity, with a deal value
lower than 50 million dollars, or equivalent to less than 1% of the bidder’s assets. Further-
more, to avoid contamination, we exclude clustered acquisitions, defined as deals announced
within five trading days by the same bidder. We also exclude leveraged buyouts, privatizations,
spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, and repurchases. We require data on
the bidder to exist on CRSP and Compustat. Finally, we exclude offers that involve securities
as a method of payment (either fully equity-financed or mixed offers) if they also involve a
publicly-traded target.8 Particularly, when using takeovers in the context of analyzing whether
stock liquidity affects the incentives for institutional monitoring, there are several reasons for
this exclusion. Equity offers for public targets are often associated with negative abnormal re-
turns due to the signaling of overvaluation of the bidder (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Because
the more overvalued a firm is, the higher the incentive it has to use stock as a method of pay-
ment, the abnormal return at the time of the announcement is a poor proxy for how the market
perceives the quality of the acquisition (Savor and Lu (2009)). More importantly, in these
offers a significant component of the market reaction is caused by merger arbitrageurs short-
ing the stock of the acquirer (Mitchell et al. (2004)).9 Not only does the effect of short-selling
pressure on prices further weakens the interpretation of announcement returns as a sign of deal
quality, but it is also an effect that affects bidder returns in an inverse relation to stock liquid-
ity (the stock price of illiquid bidders suffers more from the selling pressure of arbitrageurs),
8In Section 3.5 we show that this selection criteria is unlikely to bias our sample given that stock liquidity
does not affect the choice of method of payment and that our results are robust to restricting the whole sample to
all-cash offers.
9The arbitrageurs’ strategy is to capture the difference between the value offered by the acquirer and the
target’s stock price. In order to protect themselves from changes in the relative market value of the acquirer and
the target, they short the stock from the acquirer at a ratio that depends on the conversion rate offered by the
acquirer for the target shares. Given that this shorting is not driven by the fundamental value of the acquirer or by
the market assessment of the deal, its impact on prices is solely due to demand curves not being perfectly elastic
(Mitchell et al. (2004)).
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thereby biasing the coefficient of this measure, which is our variable of interest. We thus opt
to leave out deals involving both equity as a method of payment and public targets. Our main
sample comprises 2,601 completed acquisitions for which we can analyze announcement re-
turns. We focus on completed acquisitions to mitigate concerns that different expectations
regarding the probability of completion of a deal affect the announcement returns.
We get the institutional ownership data from Thomson 13-F filings. 13-F filings include
all the long common stock positions of institutional investment managers with assets under
management above USD$100 million. All the positions of 10,000 shares or more, or worth
$200,000 or more, have to be disclosed. Institutional investment managers include all the in-
stitutions that invest on their own account or that exercise discretion over the account of other
person or entity. This definition thus includes, among other institutions, banks, insurance
companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds. The remaining data is obtained
from SDC (deal-related data), CRSP (stock prices and trading volume), Compustat (account-
ing data), and ExecuComp (insider stock ownership and CEO information). All accounting
variables refer to the financial year before the announcement date. All variables are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% percentile and are defined in the Appendix.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 3.1 we present the summary statistics for our sample of acquisitions. We measure an-
nouncement returns by calculating the abnormal return on the stock in the 5 days surrounding
the acquisition announcement date (obtained from SDC). We use a market model based on the
CRSP value-weighted index.10 The estimation windows for the factor’s exposure comprise at
least 100 trading days (maximum 200) and end in day -46 relative to the announcement date.
Our measure of liquidity is the Amihud (2002) measure. We compute it by taking the average
of the daily Amihud measure over a period of 100 trading days finishing 46 days before the
announcement date of the deal. Days with no trading are excluded from this calculation. We
multiply its value by 1012 and take its square root to account for the skewness in its distribu-
tion. Since a higher value of this measure corresponds to a lower level of liquidity (higher
price impact of trades), we also multiply it by minus one to facilitate its interpretation as a
measure of liquidity.
Following the literature on corporate acquisitions (Masulis et al. (2007), Moeller et al.
10All our results are robust to using the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model to calculate expected
returns.
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Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics
This Table presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The sample includes all the completed
takeovers between U.S. based firms that involve a public acquirer occurring between 1998 and 2008.
We exclude acquisitions for less than 50% of the equity, and with a deal value lower than 50 million
dollars or equivalent to less than 1% of the bidder’s assets. We exclude offers involving securities as
method of payment if the target is publicly listed. We also exclude acquisitions that are announced
within five trading days by the same bidder. All variables are described in the Appendix.
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum N
Deviation
Bidder CAR [-2; +2] 1.211% 7.243% -24.230% 27.390% 2601
Bidder Stock Liquidity -0.079 0.140 -1.221 -0.004 2601
Percentage of Cash 51.754% 46.400% 0% 100% 2601
Percentage of Cash (Non-Public Target) 46.510% 45.896% 0% 100% 2346
Target = Public 0.098 0.297 0.000 1.000 2601
Target = Subsidiary 0.444 0.497 0.000 1.000 2601
Relative Size 0.326 0.640 0.011 6.257 2601
Bidder Total Assets 4154.935 8800.635 30.610 84785.600 2601
Bidder Leverage 0.215 0.196 0.000 0.779 2601
Bidder Market to Book 2.247 2.864 0.235 20.524 2601
Bidder Cash Flow 0.091 0.087 -0.388 0.319 2601
Bidder Insider Ownership 3.101% 6.000% 0.000% 33.446% 1704
Bidder Dedicated Institutional HHI 0.007 0.010 0.000 0.056 2601
Bidder Dedicated Institutional Ownership 8.941% 7.538% 0% 35.674% 2601
Bidder Institutional Ownership 68.547% 25.338% 0.987% 118.094% 2601
(2004), Moeller et al. (2005)) we include a large set of variables to control for other effects
that may impact announcement returns. These include the percentage of cash included in the
acquisition offer, a dummy for whether the target is publicly listed, a dummy for whether
the target is a subsidiary, the relative size of the target relative to the bidder, and a range of
variables related to the bidding firm. The latter include size, leverage, market to book ratio,
cash flow scaled by total assets, and insider ownership. Finally, we control for institutional
monitoring by including the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of ownership concentration of the
bidder’s stock by dedicated institutions (Bushee (1998); Bushee (2001)). We calculate it by
summing at the firm level the square of the holdings (expressed as a percentage of total shares
outstanding) of every institution classified as dedicated.11 This measure is expected to better
11We follow the definition of Bushee (2001), who uses principal component analysis based on a large number
of variables for this classification. An institution is labeled dedicated if it belongs to the group with lower share
turnover and more concentrated holdings. This data is kindly made available by Brian Bushee on his website
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capture institutional monitoring than a measure based on the level of institutional ownership.
Previous literature shows that ownership concentration is a better predictor of monitoring than
ownership levels (Burns et al. (2010); Chen et al. (2007)), and that dedicated institutions are
the ones that monitor firms more intensely (Bushee (2001); Demiralp et al. (2011)). The
descriptive statistics for all the variables are in Table 3.1.
The average announcement return in our sample is 1.21%, close to the average announce-
ment return of non-listed targets of 1.45% in Chang (1998) (public targets constitute only 10%
of our sample). Bidder characteristics are also in line with previous studies. For example, in
our sample the averages for the bidder’s leverage and market to book ratio are 0.22 and 2.25. In
comparison, the equivalent averages reported by Masulis et al. (2007) are 0.15 and 1.98. The
higher leverage and market to book in our sample may be due to our exclusion of acquisitions
of publicly-listed targets paid for with equity, which typically are made by larger firms with
lower leverage and fewer growth opportunities. This exclusion also results in a lower average
for the bidder’s total assets in our sample, at slightly more than 4 billion dollars, compared to
Masulis et al. (2007) average of 9 billion dollars. Our median of 1,438 million (untabulated)
is much closer to the one in their sample (1,880). Also, in our sample, institutions own on av-
erage 68.55% of the outstanding shares (8.94% is owned by dedicated institutions), which is
slightly above the 60% level reported by Gaspar and Massa (2007) for all Compustat firms.12
Overall, despite its unique selection criteria, our sample seems comparable to the samples
used in previous studies.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Bivariate Analysis of Announcement Returns
We start by examining, in a bivariate setting, how bidder announcement returns vary depend-
ing on the liquidity of the bidder. For this purpose, we split the observations based on the
bidders’ pre-announcement stock liquidity. Since liquidity is highly correlated with firm size,
and firm size is a known determinant of bidder announcement returns (Moeller et al. (2004)),
we first construct three size portfolios and then sort on the basis of stock liquidity within each
(http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/).
12The maximum institutional ownership in our sample is above 100% both because of inaccuracies in the
database and because of the double counting arising from institutions lending out shares to parties that short-sell
them in the market and that end up being owned by other institutions.
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size portfolio. We then compare the announcement returns (CAR) and the likelihood of ob-
serving a negative CAR between the top and bottom liquidity terciles within each size tercile.13
Results are in Table 3.2. We find preliminary support for the tradeoff hypothesis. In Panel A
Table 3.2
Bivariate Analysis
This Table presents a bivariate comparison of abnormal returns and of the likelihood of experiencing
negative abnormal returns at the time of the announcement of an acquisition. The sample includes all
the completed takeovers between U.S. based firms that involve a public acquirer occurring between
1998 and 2008. We exclude acquisitions for less than 50% of the equity, and with a deal value lower
than 50 million dollars or equivalent to less than 1% of the bidder’s assets. We exclude offers including
securities as method of payment if the target is publicly listed. We also exclude acquisitions that are
announced within five trading days by the same bidder. The sample is double sorted on the basis of the
size and stock liquidity of the bidding firm. High Liquidity (Size) is the top tercile of the observations
sorted on the basis of the variable Bidder Stock Liquidity (Bidder Total Assets). Medium Liquidity
(Size) is the middle tercile of the observations sorted on the basis of the variable Bidder Stock Liquidity
(Bidder Total Assets). Low Liquidity (Size) is the bottom tercile of the observations sorted on the basis
of the variable Bidder Stock Liquidity (Bidder Total Assets). Panel A presents the average Bidder CAR
[-2, +2] for each cell and the t-statistics and associated p-values of a t-test that the average of the CAR in
the low liquidity subsamples is equal to the average of the CAR in the high liquidity subsamples. Panel
B presents the Bidder Negative CAR average for each cell and the χ2-statistics and associated p-values
of a χ2 test that the fraction of negative CARs in the low liquidity subsamples is equal to the fraction
of negative CARs in the high liquidity subsamples. All variables are described in the Appendix. Each
cell has between 285 and 293 observations. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A - Bidder CAR [-2; +2]
Low Medium High Low Minus
Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity High T-statistic P-value
Small Size 4.638% 2.162% 1.076% 3.562% 4.357*** 0.000
Medium Size 1.336% 0.669% 0.213% 1.123% 2.052** 0.041
Large Size 0.594% 0.569% -0.368% 0.962% 2.285** 0.023
Panel B - Fraction of Bidders with Negative CAR
Low Medium High Low Minus
Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity High χ2-statistic P-value
Small Size 31.488% 41.724% 46.875% -15.387% 14.334*** 0.000
Medium Size 39.100% 42.321% 48.421% -9.321% 5.066** 0.024
Large Size 50.519% 44.138% 51.042% -0.523% 0.016 0.900
of Table 3.2 we show that announcement returns are declining on the bidder’s stock liquid-
ity in the three size terciles. The difference between the two extreme terciles is statistically
13We use total assets as a measure of size, but using the market capitalization of the bidder does not change
any of our conclusions throughout the chapter.
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significant within each of the three size groupings. In Panel B we examine the likelihood of
observing a negative CAR at announcement depending on the bidder’s stock liquidity. Consis-
tent with a tradeoff between liquidity and institutional monitoring, we find that bidders with
higher stock liquidity are more likely to experience a negative CAR at deal announcement
within each of the size terciles. The difference between the two extreme terciles is statistically
significant in both the small and medium size groups, but not in the large size group. It must
be noted though that there may be more differences in the characteristics of the acquirer and
of the deal between the two different groups that drive our bivariate results. We thus run a
multivariate analysis in the next section to control for these differences and understand the
role of stock liquidity as an incentive for monitoring.
3.4.2 Multivariate Analysis of Announcement Returns
We first run an Ordinary Least Squares regression using the cumulative abnormal returns of
the bidder at the time of the takeover announcement, CAR, as the dependent variable. We
are interested in the coefficient of the variable Bidder Stock Liquidity, which captures the
liquidity of the stock of the bidder before the takeover announcement. We use the set of
control variables commonly employed in the literature that we introduced in Section 3.3. In
all the models throughout the chapter we use year and industry fixed effects, the latter based
on the acquirer’s Fama and French (1997) industry, but we do not report them. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the acquirer level.
In Models (1) to (4) of Table 3.3 we progressively introduce all the control variables. We
consistently find that the higher the liquidity of the bidder’s stock, the lower the announcement
returns. With a t-statistic of 2.67 or above in all the models, this relation is consistent with
our bivariate results and in line with the predictions of the tradeoff hypothesis. This hypoth-
esis states that liquidity reduces the incentive for institutional holders to monitor the firm’s
actions, resulting in corporate takeover decisions with a less positive impact on shareholder
wealth. Results are not consistent with the predictions of the complementarity hypothesis, un-
der which a higher degree of liquidity would encourage institutional shareholders to increase
their monitoring efforts. In terms of economic significance, and using Model (3) as reference,
a one standard deviation change in the level of the Bidder Stock Liquidity is associated with
a 0.38% change in Bidder CAR. Given that the average Bidder CAR is 1.21% (with a stan-
dard deviation of 7.24%), it is clear that the level of stock liquidity of the bidding firm has a
significant economic impact on acquisition announcement returns.
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Next, we run a similar analysis to the one described above, but using as dependent variable
a dummy variable for whether the market reaction to the takeover announcement is negative
(Bidder Negative CAR). It is important to check whether our results hold in this specification
because of the potential nonlinearities in the relation between stock liquidity and announce-
ment returns and because of the skewness present in both variables. In Models (5) to (8) of
Table 3.3 we report that firms with higher stock liquidity are more likely to experience nega-
tive announcement returns. This relation is statistically very robust, with the t-statistics of the
coefficients always above 2.48.
Although the negative relation between stock liquidity and announcement returns is con-
sistent with our tradeoff hypothesis, there may be alternative mechanisms through which liq-
uidity impacts the quality of the acquisitions made. A unique prediction of the tradeoff hypoth-
esis is that, if stock illiquidity impacts announcement returns through its role as a monitoring
incentive, it should affect announcement returns only when there is a large enough fraction of
shares held by institutions as to encourage them to collect private information on the firm’s
activity. It is however challenging to define what would be a "large enough" stake in the firm.
We assume that the likelihood that an institution incurs in costly information collection about
the firm is increasing on the relative importance that the firm has on that institution’s portfolio.
If an institution has a very small share of its total portfolio invested in a single firm, it is less
likely that it will ever monitor managers, regardless of the liquidity of its participation. Based
on this idea, we create a measure capturing how important a firm is in an institutions’ portfo-
lio, which we call Portfolio Share. The Portfolio Share of institution i in firm n in quarter t is
defined as following:
Portfolio Sharei,n,t =
Shares Ownedi,n,t ∗ Price per Sharen,t
[
∑N
n=1(Shares Ownedi,n,t ∗ Price per Sharen,t)]i,t
(3.1)
We obtain the information needed to calculate the Portfolio Share from the Thomson 13-
F filings. A higher value for this variable means that a larger fraction of the institution’s
holdings is committed to firm n at time t. We aggregate this information at the bidding firm
level by calculating the highest portfolio share per firm (main results are unchanged if we
instead aggregate it as an Herfindahl-Hirschman index at the firm level). We call this new
variable Bidder Top Portfolio Share. This variable reflects the weight that the firm n has
on the institution i, which at time t is the institution with the largest fraction of its portfolio
invested in the firm. The larger the variable Bidder Top Portfolio Share is, the more likely
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it is that an institution will be engaged in collecting information on the firm’s actions.14 Its
average in our sample is 7.949%, with a median of 4.525%. It must be noted that this variable
captures an institution’s own interest in monitoring a portfolio firm irrespective of free-rider
concerns; assuming a fixed cost component of monitoring (Chen et al. (2007)), the net benefit
of monitoring for the institution is proportional to the importance of the firm in its portfolio,
regardless of who else owns the stock.
We partition our sample in two halves based on the variable Bidder Top Portfolio Share in
the quarter before the acquisition was announced. We expect to find little or no effect of the
bidder’s stock liquidity in the subsample of firms in which institutional shareholdings are less
significant in the context of the institutions’ total portfolios. Once an institution has a large
enough stake to potentially engage in monitoring, the incentive effect of stock liquidity should
matter and be reflected in a significant relation between stock liquidity and announcement re-
turns. In addition, we partition our sample based on the ownership concentration of dedicated
institutions (Bushee (1998); Bushee (2001)). Although we consider this partition conceptually
inferior to the partition based on Bidder Top Portfolio Share, it gives us two subsamples for
which the monitoring role of institutions ought to be different based on the higher importance
of active institutions in the subsample with higher concentration relative to the subsample
with lower concentration. We thus expect the effect of stock liquidity to be concentrated on
the former.
In Table 3.4 we repeat the main specification of Model 4 from Table 3.3 for the splits based
on Bidder Top Portfolio Share and on Bidder Dedicated Institutional HHI.15 In line with our
expectation, the effect of stock liquidity on bidder CAR is not significant when institutions are
less likely to collect information on the managers’ actions (Model (1) and (3)). Once the likeli-
hood of having institutions actively following the managers’ actions increases (Models (2) and
(4)), the effect of stock illiquidity on bidder CAR increases in importance and becomes sta-
tistically significant. The difference in the coefficients of the variable Bidder Stock Liquidity
between Models (1) and (2) is statistically significant, and between Models (3) and (4) almost
so. More specifically, the p-value of a t-test that the coefficient is significantly lower in the
14This variable is, of course, correlated with the size of the bidding firm, as larger firms are more likely to be
a more significant portion of institutions’ portfolio. However, this correlation is not very high (0.33), and simply
reflects the stronger incentive that institutions have to monitor larger firms.
15Throughout the chapter we split the sample based on different measures rather than using interaction terms
because, given the differences in the characteristics of firms with different levels of institutional ownership or of
liquidity, we do not want to impose a linear structure on the relation between the explanatory variables and the
different dependent variables equal for all the firms.
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subsamples with Lower Bidder Top Portfolio Share and Lower Bidder Dedicated Institutional
HHI is 0.037 and 0.141 respectively. Partitioning on the basis of an Herfindahl-Hirschman
concentration index of the institutions’ Portfolio Share in each bidder leads to similar results,
also if we restrict it to be calculated using only dedicated institutions (unreported). Overall the
results are consistent with the view that stock liquidity is an important monitoring incentive
only when there are active institutions with a large enough level of ownership in the firm to
put resources into monitoring (Bushee (1998)).16
Table 3.4
Multivariate CAR Analysis sorted on Maximum Portfolio Share
This Table presents a multivariate analysis of abnormal returns at the time of the announce-
ment of an acquisition. The sample includes all the completed takeovers between U.S. based
firms that involve a public acquirer occurring between 1998 and 2008. We exclude acqui-
sitions for less than 50% of the equity, and with a deal value lower than 50 million dollars
or equivalent to less than 1% of the bidder’s assets. We exclude offers including securities
as method of payment if the target is publicly listed. We also exclude acquisitions that are
announced within five trading days by the same bidder. Models (1) includes only the bot-
tom half of the sample sorted on the largest relative ownership by institutions as given by
the maximum of the variable Portfolio Share (defined in Equation (1)) at each observation’s
level. Model (2) includes the corresponding top half. Model (3) includes only the bottom
half of the sample sorted on the variable Bidder Dedicated Institutional HHI. Model (4)
includes the corresponding top half. All variables are described in the Appendix. All mod-
els are estimated using an Ordinary Least Squares regression and include year and industry
fixed-effects, the latter based on the bidder’s Fama and French (1997) industry. T-statistics
are reported in parenthesis and are based on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bidder Bidder Bidder Bidder
CAR CAR Negative Negative
[-2; +2] [-2; +2] CAR CAR
Low Bidder High Bidder Low Bidder High Bidder
Top Portfolio Top Portfolio Top Portfolio Top Portfolio
Share Share Share Share
Bidder Stock Liquidity -0.036 -0.158** -0.035 -0.076**
(-1.587) (-2.460) (-1.505) (-2.541)
Continued on the next page
16Because of concerns with reduced statistical power, for the tests in this and in the following sections (except
the sections on deal completion and on CEO turnover) we use only Bidder CAR [-2; +2] as a measure of deal
quality rather than the dummy variable for whether the CAR at announcement is negative (Bidder Negative
CAR). The latter generally yields results of the same sign but with weaker statistical significance, as expected
when not using all the information contained in the data.
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Table 3.4 – Continued from the previous page
Percentage of Cash 0.012** 0.000 0.011** -0.000
(2.221) (0.031) (2.171) (-0.010)
Target = Public -0.015* 0.006 -0.003 -0.004
(-1.752) (1.052) (-0.382) (-0.631)
Target = Subsidiary 0.009** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.008*
(1.984) (3.196) (2.997) (1.834)
Relative Size 0.051*** 0.022 0.038*** 0.038**
(3.512) (1.413) (2.712) (2.321)
Bidder Total Assets -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.460) (-0.944) (-0.867) (-0.240)
Bidder Leverage 0.006 -0.009 0.028* -0.031*
(0.397) (-0.555) (1.854) (-1.944)
Bidder Market to Book -0.005** -0.001 -0.000 -0.004**
(-2.256) (-0.419) (-0.364) (-2.467)
Bidder Cash Flow 0.004 -0.022 -0.011 0.034
(0.121) (-0.664) (-0.347) (0.877)
Bidder Dedicated 0.211 -0.197 1.183 0.173
Institutional HHI (0.773) (-1.014) (0.499) (0.803)
Constant 0.036 -0.032 0.024 -0.029
(1.395) (-1.448) (1.301) (-1.311)
Observations 1,301 1,300 1,284 1,286
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.042 0.055 0.074
3.4.3 Analysis of Probability of Completion
The previous analyses give strong support to our first hypothesis that stock liquidity acts as
a deterrent for institutional monitoring. So far we show this effect by presenting a negative
relation between the quality of takeovers completed by the firm and its stock liquidity and by
demonstrating that this effect is concentrated in the firms that institutions are more likely to
collect private information on. We now focus on testing further predictions associated with
our tradeoff hypothesis leaving aside the complementarity hypothesis, for which we find no
empirical support whatsoever in this setting.
An additional way to test whether the tradeoff hypothesis describes managerial behavior
is to examine how managers react to market information (Chen et al. (2007); Kau et al. (2008);
Luo (2005)). If there is an increased monitoring of managerial actions by institutions, man-
agers are more likely to be pressured into withdrawing a deal that has been considered a bad
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deal by the market, i.e., a deal with more negative announcement returns. According to the
tradeoff hypothesis, more negative market reactions should be associated with a higher likeli-
hood of withdrawing a deal for the firms with lower stock liquidity, in which institutions are
more active monitors, but less so for the firms with higher stock liquidity, in which institutions
are more likely to exit rather than intervene.
We test this conjecture by running a Probit analysis on the likelihood of completing an
announced deal using the market reaction at announcement as the key independent variable.
We use the same sample as before, but we also include 202 deals that meet the selection criteria
outlined in Section 3.3 but that were withdrawn. Note that because of the perfect colinearity
between some of the industry fixed effects and the dependent variable the total sample size is
reduced (these observations are dropped out of the estimation). We sort the sample into two
halves based on the bidder’s stock liquidity and use the same explanatory variables as before.
In Models (1) and (2) of Table 3.5 we use the Bidder CAR [-2; +2] as an independent variable
to measure the market reaction to deal announcement. However, we expect that there is a non-
linear relation between Bidder CAR and likelihood of withdrawal, with institutions becoming
significantly more dissatisfied with a deal that triggers negative announcement returns. As
such, in Models (3) and (4) we use a dummy for whether the Bidder CAR is negative at
announcement (Bidder Negative CAR), and in Models (5) and (6) a dummy for whether the
Bidder CAR is below -5% at announcement (Bidder Extreme Negative CAR). We find that,
in line with the prediction of the tradeoff hypothesis, a more negative market reaction to deal
announcement is positively associated with the likelihood of withdrawing the deal, but only
for firms in the subsample with lower stock liquidity. This relation holds independently of
whether we measure the market reaction with a continuous variable or using a dummy for
negative or extremely negative market reactions. The coefficients in the subsamples with lower
stock liquidity are statistically different from the coefficients in the corresponding subsample
with higher stock liquidity. The p-values of a test that the coefficient of Bidder CAR [-2; +2]
in the low stock market liquidity subsample is higher than in the high stock market liquidity
subsample is 0.017. An equivalent test on the coefficients of the Bidder Negative CAR dummy
and of the Bidder Extreme Negative CAR dummy yields similar results, with p-values of 0.008
and 0.013 respectively. In an unreported analysis we find that the relation between stock
market reaction and deal completion is concentrated in the subsample with higher Bidder Top
Portfolio Share within the subsample of firms with lower stock liquidity, consistent with our
hypothesis of illiquidity working as an incentive for institutions to monitor managers.
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3.4.4 Analysis of CEO Turnover
So far we show that monitoring by institutions is associated with higher announcement returns
(ex-ante monitoring) and with a higher likelihood of withdrawing value-destroying deals (ex-
post monitoring). Another way of examining whether institutions are engaged in ex-post mon-
itoring is to examine CEO turnover subsequent to the completion of an acquisition. Lehn and
Zhao (2006) report that there is a significant negative relation between acquisition announce-
ment returns and subsequent CEO turnover, consistent with corporate governance mechanisms
punishing CEOs for value-destroying acquisitions. Following our tradeoff hypothesis that
stock liquidity serves as an impediment for institutional monitoring, we expect that the nega-
tive relation between announcement returns and CEO turnover is stronger for firms with lower
stock liquidity (in which institutions have stronger incentives to monitor) than for firms with
higher stock liquidity (in which institutions have fewer incentives to monitor).
We split our sample based on pre-acquisition stock liquidity (variable Bidder Stock Liq-
uidity) and we run a Probit analysis with CEO Turnover as dependent variable for each sub-
sample. We define CEO Turnover as a dummy variable taking one if the executive with the
CEO title changes in any of the five years following the acquisition announcement, zero oth-
erwise. We obtain this data from ExecuComp, and we exclude observations which disappear
from ExecuComp in any of the subsequent five years or whose CEOs were 58 years old or
above. We apply these criteria to ensure that we restrict our turnover variable to situations
in which the CEO is replaced involuntarily, and not because the firm got delisted or acquired
or the CEO retired. As independent variables we include the same set of variables used in
previous analyses, plus the returns on the acquirer’s stock the three years following the an-
nouncement and the CEO’s age and tenure, following Lehn and Zhao (2006). We have 770
observations of completed deals for which the analysis can be run.
In Table 3.6 we report the results on the likelihood of CEO turnover following an ac-
quisition. As in Lehn and Zhao (2006), we find a negative relation between announcement
returns and CEO turnover, regardless of whether announcement returns are measured using
the Bidder CAR or dummy variables capturing a negative CAR or an extremely negative CAR
(<-5%). However, in support of the view that liquidity reduces the incentives for institutional
monitoring, this negative relation is only significant in the subsample of firms with lower stock
liquidity (Models (1), (3), and (5)). Due to the small sample size, the p-value of a test that the
coefficient on Bidder CAR [-2; +2] is lower in the low stock market liquidity subsample than
in the high stock market liquidity subsample is above standard levels of statistical significance
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(0.201). However, the p-values of a test that the coefficient on Bidder Negative CAR and
Bidder Extreme Negative CAR is higher in the low stock market liquidity subsample than in
the high stock market liquidity subsample is 0.064 and 0.140, respectively, corroborating our
interpretation that liquidity works as an incentive for institutions to monitor and results in the
negative effect of announcement returns on CEO turnover being stronger when stock liquid-
ity is lower. As with the analysis on the probability of completion, we find that the effect of
announcement returns on CEO turnover is concentrated in the subsample with higher Bidder
Top Portfolio Share within the subsample of firms with lower stock liquidity, again supporting
our hypothesis that illiquidity works as an incentive for institutions to monitor management.
3.4.5 Cross-Sectional Variation in the Effect of Liquidity
In the previous sections we show that liquidity is negatively associated with takeover an-
nouncement returns, and that such effect is concentrated in the firms in which institutions may
potentially engage in costly information acquisition. We also show that managers in less liquid
firms are more responsive to market signals about the quality of an announced deal, presum-
ably because of closer institutional monitoring, and are more likely to be fired in the event of
a bad acquisition. However, it is still possible that there are omitted factors that impact our re-
sults and that are not related to stock liquidity reducing the incentives for institutional owners
to monitor firms’ management. Although it is impossible to completely dispel all alternative
explanations, in this section we run further tests that provide additional evidence consistent
with our interpretation of the results. We use one-sided tests, which are based on the idea
that, if liquidity is related to the institutions’ incentives to monitor, its effect on announcement
returns should be concentrated on firms that have potentially more severe agency problems.
In other words, if a firm has a strong system of governance or external monitoring, the mon-
itoring incentive given to institutions by the stock’s illiquidity should unambiguously be of
relatively lower importance.
We start by testing whether the effect of liquidity is more pronounced for firms with a
weaker corporate governance system. We do so by partitioning the sample on the basis of two
different measures. First, we split the sample into two halves based on the share of common
equity held by firm managers. A higher level of insider ownership implies that managers’
interests are more closely aligned with shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).
As such, the importance of monitoring incentives should be lower in the subsample with higher
insider ownership. Second, we split the sample based on the governance index (GIM index)
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developed by Gompers et al. (2003). This measure is the number of the anti-takeover defenses
present in the firm ranging from 1 to 24, with a higher value being equivalent to a worse
governance system. Gompers et al. (2003) show that a higher GIM index reduces the value of
a firm, while Masulis et al. (2007) link it to a higher propensity for the managers to engage in
empire-building. We run our analysis separately on the half with better governance (low GIM
index) and on the half with worse governance (high GIM index) to understand how corporate
governance is linked to the role of stock liquidity on monitoring incentives.
Next, we analyze the role of product market pressure in the relation between stock liquid-
ity and announcement returns. Recent literature shows that corporate governance is more
important for firms that operate in less competitive product markets (Giroud and Mueller
(2011)). Managers in firms that operate in competitive industries already have less slack due
to demands put by vibrant competition; if a firm has high agency costs in such environment,
it is put out of business. In the literature, industry competition is often measured using the
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index based on all the Compustat firms. However, Ali
et al. (2009) highlight that using Compustat data for calculating industry concentration may
lead to incorrect inferences due to the exclusion of almost all private firms, and suggest using
the U.S. Census database instead. Nevertheless, there are also some problems with relying
on Census data, as it only includes manufacturing companies and is only released every 5
years (Giroud and Mueller (2011)). Given these problems with calculating the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, we use instead the ratio of selling expenses to sales as a proxy for the
degree of product market pressure in a firm’s industry (Titman and Wessels (1988)). This ratio
captures product uniqueness - a firm in an industry with higher selling expenses as a fraction
of sales has more unique products, and is therefore less subject to product market pressure
and more subject to agency problems (Masulis et al. (2007)). The advantage of this variable is
that it captures the market conditions in the industry also taking into account the competition
by foreign and non-listed firms. Arguably such competition impacts the decisions regarding
selling expenses for all the firms in the industry. We compute the degree of product uniquess
of each observation by taking the median of the ratio of selling expenses to sales in the bid-
ding firm’s industry (defined following Fama and French (1997)) each year. We then sort our
sample into two halves based on this measure, and run our main regression separately for the
bottom half (low product uniqueness) and for the top half (high product uniqueness).
In Models (1) and (2) of Table 3.7 we sort the sample based on the level of insider owner-
ship, and we find that the negative relation between stock liquidity and announcement returns
is significantly more negative in the regression including the subsample with low insider own-
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ership than in the regression including the subsample with higher insider ownership (p-value
for a one-sided t-test of difference in means is 0.066). In Models (3) and (4) we find that
the negative impact of stock liquidity on announcement returns is not statistically different
from zero in either governance subsample, potentially due to the lower power arising from
the smaller sample size. Finally, we analyze the effect of product market pressure on the im-
portance of monitoring in Models (5) and (6) of Table 3.7. Stock liquidity as a monitoring
incentive is only important for firms that operate in industries with more unique products, in
which product market competition per se is not enough to minimize agency costs. The coef-
ficient on Bidder Stock Liquidity is significantly lower for the top half of the sample sorted
on (industry) product uniqueness than for the bottom tercile (p-value for a one-sided t-test of
difference in means is 0.062). It must be noted that insider ownership, corporate governance
(GIM index), and product market pressure (product uniqueness) are capturing different aspects
of the firm’s environment, as the correlations between these variables are low (the maximum
correlation is -0.137 between the GIM Index and Insider Ownership). Overall the evidence
presented in Table 3.7 is consistent with our intuition that monitoring incentives, such as stock
illiquidity, are of greater importance when the firm’s agency problems are likely to be greater.
3.4.6 Operational Performance Analysis
If increased incentives for institutional monitoring result in better acquisitions, this effect
should be present in the operational performance of the bidding firm in addition to being
reflected in announcement returns. We test whether stock liquidity is associated with changes
in the industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) of the acquiring firms using the same method
as Chen et al. (2007). More specifically, we estimate a cross-sectional AR(1) model in which
the average ROA in the three years following the completion of the merger is regressed on the
average ROA in the three years prior to the completion of the merger. We take out the industry
medians from each of these measures by subtracting the industry-year median. Industries are
defined at two digit SIC level. We use the residual of the regression (adjusted R-squared of
0.57) as the measure of change in return on assets (Change in ROA). We then regress this
variable on the set of variables of Model (2) of Table 3.3. Results are in Table 3.8.
Consistent with the liquidity tradeoff hypothesis, in Model (1) of Table 3.8 we find that
the bidder’s stock liquidity is negatively associated with the change in operating performance
of the acquirer following the takeover. In Models (2) and (3) we split our sample based on the
median of the Bidder Top Portfolio Share to understand if the negative impact of stock liquidity
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Table 3.8
Operational Performance Analysis
This Table presents a multivariate analysis of change in operational performance following
an acquisition. The sample includes all the completed takeovers between U.S. based firms
that involve a public acquirer occurring between 1998 and 2008. We exclude acquisitions
for less than 50% of the equity, and with a deal value lower than 50 million dollars or
equivalent to less than 1% of the bidder’s assets. We exclude offers including securities
as method of payment if the target is publicly listed. We also exclude acquisitions that
are announced within five trading days by the same bidder. Bidder Change in ROA is the
residual of a cross-sectional regression of the average industry-adjusted return on assets in
the three years following the completion of the merger on the average industry-adjusted
return on assets in the three years prior to the completion of the merger. Return on assets is
equal to Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) scaled by Total Assets. It is industry-
adjusted by subtracting the median ROA of the two-digit SIC code industry of the bidder
in the same year. Bidder Top Portfolio Share Group is equal to one if the observation is in
the bottom half of the sample sorted by Bidder Top Portfolio Share and to two if it is in the
top half, as defined in Table 3.4. All other variables are described in the Appendix. Models
(2) includes only the bottom half of the sample sorted on the largest relative ownership by
institutions as given by the maximum of the variable Portfolio Share (defined in Equation
(1)) at each observation’s level. Model (3) includes the corresponding top half. Model
(3) includes only the bottom half of the sample sorted on the variable Bidder Dedicated
Institutional HHI. All models are estimated using an Ordinary Least Squares regression and
include year and industry fixed-effects, the latter based on the bidder’s Fama and French
(1997) industry. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and are based on standard errors
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bidder Bidder Bidder Bidder
Change Change Change Change
in ROA in ROA in ROA in ROA
Complete Low Bidder Top High Bidder Top Complete
Sample Portfolio Share Portfolio Share Sample
Bidder Stock Liquidity -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.203*** 0.088
(-4.050) (-3.628) (-2.777) (1.354)
Bidder Top Portfolio Share -0.002
Group (-0.415)
Bidder Stock Liquidity * -0.146**
Top Portfolio Share Group (-2.231)
Percentage of Cash 0.005* 0.004 0.006 0.006*
(1.725) (0.851) (1.224) (1.835)
Target = Public -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.153) (-0.684) (-0.393) (-0.133)
Target = Subsidiary -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000
Continued on the next page
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(-0.011) (-0.549) (0.226) (0.047)
Relative Size -0.032*** -0.028** -0.043** -0.033***
(-2.977) (-2.105) (-2.563) (-3.121)
Bidder Total Assets 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.831) (1.167) (0.264) (1.056)
Bidder Leverage -0.020 0.000 -0.052** -0.022*
(-1.587) (0.013) (-2.581) (-1.725)
Bidder Market to Book -0.003* 0.002 -0.005** -0.003*
(-1.847) (0.450) (-2.497) (-1.734)
Bidder Cash Flow -0.074 -0.024 -0.114** -0.071
(-1.370) (-0.371) (-2.075) (-1.324)
Bidder Dedicated -0.089 -0.231 0.055 -0.152
Institutional HHI (-0.642) (-1.103) (0.288) (-1.071)
Constant 0.050*** 0.011 0.067** 0.047***
(2.928) (0.414) (2.560) (2.747)
Observations 2,067 1,034 1,033 2,067
Adjusted R-squared 0.151 0.073 0.245 0.157
on the operational performance can be related to institutional monitoring intensity. Consistent
with our predictions, we find that the effect is significantly stronger in the subsample with
higher likelihood of having institutions engaged in monitoring. The p-value of a one-sided t-
test that the coefficient of Bidder Stock Liquidity is more negative in the subsample with High
Bidder Top Portfolio Share than in the subsample with Low Bidder Top Portfolio Share is
0.026. However, in constrast to the results of the analyses in previous sections, the coefficient
on Bidder Stock Liquidity is also statistically significant in the model with Low Bidder Top
Portfolio Share, and the R-squared of the regression is much lower for this subsample. It
is thus possible that the difference between the two samples is being driven by the different
distribution of the Bidder Stock Liquidity variable in each of them or by the noise that exists
in the estimation. To ensure that these effects are not driving our conclusions, in Model (4)
we interact the Bidder Top Portfolio Share group variable (taking value one if low, value two
if high) with Bidder Stock Liquidity. As discussed before, this approach has the disadvantage
of forcing a similar relation between the control variables and the dependent variable across
the two groups. Nevertheless, we find that the interaction term is negative and statistically
significant, confirming our previous finding that higher stock liquidity is associated with less
positive changes in operating performance following the takeover, especially for the firms for
which institutions have a stronger interest in monitoring.
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Table 3.9
Instrumental Variable Analysis
This Table presents an instrumental variable analysis of cumulative ab-
normal returns at the time of the announcement of an acquisition. The
sample includes all the completed takeovers between U.S. based firms
that involve a public acquirer occurring between 1998 and 2008. We
exclude acquisitions for less than 50% of the equity, and with a deal
value lower than 50 million dollars or equivalent to less than 1% of the
bidder’s assets. We exclude offers including securities as method of
payment if the target is publicly listed. We also exclude acquisitions
that are announced within five trading days by the same bidder. Bid-
der Stock Liquidity* is the predicted value given by Model (1), using as
instrument the variable Bidder Institutional Ownership 1 Year. All the
other variables are described in the Appendix. Model (1) is estimated
using an Ordinary Least Squares regression. Model (2) is estimated us-
ing a Two-Stage Least Squares regression. All models include year and
industry fixed-effects, the latter based on the bidder’s Fama and French
(1997) industry. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and are based
on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm
level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
Bidder Bidder
Stock Liquidity CAR [-2; +2]
Bidder Stock Liquidity* -0.115*
(-1.817)
Percentage of Cash -0.000 0.006*
(-0.034) (1.768)
Target = Public -0.010* -0.004
(-1.676) (-0.725)
Target = Subsidiary 0.002 0.011***
(0.346) (3.456)
Relative Size -0.068*** 0.026**
(-4.144) (2.081)
Bidder Total Assets 0.036*** 0.001
(13.520) (0.300)
Bidder Leverage -0.205*** -0.021
(-6.787) (-1.476)
Bidder Market to Book 0.011*** -0.001
(8.317) (-1.056)
Bidder Cash Flow -0.047 -0.007
(-1.286) (-0.279)
Bidder Dedicated -0.100 0.123
Continued on the next page
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Institutional HHI (-0.197) (0.328)
Bidder Dedicated -0.101* -0.019
Institutional Ownership (-1.682) (-0.425)
Bidder Institutional 0.179***
Ownership 1 Year (10.728)
Constant -0.452*** -0.034
(-12.822) (-1.129)
Observations 2,601 2,409
Adjusted R-squared 0.427 0.032
3.4.7 Instrumental Variable Analysis
The evidence provided in the previous sections mitigates concerns with having omitted vari-
ables driving the results we report. For that to be the case, it is necessary that the omitted
variable is correlated with liquidity and correlated in an inverse way with announcement re-
turns, but only in firms with sufficiently large importance in institutions’ portfolios, with lower
management ownership, and in industries with more unique products. Furthermore, it must
be correlated with managerial’s choice to withdraw takeover bids that trigger more negative
announcement returns, with CEO turnover after a value-destroying acquisition, and with im-
provements in operating performance following a merger. We cannot think of any plausible
explanation for these results other than the monitoring incentives created by stock (il)liquidity.
Nevertheless, in this subsection we try to address any remaining concern with omitted vari-
ables by instrumenting the stock liquidity of the bidder.
It is always challenging to find valid instruments for stock liquidity that are not correlated
with any omitted factor influencing announcement returns. The one we use is institutional
ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding. Institutions are likely to prefer more liq-
uid stocks, all else equal, due to the lower costs associated with trading. On the other hand,
institutional ownership has been reported in the literature as having no direct impact on an-
nouncement returns (Duggal and Millar (1999); Masulis et al. (2007)). We think that such a
measure will be a valid exogenous instrument provided we control for any monitoring effects
of specific institutions that may be correlated with the error term in the CAR regression. We do
so by controlling for the concentration of dedicated institutions’ ownership in the firm, which
we already have in our model. Dedicated institutions, defined as in Bushee (2001), have been
shown to be the ones that monitor managers’ actions (e.g. Burns et al. (2010)). Although own-
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ership concentration is usually seen as the best proxy for monitoring efforts, to ensure that our
instrument is exogenous we also include the percentage ownership by dedicated institutions
in the firm as a control variable (Dedicated Institutional Ownership). In addition, to mitigate
concerns that an unobservable effect drives both the ownership decisions of institutions and
the acquisition decisions of companies contemporaneously, we use the level of institutional
ownership in the firm one year prior to the acquisition announcement (Bidder Institutional
Ownership 1 Year). It is unlikely that institutions positions in a firm are due to the same
information that one year later drives the company to make a takeover, especially given that
we control for the level of dedicated ownership, which represents ownership by longer-term
informed institutions.
In Model (1) of Table 3.9 we regress Bidder Stock Liquidity on the set of control variables
used before and on the instrumental variable Bidder Institutional Ownership 1 Year. The
instrument is highly significant, with a F-statistic of 113.087 (p-value of 0.000) and a partial
R-squared of 0.046, ensuring good identification of the system. We then use the fitted values
from this first regression (Bidder Stock Liquidity*) as a regressor in Model (2). The coefficient
on the instrumented Bidder Stock Liquidity remains significantly negative, lending further
support to the hypothesis that higher stock liquidity reduces monitoring incentives.
3.5 Robustness Checks
In this section we present several robustness checks to dismiss alternative explanations for
our results and to show their robustness to different specifications. A primary concern in the
literature on institutional ownership and firm value is whether such relation is driven by mon-
itoring or by the stock-picking abilities of the institutions (Chen et al. (2007)). For example,
Nain and Yao (2012) find that acquirers whose stock is held by skilled mutual funds make
better acquisitions. However, stock-picking is unlikely to be the effect driving our results.
For that to be the case, stock liquidity would have to be inversely related to acquirer returns
due to factors other than institutional monitoring incentives, and institutions would have to
consistently choose to invest in the lower liquidity stocks. The latter is not consistent with
existing evidence on institutional ownership preferences (e.g. Gompers and Metrick (2001)).
Nevertheless, we test whether our results change while controlling for changes in institutional
ownership in the bidding firm, as a proxy for stock-picking by institutions (unreported). Our
results are unchanged, and this variable is almost never statistically significant.
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Table 3.10
Robustness Checks
This Table presents robustness checks on the multivariate analysis of cumulative abnormal returns
at the time of the announcement of an acquisition. The sample includes all the completed takeovers
between U.S. based firms that involve a public acquirer occurring between 1998 and 2008. We exclude
acquisitions for less than 50% of the equity, and with a deal value lower than 50 million dollars or
equivalent to less than 1% of the bidder’s assets. We exclude offers including securities as method of
payment if the target is publicly listed. We also exclude acquisitions that are announced within five
trading days by the same bidder. All variables are described in the Appendix. All models are estimated
using an Ordinary Least Squares regression with year and industry fixed-effects, the latter based on
the bidder’s Fama and French (1997) industry. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and are based
on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Bidder Bidder Bidder
CAR CAR CAR
[-2; +2] [-2; +2] [-2; +2]
Bidder Stock Liquidity -0.038* -0.046**
(-1.959) (-2.536)
Bidder Change in Stock Liquidity 0.023*** 0.032***
(4.758) (5.575)
Bidder Change in Stock Liquidity* 0.078**
Bidder Stock Liquidity (2.253)
Bidder Bid-Ask Spread 0.175***
(2.855)
Percentage of Cash 0.008** 0.008** 0.006*
(2.302) (2.340) (1.666)
Target = Public -0.005 -0.005 -0.003
(-0.984) (-1.026) (-0.673)
Target = Subsidiary 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(3.582) (3.535) (3.360)
Relative Size 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.040***
(3.353) (3.340) (3.881)
Bidder Total Assets -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.433) (-1.199) (-1.600)
Bidder Leverage -0.004 -0.002 0.004
(-0.383) (-0.216) (0.379)
Bidder Market -0.002** -0.002** -0.001
to Book (-2.135) (-1.989) (-1.369)
Bidder Cash Flow -0.008 -0.006 -0.002
(-0.297) (-0.226) (-0.095)
Bidder Dedicated -0.104 -0.115 -0.064
Institutional HHI (-0.715) (-0.780) (-0.407)
Constant -0.001 -0.005 -0.018
(-0.037) (-0.227) (-0.801)
Observations 2,461 2,461 2,601
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.079 0.057
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Table 3.11
Analysis of Long-Term Returns
This Table presents a long-term analysis of the stock returns following the completion of a takeover.
The sample includes all the completed takeovers between U.S. based firms that involve a public acquirer
occurring between 1998 and 2008. We exclude acquisitions for less than 50% of the equity, and with
a deal value lower than 50 million dollars or equivalent to less than 1% of the bidder’s assets. We
exclude offers including securities as method of payment if the target is publicly listed. We also exclude
acquisitions that are announced within five trading days by the same bidder. Long Illiquid 1(3) Year(s)
is a portfolio that buys and holds for one (three) year(s) the stocks of bidders included in the bottom
half of the sample sorted on the basis of stock liquidity. A stock is bought in the month following the
completion of the takeover. Long Illiquid Short Liquid 1(3) Year(s) is a portfolio that goes long on the
Long Illiquid 1(3) Year(s) portfolio and short on an equivalent portfolio comprising only the top half
of the sample sorted on the basis of stock liquidity. Market, Small Minus Big, High Minus Low, and
Momentum are asset pricing factors obtained from Kenneth French’s website, and are based on Fama
and French (1992) and Carhart (1997). Liquidity Innovations is based on Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
and is obtained from Robert Stambaugh’s website. All models are estimated using an Ordinary Least
Squares regression. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and are based on standard errors robust
to heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long Illiquid Long Illiquid Long Illiquid Long Illiquid
1 Year 3 Years Short Liquid Short Liquid
1 Year 3 Years
Market 0.974*** 0.997*** -0.130* -0.112*
(16.756) (19.151) (-1.707) (-1.967)
Small Minus Big 0.572*** 0.578*** 0.419*** 0.396***
(8.418) (10.118) (5.271) (6.635)
High Minus Low 0.487*** 0.525*** 0.707*** 0.575***
(6.913) (9.689) (6.805) (9.566)
Liquidity Innovations -1.723 -4.483 1.663 0.280
(-0.552) (-1.529) (0.450) (0.093)
Momentum -0.205*** -0.200*** -0.022 0.061
(-5.354) (-4.958) (-0.375) (1.181)
Constant 0.127 0.275 -0.168 -0.103
(0.610) (1.555) (-0.608) (-0.467)
Observations 143 155 143 155
Adjusted R-squared 0.863 0.895 0.405 0.405
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Another possible alternative explanation for our results is related to the change in stock
liquidity after a merger. If there is an improvement in the stock liquidity of the bidder after
a takeover (maybe due to the increase in firm size), and such improvement is larger and/or
more valuable for illiquid bidders, there would be a spurious negative relation between the
bidder’s pre-acquisition liquidity and announcement returns, as the market prices in the future
improvement in the liquidity of the stock. We thus study the changes in liquidity occurring as
a result of the takeover and its possible impact on announcement returns.
We create a new variable, Bidder Change in Stock Liquidity, that captures the difference
in the Amihud measure of stock liquidity of the bidder, measured over the 100 trading days
starting 46 days after the completion of the takeover, to the Amihud measure before the ac-
quisition announcement used in the previous analyses, scaled by the latter. Again, to facilitate
interpretation we multiply this measure by minus one: a positive value for the variable thus
means that the liquidity of the stock increased after the takeover.
We re-estimate Model (3) of Table 3.3 including as a regressor the variable Bidder Change
in Stock Liquidity. If the market has unbiased expectations on the improvement of liquidity
as a result of the takeover, the coefficient on that regressor should capture the value effects
arising from the change in liquidity. The results in Model (1) of Table 3.10 are consistent with
the market reacting positively to an anticipated increase in the stock’s liquidity; a positive
coefficient on the Bidder Change in Stock Liquidity means that the more the Bidder Stock
Liquidity is increased after the takeover, the higher the abnormal returns at the time of the an-
nouncement. More importantly, the coefficient on the Bidder Stock Liquidity variable remains
negative and statistically significant, dispelling concerns that it was simply capturing the value
effects of expected changes in liquidity. However, it is still possible that illiquid bidders bene-
fit disproportionably more from a change in liquidity than liquid bidders. Such relation could
drive the results we report on the negative impact of stock liquidity on announcement returns.
Nevertheless, when we introduce an interaction term between the Bidder Stock Liquidity and
the Bidder Change in Stock Liquidity variables, the coefficient on Bidder Stock Liquidity
remains negative and even becomes more statistically significant (Model (2) of Table 3.10).
We also re-run our main analysis using the bid-ask spread as a measure of stock liquidity.
We calculate it as in the Bidder Stock Liquidity variable, i.e., over a window of 100 trading
days ending 46 days before the announcement of a takeover. We take the square root to
mitigate its skewness. We use closing bid and ask prices obtained from CRSP and exclude
days with no trading. Results are in Model (3) of Table 3.10 and are similar to the ones
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obtained using the Bidder Stock Liquidity variable based on the Amihud (2002) measure. We
also check for the robustness of our findings to a change in the event-window from 5 to 3
days and to using Fama and French (1992) three-factor model as the asset pricing model for
computing abnormal returns. All our results are qualitatively similar (unreported).
Next, we run a long-term analysis of the abnormal returns following the completion of an
acquisition. We do so to alleviate any concerns that the market may systematically misvalue
deals made by less liquid firms in the short-run. We construct an equally-weighted portfolio
including all the takeovers completed by bidders in the less liquid half of the sample. We
rebalance the portfolio monthly, introducing illiquid bidders in the month following the com-
pletion of a takeover included in our sample and dropping them out of the portfolio one (or
three) year(s) later. Following Fama (1998), we then regress the monthly returns of the port-
folio (above the risk-free rate) on the Fama and French (1992) factors and on a momentum
factor following Carhart (1997).17 In addition, given that the portfolio is built on the basis of
stock liquidity, which is a priced factor, we include the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stam-
baugh (2003) to ensure that any abnormal returns we may capture are not simply driven by the
illiquidity of the stock.18. Results are in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.11. The intercept of
the regression model is not significantly different from zero in either of the models, implying
that there are no long-run abnormal returns systematically arising from takeovers made by less
liquid bidders.
In Models (3) and (4) of Table 3.11 we create a portfolio that has a long position on the
half of our sample that completes a deal and has the lowest stock liquidity and has a short
position on the half that completes a deal and has the highest stock liquidity. This zero-cost
portfolio allows us to capture any long-term returns differential between the two types of
bidders. However, again we find that there are no statistically significant abnormal returns
as the intercept is never statistically different from zero. Overall the findings in Table 3.11
suggest that the market does not systematically misprice the acquisitions made by less liquid
firms.
Finally, we check whether our sample selection procedure, based on the method of pay-
ment used for acquisitions of public targets, may be introducing a selection bias in our study.
We do so by testing whether stock liquidity, which is our main variable of interest, has any
power in explaining the choice of method of payment. We run both an OLS and a Tobit analy-
17We obtain this data from Kenneth French’s website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html
18We obtain this data from Robert Stambaugh’s website at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~stambaug/
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Table 3.12
Analysis of Percentage of Cash Used
This Table presents a multivariate analysis of the percentage of cash used in a takeover offer. The
sample includes all the completed takeovers between U.S. based firms that involve a public acquirer
occurring between 1998 and 2008. We exclude acquisitions for less than 50% of the equity, and with
a deal value lower than 50 million dollars or equivalent to less than 1% of the bidder’s assets. We
exclude offers including securities as method of payment if the target is publicly listed. We also exclude
acquisitions that are announced within five trading days by the same bidder. All variables are described
in the Appendix. Model (1) is estimated using an Ordinary Least Squares regression. Model (2) is
estimated using a Tobit regression. All models include year and industry fixed-effects, the latter based
on the bidder’s Fama and French (1997) industry. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and are based
on standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2)
Percentage Percentage
of of
Cash Cash
OLS Tobit
Bidder Stock Liquidity 0.032 0.100
(0.513) (0.437)
Target = Public 0.044** 0.250***
(1.990) (2.998)
Target = Subsidiary 0.076*** 0.287***
(3.969) (3.892)
Relative Size -0.120*** -0.528***
(-4.391) (-4.477)
Bidder Total Assets -0.008 -0.024
(-1.048) (-0.814)
Bidder Leverage -0.116* -0.427*
(-1.839) (-1.777)
Bidder Market to Book -0.021*** -0.105***
(-5.922) (-4.688)
Bidder Cash Flow 0.551*** 2.269***
(6.472) (5.987)
Bidder Dedicated 1.162 5.608*
Institutional HHI (1.403) (1.753)
Constant 0.668*** 0.988
(4.473) (1.139)
Observations 3,226 3,226
Adjusted R-squared 0.158
Pseudo R-squared 0.0891
sis using the percentage of cash used in the takeover offer as dependent variable and the same
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set of controls as before. For this analysis we also include acquisitions for public targets that
include securities as method of payment. We exclude withdrawn deals to be consistent with
most of our analyses, but results are unchanged if they are included. Results are in Table 3.12
and mitigate concerns with sample selection bias, as stock liquidity does not seem to be taken
into account by firms when choosing the method of payment used in takeovers. In addition,
in unreported analyses we confirm that our results continue to hold even when we restrict the
whole sample to cash-only acquisitions.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyze the role of liquidity as a monitoring incentive and its effect on
firm value by analyzing the market reaction to the takeover decisions of firms. There are
two main views in the theoretical literature that analyzes the relation between stock liquidity
and the monitoring efforts of large shareholders. On the one hand, by making exit easier,
liquidity may reduce the incentives for institutional owners to monitor and intervene in the
firm’s management (tradeoff hypothesis). On the other hand, since more liquid stocks reflect
better the value-improvement activities of institutions and make their exit threat more credible,
higher liquidity may result in an increase in monitoring efforts (complementarity hypothesis).
The empirical evidence we present in this chapter is consistent with the view that there
is a tradeoff between monitoring and liquidity. In all our specifications, in which we include
a large set of control variables and industry and year fixed effects, we find that less liquid
bidders make acquisitions that trigger higher announcement returns and that are less likely to
have negative announcement returns. In addition, firms with lower stock liquidity are more
likely to withdraw takeover bids that trigger more negative announcement returns, experience
higher CEO turnover following value-destroying acquisitions, and have better operating per-
formance following the acquisition. These results, which are mostly concentrated in the group
of firms in which institutions are more likely to collect private information, are consistent with
an active role of institutions in monitoring management when stock illiquidity impedes their
easy exit from the firm. We present several additional tests that reduce concerns with biases
arising from omitted variables. More specifically, the effect of liquidity on announcement re-
turns is significantly stronger when the firm is more prone to suffer from agency problems, as
measured by the level of insider ownership or by product market pressure, when monitoring is
more valuable. Further, we show that results are robust to instrumental variables estimation,
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cannot be explained by the market anticipation of the change in liquidity after the takeover,
and are unchanged by using the bid-ask spread as an alternative measure of stock liquidity.
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Appendix # indicates a Compustat data item. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level.
Bidder Bid-Ask Square root of the average of the bidder’s closing bid-ask spread
Spread over 100 trading days, finishing 46 days before the announcement
date, scaled by the share price. Days with negative spread are
excluded.
Bidder CAR [-2; +2] Bidder cumulative abnormal return in the window [-2; +2] relative
to the announcement date of the deal, using the market model.
The estimation period ends in day -46 and runs for a period of
100 to 200 trading days.
Bidder Cash Flow Following Sufi (2009). Net income before extraordinary items
(#IB) plus depreciation and amortization expenses (#DPC), over
total assets (#AT).
Bidder Change in Difference between the square root of the average illiquidity
Stock Liquidity measure of Amihud (2002) over a period of 100 trading days end-
ing 46 days after the takeover completion (multiplied by 1012) and
the variable Bidder Stock Liquidity, scaled by the latter and mul-
tiplied by minus one. Days with no trading are excluded from the
calculation.
Bidder Dedicated Herfindahl Hirschman concentration ratio of the holdings of
Institutional HHI dedicated institutions in the bidding firm, measured in the quarter
prior to the takeover announcement. Dedicated institutions are as
classified by Bushee (2001).
Bidder Dedicated Fraction of shares held by dedicated institutional owners in the
Institutional Ownership bidding firm, measured in the quarter prior to the takeover an-
nouncement. Dedicated institutions are as classified by Bushee
(2001).
Bidder Extreme Dummy variable taking value 1 if Bidder CAR [-2; +2] is less
Negative CAR than -5%, zero otherwise.
Bidder Institutional Fraction of shares held by institutional owners in the bidder in the
Ownership quarter prior to the acquisition announcement.
Bidder Institutional Fraction of shares held by institutional owners in the bidder in the
Ownership 1 Year quarter one year prior to the acquisition announcement.
Bidder Insider Fraction of shares held by insiders in the bidding firm.
Ownership
(Continued on the next page)
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Bidder Leverage Bidder book value of debt over market value of assets. Book
value of debt equals long-term debt (#DLTT) plus debt in cur-
rent liabilities (#DLC). Market value of assets is given by liabili-
ties (#LT) minus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax
credit (#TXDITC) plus preferred stock (#PSTKL if available, else
#PSTKRV) plus market equity (#CSHO times #PRCC_F).
Bidder Market Bidder market value of assets divided by the book value of assets
to Book following Fama and French (2002). Market value of assets is
given by liabilities (#LT) minus balance sheet deferred taxes and
investment tax credit (#TXDITC) plus preferred stock (#PSTKL
if available, else #PSTKRV) plus market equity (#CSHO times
#PRCC_F). Book value of assets is given by total assets (#AT).
Bidder Negative CAR Dummy variable taking value one if Bidder CAR [-2; +2] is neg-
ative, zero otherwise.
Bidder Stock Square root of the average illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002)
Liquidity over a period of 100 trading days ending 46 days before the
takeover announcement multiplied by minus 1012. Days with no
trading are excluded from the calculation.
Bidder Total Assets Total assets of the bidder (#AT). When used in multivariate re-
gressions we take the natural logarithm of this variable.
Percentage of Cash Fraction of cash used as method of payment in the takeover.
Relative Size Ratio of deal value to bidder total assets (#AT).When used in mul-
tivariate regressions we take the natural logarithm of one plus this
variable.
Target = Public Dummy variable taking value one if the target firm is publicly-
listed, zero otherwise.
Target = Subsidiary Dummy variable taking value one if the target firm is a subsidiary,
zero otherwise.
Chapter 4
Public Debt Market Access and
Corporate Investment∗
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter I study the impact of accessing the public debt market on the level of corporate
investment.1 Financial intermediation theories posit that firms with a low probability of default
and with a favourable reputation in financial markets may replace bank debt with arm’s-length
debt (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996); Diamond (1991)). By obtaining financing from a well-
diversified pool of investors, firms accessing the bond market reduce the hold-up problem
associated with borrowing from financial intermediaries and obtain financing at a lower cost
(Leland and Pyle (1977); Rajan (1992)). As a result, tapping the public debt market results
in a reduction in financing constraints, thereby allowing for an increase in the level of firm
investment (e.g., Whited (1992)).
However, there are also reasons to believe that accessing the bond market may be asso-
ciated with a reduction in firms’ investment level. Nini et al. (2009) show that creditors are
averse to firms’ capital investments, as these investments can be made to increase equityhold-
∗This chapter is based on Vasconcelos (2012). I would like to thank Dion Bongaerts, Michael Faulkender,
Miguel Ferreira, Xanthi Gkougkousi, Craig Lewis, Holger Mueller, Gordon Phillips, Melissa Porras Prado, Peter
Roosenboom, Laura Starks, Greg Udell, Dimitrios Vagias, Yuhai Xuan, David Yermack, and seminar participants
at Analysis Group in New York, Cornerstone Research in New York, FMA Europe Doctoral Consortium in
Porto, and Rotterdam School of Management for helpful comments. Part of this project was undertaken while
I was a visiting scholar at NYU Stern. The financial support of the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit
Rotterdam is gratefully acknowledged. An Internet Appendix of this chapter is included in the working paper
version available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899644.
1I use the expressions public debt market and bond market interchangeably throughout the chapter.
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ers’ expected payoff at the expense of debtholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Given that
equityholders ultimately bear the agency costs of debt, it is in their interest to commit ex-ante
not to expropriate debtholders’ wealth, thereby ensuring better access to financing in the fu-
ture (Almeida et al. (2011)). Consequently, firms that tap the bond market may want to reduce
their level of investment in order to encourage relatively uninformed investors to hold their
debt on more favourable terms. This change in firm behaviour might be necessary because
other mechanisms to reduce agency costs of debt, such as monitoring, become weaker when
switching from borrowing from financial intermediaries to borrowing from financial markets
(Chava and Roberts (2008); Diamond (1991)).
I test these two mutually exclusive hypotheses using a sample of all Compustat firms be-
tween 1986 and 2008. I examine both the level of investment in fixed assets (Capex) and
corporate takeovers. Most of the literature classifies firms as accessing the bond market if they
have a credit rating (Cantillo and Wright (2000); Faulkender and Petersen (2006)). However,
as shown by Sufi (2009), it is possible that some rated firms may be accessing only the syn-
dicated loan market and do not have outstanding bonds. I thus classify firms as accessing the
bond market only if they have both a credit rating and a bond outstanding in a given year.2
Endogeneity is a major concern in this setting. Obtaining financing from the bond market
may simply be indicative of certain characteristics of the firm that are also linked to its invest-
ment decisions, such as size or growth opportunities. I therefore use a comprehensive set of
control variables and a number of econometric tools to address concerns with omitted factors.
These include controls for industry specific shocks through the interaction of year and industry
dummies, firm fixed effects estimation, and identification via instrumental variables.
I find that firms accessing the public debt market significantly reduce their level of invest-
ment on Plant, Property, and Equipment (PPE) and on takeovers financed with cash. More
specifically, when using a firm fixed effects specification, accessing the bond market is as-
sociated with a reduction in the level of capital expenditures (cash-financed takeovers) equal
to 0.6% (1.3%) of lagged total assets per year. This difference is equivalent to a reduction
of 8.2% (38.4%) in the level of capital expenditures (cash-financed takeovers) for the aver-
age firm. This negative impact of bond market access on the level of investment is robust to
estimation using an instrumental variables procedure, and is consistent with the hypothesis
that firms accessing the bond market choose to restrict the level of investment, thereby reduc-
ing agency costs of debt and encouraging uninformed investors to hold their bonds. It is not
2All the results in this chapter are robust to classifying firms as accessing the bond market only on the basis
of having a credit rating.
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consistent with the hypothesis that firms that access the bond market increase their level of
investment as a result of a reduction in financing constraints.
Further evidence is given by an analysis of the cross-sectional variation of the impact of
accessing the bond market on corporate investment. The reduction in the level of investment is
significantly more pronounced for firms with higher credit risk, as measured by their modified
Altman Z-score (MacKie-Mason (1990)) or predicted credit rating. This result is in line with
the expectation that the need to internalize agency costs of debt is stronger for firms in a
weaker financial condition (Nash et al. (2003)). Firms relatively closer to financial distress
suffer more from the debtholder/equityholder conflict (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), and thus
have greater need to adjust their actions to attract debt investors.3
I also analyze the impact of accessing the public debt market on other firm actions and
find evidence consistent with the interpretation that managers adjust their decisions to take
into account bondholders’ preferences. More specifically, firms’ likelihood of violating debt
covenants is negatively associated with using the public debt market. In addition, firms sig-
nificantly reduce payouts to shareholders (dividends and share buybacks) when accessing the
bond market by 0.4% of lagged total assets. This effect is equivalent to a reduction of 14.0%
in payouts for the average firm. This result is of great importance in dispelling explanations
based on the life-cycle of firms accessing the bond market. If it would be the maturity of
the firm driving both its decision to access the bond markets and the reduction in investment,
and if my econometric specifications had somehow failed to control for this effect, I should
observe a positive impact of bond market access on payouts to equityholders. It is challeng-
ing to explain the reduction in payouts that I report outside a framework in which the firm is
adjusting its actions to reduce agency costs of debt and access debt markets more favourably.
I run several tests to rule out alternative explanations. I analyze the market reaction to
the announcement of acquisitions to dismiss the possibility that the reduction in corporate
investment is an effect of the discipline brought about by the use of debt (Jensen (1986)).
Inconsistent with this interpretation, I find that the market reaction to the announcement of ac-
quisitions made by firms with bond market access is not significantly different from the market
reaction to the announcement of acquisitions made by firms that only use other sources of debt
3The fact that the effect I document is mostly present in firms in a weaker financial condition also reduces
concerns that the instrument used is in any way correlated with omitted variables such as the firm’s maturity or
reputation. If that would be the case, the level of investment would be reduced the most the more mature/reputable
a firm is, implying that the effect of accessing bond markets on investment would mostly be present in firms with
a stronger financial profile.
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financing. In addition, I run several analyses to show that the results I report cannot be ex-
plained by debt-overhang either (Myers (1977)). More specifically, I find that firms accessing
the bond market have a lower credit risk than firms without such access, inconsistent with the
explanation that, in firms tapping the public debt market, equityholders force a reduction in in-
vestment because a larger fraction of the payoffs go to debtholders. Also, I find that the results
I report are not consistently depending on the macroeconomic conditions or on the maturity
of the firm’s debt as it would be expected if debt-overhang was the cause for the reduction in
corporate investment.
I conduct several robustness checks to ensure that the effect I report holds under different
specifications. Results remain qualitatively similar when including the lag of the dependent
variable as an explanatory variable, when analyzing the change in total investment, or when
controlling for previous acquisitions. In addition, I find that the results using fixed effects
estimation are similar to the ones using first differences, suggesting that most of the change in
the level of investment occurs immediately upon accessing the bond market for the first time.
It is unlikely that any omitted effect, such as a change in the unobservable investment oppor-
tunities, could explain such pronounced change in the level of investment around accessing
the public debt market. For that to be the case, the omitted effect would have to be relatively
constant over time and suddenly change around the time the firm accesses the bond market,
remaining stable afterwards (Faulkender and Petersen (2006)). Further, I find a negative im-
pact of the effect of public debt market’s access on the sensitivity of the level of investment to
investment opportunities. This last result helps to dispel any concerns that the instrument I use
is only capturing the maturity of the different industries over time. If that would be the case, it
should have no impact on the relation between firm-level growth opportunities and firm-level
investment. I also show that firms accessing the bond market significantly increase their cash
holdings.
This chapter adds to the recent literature on the importance of debtholders in corporate
governance, which has so far focused on bank debt as a result of its stricter covenants and
easier renegotiation (Chava and Roberts (2008); Nini et al. (2009); Nini et al. (2010)). I
provide evidence that, in a contracting framework with less monitoring and higher information
asymmetry, the existence of debt claims held by dispersed investors leads the firm to change
its investment decisions. This self-imposed change in behaviour is meant to reduce agency
costs of debt, and is aimed at encouraging uninformed investors to hold the firm’s debt on
more favourable terms.
Public Debt Market Access and Corporate Investment 89
My findings are in line with the intuition in Almeida et al. (2011) that, in the absence of
perfect markets for external financing, investment decisions may be significantly affected by
concerns regarding future access to financing, and with the argument of Rauh and Sufi (2010)
that debt heterogeneity should be taken into account when establishing the link between fi-
nancing and investment. In a broader sense, this chapter extends to debt financing the analysis
made by Asker et al. (2011) of the differences in investment behavior between private firms
and stock market listed firms. Similarly to them, I find that firms with publicly-listed securities
have lower levels of investment and have a weaker relation between investment and investment
opportunities. While Asker et al. (2011) show that in equity markets it is managerial myopia
the main driver of the change in investment behavior, I offer evidence that in debt markets
it is the agency costs of debt that lead to the lower investment level of the firms with traded
securities.
Given the evidence reported in this chapter, it may be asked why firms choose to access
the public debt market if it does not allow them to increase their investment level. First, it must
be noted that firms reduce their investment as a percentage of total assets, which does not nec-
essarily mean that they reduce their absolute level of investment (i.e. they reduce investment
as a percentage of the total resources they control, but the level of total resources they hold
may be, and typically is, increased).4 Furthermore, there are cost advantages of accessing
bond markets (Diamond (1991)). In addition to benefiting from bondholders’ lower cost of
capital, firms directly accessing the public debt market can benefit from the lower monitoring
expenses associated with their relatively higher reputation. This latter effect is in contrast to
what is reported for bank financing, where hold-up problems prevent firms from benefiting
in price from a lower need of monitoring of their operations by intermediaries (Petersen and
Rajan (1994)). Also, there may be other important benefits of bond market financing in the
form of an increase in bargaining power with banks or more financial flexibility (Datta et al.
(2000); Hale and Santos (2009)).
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section I discuss the theoretical background
of this study and develop testable hypotheses. In Section 4.3 I discuss the data used, and
then in Section 4.4 I present the main analyses. Additional analyses are presented in Section
4.5, alternative explanations in Section 4.6, and robustness checks in Section 4.7. Section 4.8
4In unreported analyses I find that firms accessing the bond market significantly increase their assets and
their investment as a percentage of capital stock, consistent with such access reducing their financing constraints.
However, the focus of this chapter is on how agency considerations result in a decrease in investment as a fraction
of the resources controlled by a firm, and not on financing constraints and overall firm investment.
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concludes.
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section I develop two testable and mutually exclusive hypotheses on the link between
access accessing the bond market and corporate investment.
4.2.1 Reduction in Financial Constraints
Firms that access the public debt market are typically large firms with stable operations that
have built their reputation through successful interaction with bank lenders (Diamond (1991);
Cantillo and Wright (2000)). A key advantage of this access is the possibility to obtain less
costly financing, since diversified bondholders have lower cost of capital than financial inter-
mediaries (Cantillo and Wright (2000)). In addition, the reduced importance of informational
advantages in the bond market (Rajan (1992)) allows the firm to benefit in price from the
reduction in the level of monitoring associated with its higher reputation.
As a result, firms that use the public debt market are usually deemed to be firms less
subject to financial constraints, which are therefore better able to raise the necessary funding
for new projects (e.g., Almeida and Campello (2007); Whited (1992)). Consistent with this
view, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) show that firms significantly increase their leverage
after starting to access the bond market. Sufi (2009) argues, based on the Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997) model, that firms that are able to certify their debt at a lower cost are more
likely to raise funds from uninformed investors, and are thus less affected by credit constraints
when making investment decisions. He shows that firms that obtain a loan rating to access
the syndicated loan market increase their level of cash acquisitions and investment in working
capital. He therefore concludes that third-party debt certification has a positive impact on
firms’ investment level.5
Based on the abovementioned findings, I hypothesize that firms increase their level of in-
vestment when they access the public debt market, taking advantage of their reduced financing
5The key difference of this chapter in relation to Sufi (2009) is that Sufi focuses only on syndicated loans, in
which monitoring is arguably more present than in public debt markets, and in the corresponding loan ratings,
which are obtained also by firms that cannot access public debt markets. It is not clear whether his results can
be extended to a setting including the public debt market, in which monitoring is reduced and in which there are
more concerns with information asymmetry (Diamond (1991)).
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constraints to not only increase investment at large, but also its intensity (investment level).
Another potential driver of the increase in investment level may be the easing of the debt
covenants, which in the public debt market are looser than in the private lending market (Nash
et al. (2003); Nini et al. (2010)). By accessing non-private markets and gradually becoming
free from tighter covenants, firms may more easily finance and pursue investment projects.
I further hypothesize that accessing uninformed capital is more important for firms with
higher credit risk. These are firms that are more subject to financial constraints, which are
prevented from obtaining as much capital as they need for investment (Almeida and Campello
(2007)). Following Sufi (2009), I expect that they benefit the most from an increase in the
availability (or a decrease in the cost) of capital.
4.2.2 Increase in Agency Costs
Another view on the interaction between public debt market access and corporate investment
is given by the literature on agency costs and on financial intermediation. Although the con-
flict of interests between managers and shareholders has been the main focus of the literature
since Jensen and Meckling (1976), it has long been recognized that there is also an important
misalignment of interests between shareholders and debtholders that may carry costs for a
levered firm. Given that shareholders hold an option on the firm’s assets with exercise value
equal to the face value of debt, they have an incentive to increase the variance of the value
of firm’s assets, especially when the firm is closer to the point of financial distress, as they
benefit from the upside but have limited loss on the downside. Furthermore, they may not pur-
sue investments that increase the value of the firm if such value mostly accrues to debtholders
(Myers (1977)). Rational debtholders will anticipate this behaviour and demand a higher price
to hold the debt of the firm, which implies that the agency costs of debt are ultimately borne
by the equityholders. Any reduction in agency costs, through monitoring for example, is thus
in the interest of the equityholders.
For firms accessing the public debt market, monitoring by bondholders is difficult given
the well-known free-riding and incentive problems faced by large numbers of claim-holders.
Furthermore, the incentives for banks to monitor these firms are reduced because of the dilu-
tion of the banks’ claims and their seniority in relation to bondholders (Besanko and Kanatas
(1993)).6 As such, agency costs become higher when a firm introduces public debt (Datta
6An alternative view is derived by Park (2000), who argues that by having a smaller senior claim on a firm’s
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et al. (2000)). A potential concern for dispersed lenders is that firms may engage in deceptive
behaviour once they borrow directly from financial markets and are less subject to the strict
monitoring exerted by banks.7 In contrast to direct bank lenders, dispersed debtholders have
difficulty in enforcing covenants limiting firms’ actions (Nini et al. (2009)). As such, they may
avoid holding a firm’s debt when they have little knowledge about projects that have substan-
tial room for managerial misbehaviour or risk-shifting (Ortiz-Molina (2006)). Given that any
such fears will be priced in the cost of debt, firms that access the bond market have an incentive
to reduce the concerns of debtholders and build their reputation by adjusting their investment
decisions taking into account lenders’ preferences, thereby securing more favourable access
to financing in the future (Almeida et al. (2011); Aivazian et al. (2006)).8 Debt investors typi-
cally want the firm to reduce its investment level, as they fear that equityholders may engage in
risk-shifting (Nini et al. (2009)). In the terminology of Jensen and Meckling (1976), firms can
offset the reduction in external monitoring (banks’ oversight) with internal bonding (reduction
in investment level).
Following this reasoning, I hypothesize that firms accessing the bond market reduce their
level of investment in order to attract investors’ interest in their debt securities and secure
financing on more favourable terms. Not all firms need to equally take into account the pref-
erences of their debtholders. Firms farther from financial distress, for which there is little
risk of missing the debt repayments, are less likely to be affected by debtholders’ concerns,
and therefore have less need to adjust their actions (Nash et al. (2003); Nini et al. (2010)). I
thus hypothesize that the reduction in the level of investment triggered by accessing the bond
market is stronger when the firm has a higher credit risk.
assets, due to the introduction of junior public debt, banks actually exert more monitoring of the borrower.
However, his model focuses on situations in which moral hazard is a very large concern and the bank has to
decide on the liquidation of the firm. Furthermore, such relation only holds if the bank’s claim is large enough
to be impaired in case of default. As Park (2000) highlights, this model is more likely to be applicable to highly-
leveraged transactions such as buyouts. If bank monitoring is more focused on maintaining the going-concern
value of the firm rather than liquidating it, which is arguably the situation for the vast majority of the firms that
access the bond market in my sample, then Park argues that "an investor’s incentive to monitor is stronger when
his stake is bigger" (p. 2159).
7The need of a credit rating to access debt markets (Sufi (2009)) cannot replace the monitoring by debtholders
given the lack of direct financial incentives and the well-known agency problems of rating agencies (Leland and
Pyle (1977)).
8Such adjustment was not as necessary before since stricter monitoring gave bank lenders more security that
the firms’ actions were not meant to expropriate them. In the absence of monitoring, the threshold at which firms’
actions may start triggering debtholders’ concerns is lowered (higher information asymmetry).
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4.3 Data and Univariate Analysis
4.3.1 Data Sources
I retrieve all annual observations of publicly-traded firms incorporated in the United States
that are available on Compustat between the beginning of 1986 and the end of 2008. I delete
observations with total assets or sales below one million dollars and firms defined as utilities
(SIC codes starting with 49) or financials (SIC codes between 6000 and 6800). I also obtain
from Compustat data on the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) long-term issuer credit rating. I re-
trieve from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) information on issuance and
maturity dates for all bonds issued by firms in the sample. I collect from the Securities Data
Company (SDC) the information on all the takeovers completed by each firm in each year,
defined as acquisitions for more than 50% of the equity and with information available on the
deal value. Finally, I collect from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data on
stock prices. The final sample consists of 84,556 firm-year observations.
4.3.2 Univariate Analysis
I start by comparing the characteristics of firms that access the bond market with the ones
that do not do it. Most of the literature identifies companies that use the bond market by
checking whether they have a S&P credit rating on Compustat at the end of the financial year
(Faulkender and Petersen (2006); Rauh and Sufi (2010)). Cantillo and Wright (2000) show
that in less than 3% of their sample a firm has a credit rating and no publicly traded debt
or vice-versa. However, as highlighted by Sufi (2009), some firms started obtaining credit
ratings to access the syndicated loan market without issuing publicly-traded bonds after 1995.
As such, I define firms as accessing the bond market if, in addition to appearing with a credit
rating on Compustat, they also appear on Mergent FISD as having a bond outstanding for the
same year in which they have the credit rating, and that thus I am certain that used public debt.
Due to the limited coverage of Mergent FISD, I risk misclassifying issuers of public debt as
firms that do not access the bond market. Nevertheless, all the results reported in this chapter
are robust to the classification of firms as using the bond market based solely on whether they
have a credit rating.
In Table 4.1 I separate the firm-year observations into two groups sorted on whether the
firm accesses the public debt market. To be consistent with later analyses, I use the lag of all
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample, split into observations of firms accessing
the bond market and not accessing to the bond market. The sample includes all Compustat firm-year
observations of US-incorporated public firms between 1986 and 2008 with total assets and sales above
1 million dollars. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) and financials (SIC codes between 6000
and 6800) are excluded. Firms accessing the bond market are firms for which there is both a Standard
and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating in Compustat and a bond outstanding in Mergent FISD for the
last month of the fiscal year. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. The test for differences in
means is executed using a t-test (for non-discrete variables) or a Chi-square test (for dummy variables).
The p-value reported is the probability that the difference between the average of the firms accessing
and the average of the firms not accessing the bond market equals zero.
Firms Accessing Firms not Accessing P-value N
to Bond Markett-1 to Bond Markett-1 of test for
difference
Total Assetst-1 4299.590 439.043 0.000 84,556
Market to Book Ratiot-1 1.635 2.154 0.000 84,556
Cash Flowt-1 0.076 -0.001 0.000 84,556
Market Leveraget-1 0.486 0.343 0.000 84,556
Firm Aget-1 27.098 13.771 0.000 84,556
Modified Altman Z-scoret-1 1.746 0.908 0.000 84,556
S&P 500t-1 0.392 0.037 0.000 84,556
NYSE listedt-1 0.706 0.181 0.000 84,556
Percentage Accesst-1 0.184 0.116 0.000 84,556
Capex/TAt 0.074 0.073 0.369 84,556
Acqs/TAt 0.036 0.034 0.030 82,374
N (out of 84,556) 9,958 74,598
variables except the ones related to firm investment. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
In line with what is reported by Cantillo and Wright (2000) and Faulkender and Petersen
(2006), firms accessing to the bond market are significantly larger and have a lower market
to book ratio than the ones that do not use the bond market. As in Faulkender and Petersen
(2006), they have higher leverage, are older, and are more likely to be part of the S&P 500
and to trade on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In addition, firms tapping the public
debt market generate a higher cash flow and, as expected, have a stronger credit profile, as
measured by their modified Altman Z-score (MacKie-Mason (1990)). I use this measure of
creditworthiness rather than the classic Altman Z-score model (Altman (1968)) to isolate the
effect of leverage in my analyses. Finally, these firms are in an industry that has a higher
proportion of firms taping the bond market (variable Percentage Access).
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I examine firm investment by analyzing both the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged
total assets (following Rauh (2006) and Sufi (2009)) and the ratio of acquisitions to lagged
total assets (Sufi (2009)). For the latter I use the acquisitions reported on Compustat; note that
this definition of acquisitions only includes the cash-financed component of takeovers. The
univariate comparison of both samples gives some weak support to the hypothesis that firms
accessing the bond market invest relatively more than firms that do not access it. Firms tapping
the bond market spend an amount equivalent to 7.4% of their (lagged) total assets on capital
expenditures, compared to the 7.3% spent by other firms. A similar situation is observed when
examining the cash-financed component of the takeovers: firms with bond market financing
spend 3.6% while firms without bond market financing spend 3.4% of lagged total assets.
However, only the latter difference is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
Next, in Figure 4.1 I plot the average investment in capex, acquisitions, and their sum (total
investment), scaled by lagged total assets, around the year in which firms start borrowing from
the public debt market (t=0). In order to ensure that the averages can be compared across
years, I only include firms for which there is data available for all the years. This criteria
results in 319 firms being included in the total investment average, 326 firms being included
in the acquisitions average, and 440 firms being included in the capex average. The relative
spike in acquisitions just before and in t=0 suggests that many firms may be accessing the
bond market to finance a specific takeover, or may inherit such access from the target firm
they acquire.9 To mitigate concerns with reverse causality, in my later analyses I lag all the
independent variables by one year. There is a large drop in the level of firm investment from
year t to t+1, which does not get reversed over the following years - if anything, the level
of investment is reduced even further several years after the first time the firm accesses the
bond market. This visual pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that firms reduce their level
of investment once they access the public debt market due to the increase in agency costs
of debt. However, despite the suggestive evidence in Figure 4.1, before inferring causality it
is necessary to control for other factors that may impact both the investment policy and the
likelihood of accessing the bond market and to address endogeneity concerns.
9Excluding firms that make significant acquisitions in any of the years (e.g., with acquisitions over lagged
total assets above 10%) leads to a very similar plot to the one reported regarding the level of capital expenditures.
This result reduces concerns that the change in investment I report is driven by firms that make large acquisitions
and are spending their resources in integrating the firms. I return to this issue in Section 4.7.
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Figure 4.1
Firm Investment and Public Debt Market Access
This plot presents corporate investment as a percentage of lagged total assets around the first year a
firm accesses the bond market (t=0). A firm is defined as accessing the bond market if there is both a
Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating in Compustat and a bond outstanding in Mergent
FISD in the last month of the fiscal year. Total Investment is the sum of the average of Acquisitions/TA
and of Capex/TA for 319 firms with complete data for the 10 years surrounding the first year a firm
accesses the bond market. Acquisitions is the average Acquisitions/TA for 326 firms with complete
data for the 10 years surrounding the first year a firm accesses the bond market. Capex is the average
Capex/TA for 440 firms with complete data for the 10 years surrounding the first year a firm accesses
the bond market.
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4.4 Multivariate Results
In this section I analyze the effect of accessing the bond market on corporate investment in
a multivariate setting. The control variables I use are based on Sufi (2009) and on Gaspar
et al. (2005). These variables are in Table 4.1 and include firm size, market to book ratio, cash
flow, leverage, and firm age. In order to ensure that any effect reported does not arise from
differences in the creditworthiness between the firms accessing the bond market and the other
firms, I also control for the firms’ modified Altman Z-score. Finally, I include variables to
capture the firm’s visibility, namely indicator variables to whether it belongs to the S&P 500
index or trades on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). As with obtaining credit ratings
(Faulkender and Petersen (2006)), more visible firms may find it easier to raise financing for
investments and/or may engage more often in acquisitions as they make a more attractive
merging partner.
4.4.1 Capital Expenditures
I regress the yearly capital expenditures made by each firm, scaled by lagged total assets, on
a dummy taking value one if a firm has both a credit rating and a bond outstanding at the end
of the financial year (Access Dummy), and on the set of control variables described before. In
most cases a firm chooses whether it wants to access the bond market or not. Given that this
process is endogenous, appropriate techniques must be used to allow to infer causality. One
concern is that firms do not alter their investment policy as a result of accessing the public
debt market, but rather because they make (or will make) a large investment or acquisition
they issue a bond. This possibility seems even more relevant following the evidence presented
in Figure 4.1 of a spike in investment just before and around the first time a firm accesses the
bond market. Another potential problem is that some omitted variable, such as good industry
prospects, may drive both the decision of the firm to get bond financing and the change in
investment.
I address both issues in several ways. Firstly, to partly mitigate the concern that a firm
accesses the bond market when making a large investment, I use a one year lag on all the
independent variables. Secondly, to reduce the probability that an unobservable industry effect
or shock drives the reported relation, I estimate the models including one dummy variable per
industry-year interaction (Kisgen (2009); Sufi (2009)). I use Fama and French (1997) 48
industries classification. Any effect on investment that arises from industry-wide shocks is
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captured by these dummies, which amount to more than 900 in the main specifications.
In Model (1) of Table 4.2 the coefficient on the Access Dummy variable is not significantly
different from zero. However, it is likely that there are still other firm-specific characteristics
impacting investment that I am not taking into account. I thus re-estimate the model using
firm fixed effects.10 Note that as a result the estimate of the coefficient of the Access Dummy
variable is based only on the firms that start/stop using the bond market during the sample
period. Once firm time-invariant unobservable characteristics are accounted for in Model (2),
the coefficient on the Access Dummy becomes significantly negative, and implies that firms
accessing the bond market spend on average less 0.6% of total assets per year on capital invest-
ment. Given that on average firms spend almost 7.4% of total assets on capital expenditures,
this coefficient means that the use of the public debt market is associated with a reduction of
almost 8.2% on an average firm’s capital investment level. This result supports the hypothesis
that firms accessing the bond market reduce their level of investment to mitigate information
asymmetry and moral hazard concerns from dispersed lenders. It is inconsistent with the hy-
pothesis that these firms increase their investment level due to their better access to financing.
In addition to the use of an extensive set of control variables, industry-year fixed effects,
and firm fixed effects, the fact that I find a negative relation between corporate investment level
and bond market access further mitigates concerns with endogeneity. It is difficult to think of
an alternative factor that leads firms to both choose to start accessing debt markets and reduce
investment level other than their maturity and growth opportunities, which I control for. The
hypothesized effect of a positive relation between corporate investment and bond market ac-
cess would have been more prone to endogeneity concerns: a firm could choose to tap debt
markets in anticipation of an increase in financing needs related to investment. Nevertheless,
it is still possible that there are time-variant, non industry-specific factors impacting the re-
lation between corporate investment and bond market access. To confirm that the relation I
report is not driven by omitted variables, in Models (3) and (4) I estimate an instrumental vari-
ables model to ensure that the accessing the bond market can be treated as exogenous factor.
Since the endogenous variable (Access Dummy) is binary, I follow the procedure described in
Wooldridge (2002) (p. 623).
I first estimate the likelihood that a firm uses the public debt market, based on Faulkender
and Petersen (2006). I follow these authors in including as an instrumental variable a measure
10The NYSE dummy drops out in all the panel regressions with firm fixed effects because no firm changes
from being listed on the NYSE to another exchange during the sample period.
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Table 4.2
Analysis of Capital Expenditures
This table presents the analysis of capital expenditures for the overall sample. The sample includes all
Compustat firm-year observations of US-incorporated public firms between 1986 and 2008 with total
assets and sales above 1 million dollars. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) and financials
(SIC codes between 6000 and 6800) are excluded. Access Dummy takes value one for observations
for which there is both a Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating in Compustat and a bond
outstanding in Mergent FISD in the last month of the fiscal year. All other variables are defined in the
Appendix. All independent variables are lagged one year in relation to the dependent variable, except
in Model (3). Model (1) is estimated using OLS. Model (2) is estimated using firm fixed effects. Model
(3) is estimated using a Probit regression. Model (4) is the second stage of an instrumental variables
estimation in which the first stage includes the same independent variables plus the fitted probability
given by Model (3) as an instrument. All models except Models (3) and (4) include a dummy per
interaction of Fama and French (1997) industry and year. Models (3) and (4) include Fama and French
(1997) industry and year fixed effects separately. The constant term is included but not reported. T-stats
are in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capex/TAt Capex/TAt Access Dummyt-1 Capex/TAt
OLS Firm Fixed Probit Instrumental
Effects Variables
Access Dummyt-1 0.002 -0.006*** -0.026***
(1.308) (-3.071) (-4.304)
Total Assetst-1 0.001* -0.017*** 0.520*** 0.002***
(1.722) (-20.011) (26.938) (3.978)
Market to Book 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.060*** 0.008***
Ratiot-1 (19.697) (18.163) (4.538) (20.376)
Cash Flowt-1 0.044*** 0.012*** 0.162 0.043***
(16.679) (5.798) (1.557) (16.418)
Market Leveraget-1 -0.045*** -0.078*** 1.424*** -0.042***
(-18.198) (-25.983) (15.464) (-16.008)
Firm Aget-1 -0.012*** -0.009*** 0.118*** -0.012***
(-14.086) (-4.468) (3.811) (-13.638)
Modified Altman -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.025** -0.001***
Z- scoret-1 (-4.312) (5.309) (-2.528) (-3.582)
S&P 500t-1 -0.008*** -0.003 0.054 -0.001
(-3.417) (-1.352) (0.769) (-0.457)
NYSE listedt-1 0.007*** 0.293*** 0.009***
(3.746) (5.639) (4.950)
Percentage Accesst-1 4.298***
(8.972)
Observations 84,556 84,556 84,556 84,556
Adjusted R-Squared 0.256 0.169 0.227
Pseudo R-Squared 0.460
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for the relative easiness with which a firm can start tapping the bond market. The variable I
use is the (natural logarithm of one plus the) proportion of firms accessing the bond market in
the firm’s Fama and French (1997) industry in a given year. This variable is expected to be
associated with the probability of using the public debt market as it is easier for firms to start
issuing bonds if bond investors are already familiar with comparable companies. However,
since I include industry fixed effects and an extensive set of control variables for firm maturity
and growth opportunities in the second-stage regression, this variable is likely to be indepen-
dent of the firm’s investment decisions and of their interaction with industry membership.11
As control variables I use all the variables used in the regression on the level of investment.
The results of this Probit regression are shown in Table 4.2, Model (3), and are largely con-
sistent with Faulkender and Petersen (2006). A test that the instrument used is significantly
different from zero gives a t-statistic of 8.972 (p-value of 0.000), a necessary condition for
good identification of the system. Given that the endogenous variable is binary, I cannot rely
on the standard instrumental variables method. Instead, I obtain the probability of accessing
the bond market given by this model and use it as an instrument for bond market access in a
standard two stage least squares model, thereby accounting for the endogeneity arising from
the firm’s choice to issue a bond (Faulkender and Petersen (2006); Wooldridge (2002)).12
The inference that accessing the bond market causes a significant reduction in the level
of capital expenditures is confirmed in the instrumental variables estimation. The impact is
again statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Economically, the coefficient on
the Access Dummy is much larger in the instrumental variables estimation than in the fixed
effects model, implying a reduction in the level of capital expenditures of 2.6% of lagged total
assets.13
11In unreported robustness checks I include additional proxies to capture industry dynamics, such as growth
in sales, changes in assets, or changes in growth opportunities at the industry level. Results are unchanged,
mitigating concerns that the instrumental variable used is correlated with investment level through its link with
industry maturity.
12Exclusion restrictions are not strictly necessary for identification of the system, due to the nonlinearity of
the fitted probability in relation to the exogenous variables. However, it is generally advisable to have at least
one, and, as explained above, I use the Percentage Access variable for that purpose. Since this variable is varying
on an industry-year basis, I introduce industry and year fixed effects separately in the regressions rather than
industry-year fixed effects.
13I repeat all the main analyses of the chapter using instead a Heckman (1979) selection model (with and
without the use of the instrumental variable) as in, for example, Kisgen et al. (2009). Unreported results are very
similar to the ones reported for the instrumental variables specification, with the coefficients being only smaller
in magnitude. Statistical significance is unchanged. In addition, I repeat all the analyses including more terms to
capture the relation between investment and firm size to ensure that this relation is not influencing the results of
the instrumental variables regressions. More specifically, I add the squared term of the log of total assets and the
total assets (without log) to the second-stage regressions. Results become slightly stronger.
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4.4.2 Corporate Takeovers
Acquisitions of other firms are one of the most important events in the life of a company
and a way to grow rapidly. As such, if firms adjust capital investment decisions as a result of
accessing the bond market, there should also be a change in corporate takeovers. However, the
expected relation between acquisitions and debt markets depends on how these acquisitions
are paid for. Cash-financed acquisitions (including the share of mixed offers financed with
cash) are more likely to be affected by the ease with which financing can be obtained and are
more likely to raise concerns from creditors, as they often involve an increase in leverage and
reduce the asset liquidity of the firm. Equity-financed acquisitions do not require raising debt,
and may or may not result in a reduction in leverage or a decrease in the risk of the existing
debt claims. As my hypotheses only have clear predictions for cash-financed acquisitions, I
focus on these in the empirical analysis.
In Table 4.3 I present the results of an analysis similar to the one in Table 4.2 but with
cash acquisitions scaled by total assets as the dependent variable. Once again, controlling for
time-invariant firm characteristics is very important: the coefficient on accessing the public
debt market switches from non-statistically different from zero to significantly negative from
Model (1) to Model (2). In the latter model, with firm fixed effects, accessing the bond market
is associated with a reduction in acquisitions spending of 1.3% of total assets. This effect
is equivalent to a drop of 38.4% on the average cash-financed acquisitions spending of firms
(which equals 3.4% of total assets). Although I do not directly test it, it is likely that part of
this drop is due to replacement of cash with equity as the financing method in takeovers.
As with the analysis of capital expenditures, the fact that I uncover a negative relation
between corporate takeovers and debt market access further reduces endogeneity concerns.
Nevertheless, in Model (3) of Table 4.3 I show that the previously reported negative relation
also holds using the instrumental variables procedure of Model (4) of Table 4.2, with the
coefficient on the Access Dummy being statistically significant at the 99% level. However, its
high point estimate should be interpreted with caution, as it is likely that its value is upward
biased because of the large concentration of observations with a value of zero.
It is noticeable from the comparison between the previous two tables that the level of
spending on acquisitions is more dramatically reduced than the level of spending on cap-
ital expenditures. Corporate acquisitions are typically associated with higher information
asymmetry and provide more room for moral hazard than internal investments (Moeller et al.
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Table 4.3
Analysis of Takeovers
This table presents the analysis of completed takeovers for the overall sample. The sample includes all
Compustat firm-year observations of US-incorporated public firms between 1986 and 2008 with total
assets and sales above 1 million dollars. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) and financials
(SIC codes between 6000 and 6800) are excluded. Access Dummy takes value one for observations
for which there is both a Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating in Compustat and a bond
outstanding in Mergent FISD in the last month of the fiscal year. All other variables are defined in the
Appendix. All independent variables are lagged one year in relation to the dependent variable. Model
(1) is estimated using OLS. Model (2) is estimated using firm fixed effects. Model (3) is the second
stage of an instrumental variables estimation in which the first stage includes the same independent
variables plus the fitted probability given by Model (3) in Table 4.2 as an instrument. All models
except Model (3) include a dummy per interaction of Fama and French (1997) industry and year.
Model (3) includes Fama and French (1997) industry and year fixed effects separately. The constant
term is included but not reported. T-stats are in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence
level.
(1) (2) (3)
Acqs/TAt Acqs/TAt Acqs/TAt
OLS Firm Fixed Instrumental
Effects Variables
Access Dummyt-1 0.001 -0.013*** -0.048***
(0.541) (-4.327) (-8.827)
Total Assetst-1 0.003*** -0.017*** 0.005***
(7.921) (-14.415) (11.633)
Market to Book 0.001*** 0.000 0.001***
Ratiot-1 (3.333) (1.058) (4.263)
Cash Flowt-1 0.020*** 0.003 0.021***
(9.193) (1.397) (9.932)
Market Leveraget-1 -0.031*** -0.106*** -0.024***
(-14.666) (-25.226) (-10.487)
Firm Aget-1 -0.009*** -0.000 -0.009***
(-11.253) (-0.094) (-10.000)
Modified Altman 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
Z- scoret-1 (1.182) (5.825) (0.856)
S&P 500t-1 -0.012*** 0.011*** -0.001
(-6.043) (2.577) (-0.250)
NYSE listedt-1 0.013*** 0.016***
(7.091) (8.373)
Observations 82,374 82,374 82,374
Adjusted R-Squared 0.041 0.049 0.024
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(2007); Morck et al. (1990)), resulting on average in bondholder losses (Billett et al. (2004)).
The evidence that firms restrict more their level of acquisitions than of capital expenditures is
thus supportive of the view that firms internalize debtors’ concerns when making investment
decisions.
Given that bond markets facilitate firms’ access to financing, the results in this section
suggest that the use of investment level (investment over total assets) may sometimes not be
appropriate in tests of the financial constraints faced by firms. In unreported analyses, I find
that firms that access the bond market significantly increase their assets and their investment
scaled by capital stock. This evidence is consistent with the intuition that firms that use the
public debt market can more easily access financing to purse investment opportunities at an
individual firm level. However, my results on the level of investment show that the usage
of more information-sensitive sources of debt capital, such as bond financing, leads firms to
reduce their investment as a fraction of the total resources they control. Aggregated over the
whole economy, this finding implies that, if all firms accessed public debt markets and the
level of capital available would be unchanged, there would be less investment in the economy
as a result of information asymmetry and agency costs.
4.4.3 Cross-Sectional Variation
So far the evidence presented suggests that firms reduce agency costs of debt by restricting
the investment level when accessing markets with more uninformed investors. An additional
way of testing whether this is the case is by examining the cross-sectional variation in the
reduction in the level of investment. According to financial theory, the conflict of interests
between debtholders and equityholders is stronger the closer the firm is to financial distress
(Jensen and Meckling (1976)). As such, if firms adjust their actions to minimize agency costs
of debt, they should reduce investment the most when they are less creditworthy. Of course,
any empirical test has to make sure that such firms are not reducing investment because of
being in financial difficulties. I thus split the sample according to different measures of credit
risk and run separate regressions to understand the impact of bond market access on firm
investment levels across the different subsamples. I use the firms’ modified Altman Z-score
(MacKie-Mason (1990)) and (predicted) credit rating level as measures of credit risk.14 For
14Given that unrated firms, of course, do not have credit ratings, for the partition on credit ratings I use the
fitted value of a regression on observed credit ratings (unreported). The independent variables are total assets,
cash flow, market leverage, modified Altman Z-score, and PPE over total assets. I also include year and industry
fixed effects. The fit of the model is good, with an adjusted R-squared of 69.48%.
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the latter I split the group into firms predicted to have a non-investment grade rating (BB+ and
below) and the ones predicted to have an investment grade rating (BBB− or above).
In Table 4.4 I re-run the fixed effects model of Tables 4.2 and 4.3.15 Again I include
industry fixed effects interacted with year fixed effects. I regress the firm characteristics and
the Access Dummy on capital investment (Models (1) to (4)) and on cash-financed acquisitions
(Models (5) to (8)), both scaled by lagged total assets. I run each specification twice: in
Models (1) and (5), I only include the bottom tercile of the whole sample when sorted by the
modified Altman Z-score in year t-1. In Models (2) and (6) I only include the corresponding
top tercile. Lower levels of the Z-score are associated with a worse credit score, and thus for
that subsample I expect the effect of accessing the public debt market on investment to be
stronger.
In Table 4.4 I show that it is indeed the case that the effect of tapping the bond market
is stronger among firms with a weaker credit profile. In the capital expenditures regressions,
the coefficient of the variable Access Dummy is significantly lower in the regression includ-
ing only the bottom tercile of the sample in terms of modified Altman Z-score than in the
regression including only the corresponding top tercile. In the latter subsample the effect of
accessing the bond market on investment level is not statistically different from zero. The
p-value for a one-sided t-test that the coefficient of the Access Dummy is lower in the low
Z-score regressions than in the high Z-score regressions is 0.010. However, in the acquisitions
regressions there is no significant difference between the coefficients of the Access Dummy.
The difference in the capital expenditures regression gives support to the hypothesis that
the effect of accessing debt markets on firm investment is stronger for companies in which
the debtholders/equityholders conflict is more pronounced, i.e., firms with higher credit risk
(Nash et al. (2003)). This result does not arise from firms that tap the public debt market being
only in either of the subsamples used: the proportion of such firms in the bottom tercile of the
distribution sorted by the modified Altman Z-score is 8.5% and in the top tercile subsample is
9.8%.
15In Table A.1 in the Internet Appendix (available with the working paper version of this chapter at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899644) I run the cross-sectional analysis using the instru-
mental variables approach. Main conclusions are unchanged.
Public Debt Market Access and Corporate Investment 105
Ta
bl
e
4.
4
C
ro
ss
-S
ec
tio
na
lA
na
ly
si
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
l
an
al
ys
is
of
ca
pi
ta
l
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
an
d
co
rp
or
at
e
ta
ke
ov
er
s
fo
r
th
e
ov
er
al
l
sa
m
pl
e.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
in
cl
ud
es
al
lC
om
pu
st
at
fir
m
-y
ea
ro
bs
er
va
tio
ns
of
U
S-
in
co
rp
or
at
ed
pu
bl
ic
fir
m
s
be
tw
ee
n
19
86
an
d
20
08
w
ith
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
an
d
sa
le
s
ab
ov
e
1
m
ill
io
n
do
lla
rs
.
U
til
iti
es
(S
IC
co
de
s
be
tw
ee
n
49
00
an
d
49
99
)
an
d
fin
an
ci
al
s
(S
IC
co
de
s
be
tw
ee
n
60
00
an
d
68
00
)
ar
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
.
M
od
el
s
(1
)
an
d
(5
)
in
cl
ud
e
on
ly
th
e
bo
tto
m
te
rc
ile
of
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
so
rt
ed
by
th
e
m
od
ifi
ed
A
ltm
an
Z
-s
co
re
in
th
e
ye
ar
t-
1.
M
od
el
s
(2
)
an
d
(6
)
in
cl
ud
e
th
e
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
in
th
e
co
rr
es
po
nd
in
g
to
p
te
rc
ile
.
M
od
el
s
(3
)
an
d
(7
)
in
cl
ud
e
on
ly
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
w
ith
a
pr
ed
ic
te
d
cr
ed
it
ra
tin
g
be
lo
w
B
B
B
−
(e
xc
lu
si
ve
)
fo
r
th
e
ye
ar
t-
1.
M
od
el
s
(4
)
an
d
(8
)
in
cl
ud
e
on
ly
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
w
ith
a
pr
ed
ic
te
d
cr
ed
it
ra
tin
g
ab
ov
e
B
B
B
−
(i
nc
lu
si
ve
)f
or
th
e
ye
ar
t-
1.
T
he
pr
ed
ic
te
d
cr
ed
it
ra
tin
g
is
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
fit
te
d
va
lu
e
of
a
re
gr
es
si
on
on
th
e
S&
P
ra
tin
g
of
al
lt
he
ra
te
d
fir
m
s,
us
in
g
as
re
gr
es
so
rs
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
To
ta
lA
ss
et
s,
C
as
h
Fl
ow
,
M
ar
ke
tL
ev
er
ag
e,
M
od
ifi
ed
A
ltm
an
Z
-S
co
re
,P
PE
ov
er
To
ta
lA
ss
et
s,
an
d
ye
ar
an
d
in
du
st
ry
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s.
A
cc
es
s
D
um
m
y
ta
ke
s
va
lu
e
on
e
fo
ro
bs
er
va
tio
ns
fo
rw
hi
ch
th
er
e
is
bo
th
a
St
an
da
rd
an
d
Po
or
’s
lo
ng
-t
er
m
is
su
er
cr
ed
it
ra
tin
g
in
C
om
pu
st
at
an
d
a
bo
nd
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
in
M
er
ge
nt
FI
SD
in
th
e
la
st
m
on
th
of
th
e
fis
ca
ly
ea
r.
A
ll
ot
he
r
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
de
fin
ed
in
th
e
A
pp
en
di
x.
T
he
N
Y
SE
du
m
m
y
is
in
cl
ud
ed
bu
te
qu
al
s
ze
ro
in
al
lt
he
m
od
el
s.
A
ll
in
de
pe
nd
en
tv
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
la
gg
ed
on
e
ye
ar
in
re
la
tio
n
to
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
.
A
ll
m
od
el
s
ar
e
es
tim
at
ed
us
in
g
fir
m
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
an
d
in
cl
ud
e
a
du
m
m
y
pe
r
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
of
Fa
m
a
an
d
Fr
en
ch
(1
99
7)
in
du
st
ry
an
d
ye
ar
.
T-
st
at
s
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
si
s
an
d
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
ro
bu
st
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
fir
m
le
ve
l.
*,
**
,a
nd
**
*
re
pr
es
en
ts
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
th
e
90
%
,9
5%
,a
nd
99
%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
le
ve
l.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
C
ap
ex
/T
A
t
C
ap
ex
/T
A
t
C
ap
ex
/T
A
t
C
ap
ex
/T
A
t
A
cq
s/
TA
t
A
cq
s/
TA
t
A
cq
s/
TA
t
A
cq
s/
TA
t
L
ow
H
ig
h
L
ow
H
ig
h
L
ow
H
ig
h
L
ow
H
ig
h
Z
-s
co
re
Z
-s
co
re
R
at
in
g
R
at
in
g
Z
-s
co
re
Z
-s
co
re
R
at
in
g
R
at
in
g
A
cc
es
s
D
um
m
y t
-1
-0
.0
16
**
*
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
06
**
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
20
**
*
-0
.0
05
(-
3.
02
5)
(-
0.
66
2)
(-
2.
52
4)
(-
0.
35
2)
(-
1.
14
8)
(-
0.
70
4)
(-
4.
83
6)
(-
1.
10
7)
To
ta
lA
ss
et
s t
-1
-0
.0
21
**
*
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
22
**
*
-0
.0
08
**
*
-0
.0
17
**
*
-0
.0
25
**
*
(-
11
.4
44
)
(-
11
.1
87
)
(-
18
.2
79
)
(-
8.
42
3)
(-
9.
67
0)
(-
3.
42
1)
(-
13
.2
70
)
(-
6.
50
2)
M
ar
ke
tt
o
B
oo
k
0.
00
7*
**
0.
00
6*
**
0.
00
7*
**
0.
00
6*
**
0.
00
1*
*
-0
.0
03
**
*
0.
00
1
-0
.0
03
**
R
at
io
t-
1
(1
2.
82
4)
(7
.8
56
)
(1
6.
99
4)
(7
.8
92
)
(2
.1
54
)
(-
2.
89
9)
(1
.2
70
)
(-
1.
98
4)
C
as
h
Fl
ow
t-
1
0.
00
4
0.
04
4*
**
0.
01
2*
**
0.
04
8*
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
3
0.
01
8
(1
.4
21
)
(4
.9
21
)
(5
.5
52
)
(3
.3
65
)
(0
.0
17
)
(0
.1
68
)
(1
.3
09
)
(0
.7
71
)
C
on
tin
ue
d
on
th
e
ne
xt
pa
ge
106 Chapter 4
Ta
bl
e
4.
4
–
C
on
tin
ue
d
fr
om
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
pa
ge
M
ar
ke
tL
ev
er
ag
e t
-1
-0
.0
76
**
*
-0
.0
70
**
*
-0
.0
77
**
*
-0
.0
75
**
*
-0
.0
73
**
*
-0
.1
07
**
*
-0
.1
06
**
*
-0
.1
09
**
*
(-
13
.7
43
)
(-
13
.2
95
)
(-
24
.1
11
)
(-
9.
59
4)
(-
10
.3
07
)
(-
12
.4
88
)
(-
23
.6
03
)
(-
7.
66
2)
Fi
rm
A
ge
t-
1
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
12
**
*
-0
.0
12
**
*
0.
00
1
0.
00
4
0.
00
1
0.
02
1*
**
(-
3.
16
5)
(-
1.
20
3)
(-
5.
07
2)
(-
2.
82
6)
(0
.2
60
)
(0
.8
41
)
(0
.3
00
)
(2
.9
89
)
M
od
ifi
ed
A
ltm
an
0.
00
2*
**
0.
00
1
0.
00
1*
**
0.
00
1
0.
00
2*
**
0.
00
5*
*
0.
00
2*
**
0.
01
6*
**
Z
-s
co
re
t-
1
(5
.3
22
)
(0
.3
91
)
(5
.2
96
)
(0
.4
95
)
(5
.3
64
)
(2
.2
99
)
(5
.3
39
)
(4
.9
78
)
S&
P
50
0 t
-1
0.
00
5
-0
.0
07
**
-0
.0
02
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
-0
.0
01
0.
00
2
0.
01
1*
*
(0
.7
54
)
(-
2.
22
1)
(-
0.
50
9)
(0
.7
11
)
(0
.3
77
)
(-
0.
14
4)
(0
.1
98
)
(2
.2
40
)
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
28
,1
86
28
,1
85
72
,5
00
18
,0
18
27
,4
58
27
,4
58
71
,1
08
17
,0
26
A
dj
us
te
d
R
-S
qu
ar
ed
0.
15
0
0.
16
9
0.
16
2
0.
26
8
0.
04
9
0.
04
3
0.
05
2
0.
06
1
Public Debt Market Access and Corporate Investment 107
I also divide the sample on the basis of predicted credit ratings. In Models (3) and (7)
I include only observations that have a predicted credit rating below investment grade in the
year t-1. In Models (4) and (8) I include only observations that are predicted to be investment
grade in the year t-1. The coefficient on the dummy for accessing the public debt market is
significantly more negative in the regressions including only the subsample with weaker credit
profile (non-investment grade) than in the the regressions including only the subsample with
stronger credit profile (investment grade) (the p-value of a one-sided t-test is 0.089 for the
capex regression and 0.007 for the acquisitions regression).
Overall the evidence presented in this subsection is consistent with the hypothesis that
firms reduce their investment levels when accessing the bond market in order to induce unin-
formed investors to hold their debt, effectively internalizing the agency costs of debt in their
decisions. As expected under this hypothesis, such change is significantly stronger for firms
with higher credit risk, for which there are more concerns of wealth transfers from debtholders
to equityholders.
4.5 Additional Analysis
If a firm reduces its investment level once it accesses the public debt market to satisfy bond-
holders, it should also adjust some of its other actions to further facilitate future access to the
bond market. For example, regarding dividend policies, Aivazian et al. (2006) show that rated
firms are more likely to smooth their dividend payments. Following this idea, in this section
I analyze whether a firm accessing the bond market abides more closely by debt covenants
and/or whether it changes the level of payouts to equityholders.16
4.5.1 Covenant Violations
It is unlikely that the changes in firm behaviour after accessing the public debt market that I
report occur directly as a result of financial covenants. Private lenders use stricter covenants
than lenders in public markets (Chava and Roberts (2008); Nini et al. (2010)). Furthermore,
less than 5% of public bonds have investment covenants (Billett et al. (2007)). Merger re-
16In both analyses in this section I assume that the instrument I use in the previous instrumental variables
regressions (percentage of firms accessing the bond market per industry-year) is exogenous in relation to covenant
violations and shareholder payouts. Given that I control for industry and year fixed effects and for the main known
determinants of both dependent variables, this assumption seems to be valid.
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strictions are more widely used, but mostly only require the surviving entity of the merger
to meet all the covenants and payments of previously issued debt (Billett et al. (2007); Nash
et al. (2003)). There are doubts over whether these requirements restrict mergers at all, given
their low threshold and the existence of several loopholes (Moody’s (2006)). The restriction
of investment through the use of covenants restricting the level of debt also does not seem to
occur, as leverage is significantly higher for firms with non-private debt.
However, if a firm wants to take into account its debtholders’ preferences to ensure better
access to financing in the future, it is likely that it becomes more concerned with violating
existing debt covenants. Such violations, although fairly common, send a negative signal to
debtholders and allow them to intervene more actively in the firm (Nini et al. (2010)). I thus
examine whether borrowers violate covenants less often once they access the bond market. I
do so by running a Probit regression on the likelihood of having a new covenant violation in a
given year using as regressors the same variables as in Table 4.2.17
In Model (1) of Table 4.5 I report that firms accessing the bond market are significantly
less likely to violate debt covenants in comparison to other firms. In Model (2) I use an
instrumental variables Probit, using as instrument in the first stage the probability that a firm
accesses the bond market estimated as in the Model (3) of Table 4.2. I again find evidence
that using the bond market is negatively associated with covenant violations. This result is
consistent with firms adjusting their actions to increase their appeal to debt investors once
they start accessing the bond market. However, it should be interpreted with caution. It is
also possible that the negative relation between new violations of covenants and public debt
market access is partly driven by banks reducing the tightness of debt covenants once they
have a smaller claim on the firm’s debt. As such, I interpret the evidence in Table 4.5 merely
as consistent with my hypothesis.
4.5.2 Payouts to Equityholders
Following the argument expressed above, I expect that firms accessing the bond market adjust
their payouts to equityholders in order to leave more money in the firm, thereby reducing
debtholders’ concerns. To test whether this effect appears in the data, I analyze the relation
between shareholder payouts and firms’ use of the bond market using the methodology of
17For this purpose I use the data kindly made available by Amir Sufi on his website
(http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.htm) and described in detail in the data appendix of Nini
et al. (2010).
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Table 4.5
Analysis of Violation of Covenants
This table presents the analysis of new violations of covenants for the overall sample. The sam-
ple includes all Compustat firm-year observations of US-incorporated public firms between 1986
and 2008 with total assets and sales above 1 million dollars. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900
and 4999) and financials (SIC codes between 6000 and 6800) are excluded. Access Dummy takes
value one for observations for which there is both a Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rat-
ing in Compustat and a bond outstanding in Mergent FISD in the last month of the fiscal year. New
Covenant Violation is equal to one if the company is reported to having been in violation of a finan-
cial covenant in any of the 4 quarters preceding the end of the financial year and was not in viola-
tion of any covenant the year t-1. I obtain the data on covenants violation from Amir Sufi’s website
(http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.htm). For its detailed description see the data appendix
of Nini et al. (2010). All other variables are defined in the Appendix. All independent variables are
lagged one year in relation to the dependent variable. Model (1) is estimated using a Probit regression.
Model (2) is estimated using an instrumental variables Probit regression in which the first stage in-
cludes the same independent variables plus the fitted probability given by Model (3) in Table 4.2 as an
instrument. Model (1) includes a dummy per interaction of Fama and French (1997) industry and year.
Model (2) includes Fama and French (1997) industry and year fixed effects separately. The constant
term is included but not reported. T-stats are in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence
level.
(1) (2)
New Covenant Violationt New Covenant Violationt
Probit Instrumental Variables
Access Dummyt-1 -0.061* -0.179*
(-1.840) (-1.734)
Total Assetst-1 -0.006 0.001
(-0.991) (0.181)
Market to Book -0.019*** -0.016***
Ratiot-1 (-3.135) (-2.788)
Cash Flowt-1 0.090** 0.062
(2.020) (1.421)
Market Leveraget-1 0.627*** 0.632***
(15.603) (14.739)
Firm Aget-1 -0.083*** -0.081***
(-6.316) (-6.181)
Modified Altman 0.010** 0.011**
Z- scoret-1 (2.553) (2.932)
S&P 500t-1 -0.226*** -0.193***
(-4.364) (-3.328)
NYSE listedt-1 -0.258*** -0.242***
(-9.163) (-8.085)
Observations 47,412 48,109
Pseudo R-Squared 0.056
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Table 4.2. I measure the shareholder payouts of each firm by adding the total dividends paid
in a given year and the value spent on shares repurchases, scaled by lagged total assets (Brown
et al. (2007)).
In Table 4.6 I show that firms tapping the bond market have significantly lower levels of
payouts to equityholders. More specifically, when including firm fixed effects, accessing the
bond market is associated with a reduction in total payouts to shareholders of 0.4% of total
assets (Model (2)), which is equivalent to a reduction of 14.0% in payouts for the average firm.
These results provide strong support to the hypothesis that firms accessing the bond market
adjust their actions to reduce debtholders’ concerns. Furthermore, they are difficult to explain
outside my theoretical framework. Explanations based on an omitted characteristic of the firm
driving both the decision to access the bond market and the reduction in investment level, such
as the maturity of the industry or the reduction in firm-specific growth opportunities, predict
an increase in payouts to equityholders, which is in sharp contrast to my empirical findings.
Furthermore, in Model (3) I confirm that the negative relation between bond market access
and equity payouts is robust to estimation using the instrumental variables approach. As in the
case of acquisitions, it is not recommended to use the point estimate for inferring the economic
impact due to the large concentration of observations with a zero as the dependent variable,
but the statistical significance of the results is again very high.
4.6 Alternative Explanations
In this section I address alternative explanations for the findings reported in the previous sec-
tions. I start by examining whether the increase in debt levels associated with accessing the
public debt market, reported by Faulkender and Petersen (2006), disciplines managers and
forces them to reduce wasteful spending (Jensen (1986)), resulting in the reduction in invest-
ment level that I report. Given that previous analyses control (linearly) for leverage, such
effect would have to arise from a non-linear impact of leverage on managers’ actions or from
the fact that the impact of debt on managers’ actions is better captured by some other metric.
In addition, it must be noted that this interpretation is inconsistent with the reduction in pay-
outs that I find in Table 4.6. The free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) predicts that managers
of more leveraged firms make decisions that are better aligned with the interests of sharehold-
ers. As such, if it is the discipline introduced by public debt that forces managers to reduce
investment, the same discipline should lead them to make better takeover decisions.
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Table 4.6
Analysis of Payouts to Equityholders
This table presents the analysis of payouts to equityholders for the overall sample. The sample includes
all Compustat firm-year observations of US-incorporated public firms between 1986 and 2008 with to-
tal assets and sales above 1 million dollars. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) and financials
(SIC codes between 6000 and 6800) are excluded. Access Dummy takes value one for observations
for which there is both a Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating in Compustat and a bond
outstanding in Mergent FISD in the last month of the fiscal year. All other variables are defined in the
Appendix. All independent variables are lagged one year in relation to the dependent variable. Model
(1) is estimated using OLS. Model (2) is estimated using firm fixed effects. Model (3) is the second
stage of an instrumental variables estimation in which the first stage includes the same independent
variables plus the fitted probability given by Model (3) in Table 4.2 as an instrument. All models except
Model (3) include a dummy per interaction of Fama and French (1997) industry and year. Model
(3) includes Fama and French (1997) industry and year fixed effects separately. The constant term
is included but not reported. T-stats are in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clus-
tered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.
(1) (2) (3)
Payouts/TAt Payouts/TAt Payouts/TAt
OLS Firm Fixed Instrumental
Effects Variables
Access Dummyt-1 -0.004*** -0.004** -0.037***
(-3.081) (-2.541) (-6.927)
Total Assetst-1 0.002*** 0.001* 0.004***
(7.349) (1.705) (10.236)
Market to Book 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004***
Ratiot-1 (8.980) (3.622) (9.167)
Cash Flowt-1 -0.002 -0.006* -0.001
(-0.652) (-1.870) (-0.456)
Market Leveraget-1 -0.044*** -0.057*** -0.038***
(-22.360) (-21.638) (-16.767)
Firm Aget-1 0.008*** 0.019*** 0.009***
(13.835) (11.256) (14.157)
Modified Altman -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***
Z- scoret-1 (-4.267) (-5.271) (-5.233)
S&P 500t-1 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.026***
(7.772) (5.720) (8.746)
NYSE listedt-1 0.005*** 0.008***
(3.900) (5.558)
Observations 79,123 79,123 79,123
Adjusted R-Squared 0.080 0.038 0.064
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I test whether firms that use the public debt market make better acquisitions by running an
event study at the time of the announcement of takeovers. To ensure that I include acquisitions
that meaningfully affect the bidder’s value, I only include completed deals with a relative size
(defined as deal value over lagged bidder total assets) above 1%. I then regress the abnormal
returns from two days before until two days after the announcement date on a dummy for firms
accessing the bond market and on a set of deal and firm characteristics commonly used in the
literature (e.g., Masulis et al. (2007)). I again include the interaction of year and industry
dummies to capture industry-specific shocks in the OLS model. To capture the exogenous
effect of accessing the bond market on bidder returns I also use an instrumental variables
approach as the one of Models (3) and (4) of Table 4.2. Since the second-stage regression on
announcement returns includes only acquiring firms, I only include these firms in the Probit
regression on the likelihood of accessing the bond market.
In Models (1) and (2) of Table 4.7 I show that firms accessing the bond market do not have
significantly different abnormal returns at the time of the announcement of an acquisition. This
result is inconsistent with what would be predicted under a free cash flow theory explanation
of the negative relation between public debt market access and corporate investment level. In
Table A.2 in the Internet Appendix I split the sample based on the firms’ creditworthiness
using the modified Altman Z-score and the predicted credit rating. Firms more sensitive to
debtholders’ concerns (proxied by a lower modified Altman Z-score or by an estimated credit
rating below BBB−) do not experience significantly different abnormal returns. These results
are inconsistent with the possibility that the increase in debt brought by accessing the bond
market results in a disciplining of managers by more than what is already directly captured in
the coefficient of market leverage in the regressions.
An additional alternative interpretation of the negative relation between public debt market
access and investment level is related to debt overhang (Myers (1977)). It may be that firms
do not reduce their investment level to reduce agency costs of debt and access debt markets
on more favourable conditions, but rather because they have a large stock of debt they do not
pursue some of the positive NPV projects they have available. However, this explanation is not
consistent with the reduction in shareholders’ payouts that I report. In addition, there are three
other reasons to believe that it is not what is driving the results on the reduction in investment
level.
Firstly, I control for leverage in all my analysis. To the extent that debt overhang is related
to the stock of existing debt, this variable should capture most of its effect. Secondly, although
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the effect of the bond market access is stronger for companies closer to financial distress,
within the subsample of firms with lower creditworthiness firms accessing the bond market
are in a significantly better financial condition than firms without such access, as measured by
modified Altman Z-score, debt coverage, or interest coverage (unreported). As such, within
this subsample it seems unlikely that debt overhang would be more of a problem for the firms
using public debt than for the firms not using it, and that it would drive the results I report
regarding the lower investment levels of firms accessing the public debt market.
Table 4.7
Analysis of Announcement Returns
This table presents the analysis of cumulative abnormal returns at the an-
nouncement of takeovers for a subsample of acquisitions. The subsample
includes acquisitions completed by all the firms used in previous analyses
for which there is data available on SDC. Only offers for more than 50%
of the equity with information available on deal value in SDC are included.
Offers with a relative size below 1% are excluded. Access Dummy takes
value one for observations for which there is both a Standard and Poor’s
long-term issuer credit rating in Compustat and a bond outstanding in Mer-
gent FISD in the last month of the fiscal year. All other variables are defined
in the Appendix. All independent variables from accounting statements are
obtained from the financial year prior to the deal announcement. Model (1)
is estimated using OLS. Model (2) is the second stage of an instrumental
variables estimation in which the first stage includes the same independent
variables plus the fitted probability given by Model (3) in Table 4.2 as an
instrument, but including only the observations that relate to the subsam-
ple of acquisitions. Model (1) includes a dummy per interaction of Fama
and French (1997) industry and year. Model (2) includes Fama and French
(1997) industry and year fixed effects separately. The constant term is in-
cluded but not reported. T-stats are in parenthesis and are based on robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent signifi-
cance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.
(1) (2)
Bidder CAR Bidder CAR
OLS Instrumental
Variables
Access Dummy 0.001 -0.007
(0.676) (-1.074)
Bidder Total Assets -0.005*** -0.004***
(-5.760) (-3.873)
Bidder Market to Book -0.002*** -0.002***
Ratio (-3.075) (-2.878)
Continued on the next page
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Table 4.7 – Continued from the previous page
Bidder Cash Flow -0.013 -0.018*
(-1.292) (-1.876)
Bidder Market 0.023*** 0.029***
Leverage (3.675) (4.507)
Bidder Firm Age 0.001 0.001
(0.447) (0.865)
Bidder Modified 0.001 0.001**
Altman Z-score (1.619) (2.086)
Bidder S&P 500 0.007** 0.008***
(2.454) (3.101)
Bidder NYSE listed -0.000 0.000
(-0.060) (0.157)
Relative Size 0.005*** 0.005***
(2.967) (3.177)
Hostile/Unsolicited -0.013** -0.014**
(-2.084) (-2.591)
Percentage of Cash 0.000 0.000
(0.852) (0.896)
Target Public -0.033*** -0.033***
(-8.899) (-9.143)
Percentage of Cash 0.000*** 0.000***
* Target Public (4.606) (4.899)
Tender Offer 0.008* 0.008*
(1.948) (1.921)
Observations 13,517 13,499
Adjusted R-Squared 0.021 0.029
Finally, I check whether the results reported before are different in periods with more
macroeconomic risk, proxied by a recession indicator, or for firms with more short-term debt,
defined as debt maturing in less than 4 years as a fraction of total debt (Barclay and Smith
(1995)). Underinvestment should be more prevalent in bad economic times, when equity-
holders are even more reluctant to invest as they have to give a higher fraction of wealth to
debtholders (Chen and Manso (2010)). Also, debt overhang should be less of an issue in
firms with a higher fraction of short-term debt, as in such cases the debt is more likely to be
renegotiated before the investment options expire.
In Table 4.8 I show that there is no evidence in favor of an underinvestment story. In this
analysis I use interaction terms rather than splitting the sample because such split is equivalent
to a time-based split for the recession indicator and few firms using the bond market appear in
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Table 4.8
Underinvestment Analysis
This table presents the analysis of capital expenditures and corporate takeovers for the overall sample.
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations of US-incorporated public firms between
1986 and 2008 with total assets and sales above 1 million dollars. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900
and 4999) and financials (SIC codes between 6000 and 6800) are excluded. Access Dummy takes
value one for observations for which there is both a Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating
in Compustat and a bond outstanding in Mergent FISD in the last month of the fiscal year. Recession
Indicator is a dummy variable taking value one in a given year if more than three months were consid-
ered as part of a recessionary period by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). ST Debt
equals the fraction of debt maturing in three or less years over the total debt outstanding of the firm
(Barclay and Smith (1995)). Firms in which ST Debt is above one are excluded from Model (3) and
(4). All other variables are defined in the Appendix. The NYSE dummy is included but equals zero in
all the models. All independent variables are lagged one year in relation to the dependent variable. All
models are estimated using firm fixed effects and include a dummy per interaction of Fama and French
(1997) industry and year. T-stats are in parenthesis and are based on robust standard errors clustered at
the firm level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capex/TAt Acqs/TAt Capex/TAt Acqs/TAt
Access Dummyt-1 -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.003 -0.015***
(-3.620) (-4.145) (-1.290) (-4.130)
Access Dummyt-1 * 0.009*** -0.003
Recession Indicatort (4.873) (-0.958)
Access Dummyt-1 * -0.009** 0.009
ST Debtt-1 (-2.196) (1.307)
Total Assetst-1 -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.020***
(-20.013) (-14.415) (-15.210) (-13.586)
Market to Book 0.007*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.000
Ratiot-1 (18.160) (1.059) (12.451) (0.612)
Cash Flowt-1 0.012*** 0.003 0.016*** 0.004
(5.807) (1.394) (5.265) (1.092)
Market Leveraget-1 -0.078*** -0.106*** -0.085*** -0.111***
(-26.001) (-25.224) (-23.265) (-21.596)
Firm Aget-1 -0.009*** -0.000 -0.012*** -0.000
(-4.458) (-0.095) (-5.131) (-0.083)
Modified Altman 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002***
Z- scoret-1 (5.306) (5.826) (3.549) (4.426)
S&P 500t-1 -0.003 0.011*** -0.005* 0.010*
(-1.374) (2.582) (-1.852) (1.935)
Recession Indicatort -0.034 -0.060**
(-0.714) (-2.476)
ST Debtt-1 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.123) (-1.067)
Observations 84,556 82,374 58,724 57,238
Adjusted R-Squared 0.169 0.049 0.175 0.057
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the bottom tercile of short-term debt usage. Nevertheless, conclusions do not depend on which
method is used. The impact of economic conditions on the effect of bond market access on
corporate investment level is not consistent across Model (1) and Model (2) of Table 4.8,
taking the wrong sign in the regression on capital expenditures. The coefficient on the Ac-
cess Dummy variable remains significantly negative. The proportion of short-term debt only
significantly impacts the effect of accessing the bond market in the capital expenditures re-
gression (Model (3)), but it has the opposite sign to what would be expected if the cause of
the reduction in investment would be debt overhang. A higher fraction of short-term debt
should alleviate the underinvestment problem, but in Model (3) its coefficient suggests that it
aggravates the negative relation between public debt market access and capital expenditures.
This result is however consistent with my interpretation that firms adjust their actions because
they want to return to the debt market on more favourable conditions: firms with a higher
fraction of short-term debt are more likely to tap the bond market sooner and thus reduce their
investment level more dramatically. I do not find any effect of the proportion of short-term
debt on takeovers. Overall the evidence suggests that the reduction in firm investment that I
report cannot be explained by debt overhang.18
4.7 Robustness Checks
In order to ensure that the results reported before are robust to different specifications, I run
further tests on the relation between the level of firm investment and its decision to access
the bond market. I start by including a lagged term of the dependent variable to capture
its persistence. I also combine the capital expenditures and acquisitions in one variable (Total
Investment) and use it as the dependent variable. Results are reported in the Internet Appendix
in Tables A.4 and A.5, respectively. These are consistent with the results reported before.
Further, in order to ensure that the results are not driven by changes in the scaling variable, I
test the robustness of previous analyses to the inclusion of the inverse of lagged total assets as
an explanatory variable (unreported). Results are very similar.
To further mitigate concerns with reverse causality, I rerun the main analyses using a first
differences approach. Results are similar to the ones reported for the fixed effects estimation,
albeit slightly weaker in statistical terms, suggesting that the change in level of investment
18In Table A.3 in the Internet Appendix I show that similar results are obtained when using the instrumental
variables model.
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occurs mostly immediately upon access the bond market and is not just a difference in the
level of investment that arises over time. This finding mitigates endogeneity concerns, as it
is unlikely that an omitted factor could explain such large change in investment from one
year to another.19 Moreover, I re-run all the main analyses including a variable capturing the
level of corporate acquisitions of the firm in the previous three years or its average over the
whole sample period (unreported). Results remain qualitatively similar. This test is important
because of the spike in acquisitions around the year in which a firm first accesses the bond
market shown in Figure 4.1. The fact that all the results are unaltered by controlling for
the magnitude of previous acquisitions or for the level of total acquisitions shows that the
reduction in investment level that I report is not driven by the integration of merging firms. I
also test for the possibility that firms are raising large amounts of debt when they first access
the bond market but only slowly invest due to the lack of growth opportunities, and somehow
that effect is not well controlled for in my regressions. However, such explanation does not
seem to drive the results. Including controls for the level of cash or for changes in assets in
the regressions does not materially affect any results. Furthermore, in Figure 4.1 I show that,
inconsistent with such explanation, the level of investment after accessing the bond market
does not reverse to its pre-access level over time.
Further, I study the role of accessing the public debt market on the sensitivity of the level of
investment to investment opportunities, instead of its direct impact on the level of investment.20
I follow Asker et al. (2011) and do that both by interacting the Access Dummy with a variable
capturing investment opportunities and by replacing the instrument for accessing the bond
market (the probability obtained from Model (3) in Table 4.2) with an interaction term between
the instrument and a variable capturing investment opportunities. I use the lagged market
to book ratio as a measure of investment opportunities. The results are in Models (1) and
(2) of Table 4.9. In both specifications I find strong empirical evidence that accessing the
bond market has a negative effect on the sensitivity of the firm’s investment level to growth
opportunities. This result is particularly important to dispel any concerns that the instrument
I use is simply capturing a relation between industry characteristics and investment. If that
would be the case, there would be no effect of the variable measuring the access the bond
market on the sensitivity of firm investment to investment opportunities, as the latter already
takes into account the industry the firm belongs to.
19I thank Michael Faulkender for suggesting this test.
20Making such analysis for the cash-financed takeovers is not suitable, as firms engage in takeovers both as a
result of investment opportunities and as a result of the lack of it (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)).
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Table 4.9
Robustness Checks
This table presents robustness checks for the overall sample. The sample includes all Compustat
firm-year observations of US-incorporated public firms between 1986 and 2008 with total assets and
sales above 1 million dollars. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) and financials (SIC codes
between 6000 and 6800) are excluded. Access Dummy takes value one for observations for which
there is both a Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating in Compustat and a bond outstanding
in Mergent FISD in the last month of the fiscal year. All other variables are defined in the Appendix.
All independent variables are lagged one year in relation to the dependent variable. Model (1) is
estimated using firm fixed effects. Model (2) is the second stage of an instrumental variables estimation
in which the first stage includes the same independent variables plus the fitted probability given by
Model (3) in Table 4.2 as an instrument. Model (1) includes a dummy per interaction of Fama and
French (1997) industry and year. Model (2) includes Fama and French (1997) industry and year fixed
effects separately. The constant term is included but not reported. T-stats are in parenthesis and are
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** represent significance at the
90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level.
(1) (2)
Capex/TAt Capex/TAt
Firm Instrumental
Fixed Effects Variables
Access Dummyt-1 -0.003*** -0.006***
∗MTBt-1 (-3.570) (-2.984)
Total Assetst-1 -0.017*** 0.001***
(-20.180) (2.781)
Market to Book 0.007*** 0.008***
Ratiot-1 (18.202) (19.840)
Cash Flowt-1 0.012*** 0.044***
(5.804) (16.582)
Market Leveraget-1 -0.079*** -0.046***
(-26.101) (-18.354)
Firm Aget-1 -0.009*** -0.012***
(-4.460) (-13.911)
Modified Altman 0.001*** -0.001***
Z- scoret-1 (2.154) (-3.214)
S&P 500t-1 -0.003 -0.004
(-1.268) (-1.519)
NYSE listedt-1 0.008***
(4.417)
Observations 84,556 84,556
Adjusted R-Squared 0.169 0.231
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Finally, I analyze the changes in cash holdings of firms once they start accessing the bond
market. Since firms accessing the public debt market increase their leverage (Faulkender and
Petersen (2006)) but reduce the level of investment (Tables 4.2 and 4.3), it is likely that they
increase their cash holdings. I formally test whether that is the case by running a panel analysis
similar to the one in Tables 4.2 and 4.4, with cash and equivalents over lagged total assets as
the dependent variable. As expected, accessing the public debt market is associated with a
significant increase in cash holdings (Table A.6 in the Internet Appendix). The higher level
of cash holdings is consistent with the view that firms are adjusting their actions taking into
account bondholders’ preferences, as it gives a greater assurance of repayment of the debt.
4.8 Conclusion
Overall my findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms accessing the public bond
market take into account the need to satisfy uninformed debtholders and, as a result, reduce
their levels of capital investment and corporate acquisitions. The mechanisms used to reduce
agency costs of debt in bank lending, such as monitoring, are weaker in the public debt mar-
ket. Instead, a firm can build its reputation and benefit in future interactions with debtholders
by reducing the possibilities for risk shifting. Additional support for this interpretation is
given by the finding that the effect of accessing the bond market on investment level is sig-
nificantly stronger for firms closer to financial distress, which are more likely to suffer from
debtholder/equityholder conflicts. In addition, firms tapping the public debt market are less
likely to violate debt covenants violation and reduce their payouts to equityholders, consistent
with the hypothesis that firms accessing the bond market want to reduce debtholders’ concerns
with wealth transfers to equityholders.
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Appendix # indicates a Compustat data item. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and the 99% level.
Acqs/TA Equals the ratio of cash invested in acquisitions in a given year
(#AQC) to the firm’s total assets in the prior year (#AT).
Bidder CAR Bidder cumulative abnormal return in the window [-2; +2] relative
to the announcement date of the deal (obtained from SDC), using
the market model and CRSP data. The estimation period ends in
days -46, runs for a period of 100 to 200 trading days and uses the
CRSP value-weighted index as the market index.
Capex/TA Capital expenditures (#CAPX) over lagged total assets (#AT).
Cash Flow Following Sufi (2009). Net income before extraordinary items
(#IB) plus depreciation and amortization expenses (#DPC), over
total assets (#AT).
Firm Age Number of years since IPO (current year minus year of #IPO-
DATE). In regression analysis the natural logarithm of this vari-
able plus one is used (Datta et al. (2000)).
Hostile/Unsolicited Dummy taking value one if the deal is flagged as hostile or unso-
licited by SDC, zero otherwise.
Market Leverage Book value of debt over market value of assets, following Fama
and French (2002). Book value of debt equals total liabili-
ties (#LT). Market value of assets is given by liabilities (#LT)
minus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit
(#TXDITC) plus preferred stock (#PSTKL if available, else
#PSTKRV) plus market equity (#CSHO times #PRCC_F).
Market to Book Market value of assets divided by the book value of assets
Ratio following Fama and French (2002). Market value of assets is
given by liabilities (#LT) minus balance sheet deferred taxes and
investment tax credit (#TXDITC) plus preferred stock (#PSTKL
if available, else #PSTKRV) plus market equity (#CSHO times
#PRCC_F).
Modified Altman Following MacKie-Mason (1990). Equals 3.3 times earnings
Z-score before interest and taxes (#EBIT), plus sales (#SALE), plus 1.4
times retained earnings (#RE), plus 1.2 times working capital
(#WCAP), all scaled by total assets (#AT).
NYSE listed Dummy taking value one if the firm is listed on New York Stock
Exchange (Stock Exchange Code = 11 in Compustat), zero other-
wise.
(Continued on the next page)
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Payouts/TA Equals the sum of total dividend payments (#DVT) and share
repurchases, scaled by lagged total assets (#AT). I follow the
method suggested by Banyi et al. (2008) and compute share re-
purchases as the Compustat item of purchase of common and
preferred stock (#PRSTKC) minus any negative change relative
to the previous year in the value of the preferred stock outstand-
ing (#PSTK).
Percentage of Percentage of cash used to finance the deal as reported by SDC.
Cash
Percentage Access Based on Faulkender and Petersen (2006). Ratio of companies
with a credit rating and a bond outstanding on Mergent FISD
to the total number of companies in the firm’s Fama and French
(1997) industry in a given year. In regression analysis I use the
natural logarithm of one plus this variable.
Relative Size Ratio of the deal value given by SDC to the bidder total assets
(#AT).
S&P 500 Dummy taking value one if the firm belongs to the S&P 500 at the
end of the financial year (obtained from the Index Constituents
database from Compustat), zero otherwise.
Target Public Dummy taking value one if the target firm is flagged as publicly
listed on SDC, zero otherwise.
Tender Offer Dummy taking value one if the deal is flagged as a tender offer by
SDC, zero otherwise.
Total Assets Total assets of the firm as reported in Compustat (#AT). When
used in a regression I take the natural logarithm of this variable.
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Summary and Conclusion
Often firms do not have the internal resources necessary to pursue all profitable investment
opportunities at their disposal. One of the most important roles of financial markets is to allo-
cate unused resources from other economic agents to the firms that will better employ them,
thereby enabling productive investment to take place. If markets were frictionless, resources
would be assigned to all investment projects with a positive net present value, and no value-
destroying investment would be pursued. However, there are informational and incentive prob-
lems in financial markets that result in agency costs that may hinder the efficient allocation of
capital across the economy and, as a result, impact economic growth. These problems stem
from the separation of ownership and control, which typically provides the party in control
with superior information relative to the parties that have the ownership rights (information
asymmetry), but that also reduces the incentives of the former to act in the interest of the latter
(moral hazard). It is therefore of paramount importance to understand financing frictions as
well as the mechanisms that can be used to reduce their impact. Mitigating the impact of these
frictions allows for a better allocation of capital and can ultimately lead to higher economic
growth.
In chapter 2 of this thesis we study a mechanism that can be used to reduce the imbalance
of the information held by the managers of a publicly listed firm and its owners: the volun-
tary disclosure of inside information. More specifically, we examine why managers choose
to disclose their synergy estimates when announcing a merger or acquisition. Through the
hand-collection of data from press releases and other sources, we report that over 17% of the
acquisition announcements of publicly listed targets in the United States between 1995 and
2008 involved some sort of quantified disclosure of the expected synergies. We then use this
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data to test several predictions derived from the academic literature. Consistent with Ver-
recchia (1990), we find that managers are more likely to disclose synergies when they have
more accurate information on the potential value-creation of the merger. More specifically,
disclosure is more likely to occur when the merging firms operate in the same industry, if
there have been more takeovers in the target’s industry recently, when the bidder has access
to the target’s books (non-hostile deal), and when there is less information asymmetry about
the target’s value. If managers possess more reliable information the market will exert more
pressure for its disclosure, and the litigation risk will be lower. We also find that disclosure of
synergy estimates is more likely when the acquisition is financed with equity, suggesting that
managers use disclosure to mitigate moral hazard concerns from investors. Consistent with
this hypothesis, we find that bidder announcement returns are significantly higher when man-
agers announce synergies. Furthermore, supporting the notion that the synergies disclosed are
taking into account by shareholders, we find that announcement returns are increasing on the
fraction of synergies that is expected to accrue to the bidder. Overall, the evidence in chapter
2 highlights the importance of managerial voluntary disclosure in reducing information asym-
metries. The richness of the data on synergy disclosures can be helpful for future research to
answer questions regarding other aspects of voluntary disclosure. For example, despite theo-
retical work on the link between voluntary disclosure and proprietary costs (e.g., Dye (1986)),
a better understanding of this connection can be achieved by examining how managers adjust
their synergy estimates depending on the degree of competition in their industry. In addi-
tion, the use of disclosure as a negotiation tool can be investigated through a close analysis of
voluntary disclosure in hostile offers or in contested acquisitions.
In chapter 3 we again take advantage of the availability of data on takeover announce-
ments and study the importance of incentives in the relation between institutional ownership
and firm value. Takeovers are events characterized by a large information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders, and are often seen as an example of moral hazard (Morck et al.
(1990)). As such, they are an appropriate testing ground for the effectiveness of mechanisms
to mitigate agency costs. We analyze the effect of stock liquidity as an incentive for institu-
tional monitoring by examining the relation between the stock liquidity of the bidder and the
market reaction to the merger’s announcement. Using a sample of acquisitions made by U.S.-
based firms and announced between 1998 and 2008, we find that the stock liquidity of the
acquiring firm is negatively associated with announcement returns, especially in instances in
which information collection by institutional shareholders is more likely to occur. This finding
is consistent with the hypothesis put forward by Bhide (1993) that in firms with a higher stock
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liquidity institutions are less likely to engage in monitoring, as it is easier for them to exit their
position whenever confronted with negative news. Further support for this hypothesis is given
by a cross-sectional analysis of the relation between bidder stock liquidity and announcement
returns. We find that the negative relation between the two is more pronounced for bidders
with potentially higher agency costs, when institutional monitoring becomes more valuable.
In addition, we report that firms with lower stock liquidity are more likely to withdraw deals
that are poorly received by the market, experience higher CEO turnover following a value-
destroying deal, and have better post-merger operational performance. These results again
suggest that institutions are more active in firms with low stock liquidity. This chapter adds to
our understanding of one of the most important mechanisms to reduce agency costs in publicly
listed firms: monitoring by large shareholders. We contribute to the literature on institutional
ownership and firm value by showing that monitoring incentives and firm characteristics have
to be taken into account when trying to establish a link between institutional ownership and
firm value.
The last essay in this dissertation, chapter 4, takes a different perspective on agency costs.
Rather than studying the mechanisms that are used ex-ante to mitigate such costs, I examine
how firms adjust their decisions when they experience a change in the agency costs of ob-
taining outside financing. For this purpose I study the relation between accessing the public
debt market and corporate investment. Using a panel of U.S. firms between 1985 and 2008, I
find that firms that tap the bond market significantly reduce their level of investment in cap-
ital and in corporate takeovers, especially when they have a higher credit risk. These results
are consistent with the hypothesis that firms adjust their investment decisions in order to en-
courage the less-informed investors in public markets to hold their debt on more favourable
terms. This change in firm behaviour might be necessary because other mechanisms to reduce
agency costs of debt, such as monitoring, become weaker when switching from borrowing
from financial intermediaries to borrowing from financial markets (Chava and Roberts (2008);
Diamond (1991)). Further evidence of the intent to reduce agency costs of debt is given by an
analysis of other changes in firms’ actions. I find that firms using the bond market become less
likely to violate debt covenants, reduce the level of payouts to equityholders, and increase cash
holdings. Overall, chapter 4 shows that the link between accessing new sources of financing
and corporate investment is more complex than previously thought, and is heavily influenced
by how information-sensitive the financing is. It is therefore of interest for future research to
establish why and when firms start accessing financing from different sources.
In summary, this thesis presents evidence that frictions in the access to external finance, in
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the form of information asymmetries and agency costs, have a real effect on firm investment. It
also shows that some mechanisms, such as voluntary disclosure of information and monitoring
by institutional shareholders, are effective in reducing the impact of agency costs on firm
value. A deeper understanding of the problems raised by accessing external finance and of
their potential solutions is central to the debate on how to design policies that are effective
in addressing the difficulties experienced by firms in accessing financing for investment and
innovation.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Bedrijven hebben vaak niet de interne middelen om alle rendabele investeringsmogelijkhe-
den na te streven. Een van de belangrijkste rollen van de financiële markten is om een brug
te vormen tussen investeringsmogelijkheden en kapitaal, waardoor productieve investeringen
kunnen plaatsvinden. Als kapitaal markten perfect zouden functioneren, dan zou kapitaal
worden toegekend aan alle investeringsprojecten met een positieve netto contante waarde, en
zouden er geen waarde-vernietigende investering worden uitgevoerd. Echter, er zijn proble-
men omtrent de informatie voorziening en belangen binnen de financiële markten die leiden
tot zogenoemde ägency"kosten die de efficiënte allocatie van kapitaal in de economie kun-
nen belemmeren en daarmee consequenties hebben voor economische groei.Deze problemen
komen voort uit de scheiding van eigendom en zeggenschap, waarbij doorgaans de leidende
partij met zeggenschap over betere informatie beschikt ten opzichte van de partijen die de
eigendomsrechten bezitten(informatie-asymmetrie). Dit vermindert ook de stimulansvoor de
leidinggevende om te handelen in het belang van de eigenaren (moral hazard). Het is daarom
van het grootste belang om financieringsfricties en de manieren om de impact op de financie-
ring van bedrijven te verminderente begrijpen. Het verminderen of verzachten van de gevolgen
van financiering fricties zorgt voor een betere allocatie van kapitaal en kan uiteindelijk leiden
tot economische groei. In hoofdstuk1 van dit proefschriftbestuderen we of het vrijwilligopen-
baar maken van informatie, de onevenwichtigheid tussen demanagers, het dagelijks bestuur
van eenbeursgenoteerdeonderneming, en haareigenarenkan beperken. We onderzoeken spe-
cifiek waarom managerservoor kiezen omde geschatte synergie waarde bijde aankondiging
van eenfusie of overname openbaar te maken.We vindendat de kans op het openbaar maken
van de informatie toeneemt naarmate managersover meerbetrouwbare informatie beschikken
en naar matehet risico op een geschil lager is. We vinden ookdat de onthullingwaarschijn-
lijker wordt wanneerde overname wordtgefinancierd met eigen vermogen, wat suggereert dat
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managersopenbaarmaking van informatiegebruiken om "moral hazard"problemente vermin-
deren. In overeenstemming metdeze hypothese, vinden wij dat de aandelenkoersen van bie-
dende ondernemingen profiteren van deaankondiging vansynergiën. In hoofdstuk2 maken
we weergebruik van debeschikbaarheid van gegevensbetreffende de openbareaankondigingen
van overnames en bestuderenwe het belang vanstimuli opde relatietussen institutionelebe-
leggers endewaarde van een onderneming. Overnameszijn gebeurtenissengekenmerkt door
een groteinformatie-asymmetrie tussenmanagers enaandeelhouders,en worden vaakgezien als
eenvoorbeeld vanmoral hazard. Als zodanigzijn overnamesgeschikt om de effectiviteitvan me-
chanismen omägency kosten"te beperken te bepalen.We vinden dat de aankondiging van een
overname deliquiditeit van het aandeelvande overnemende ondernemingnegatiefbeïnvloedt,
vooral in gevallen waarinde institutionelecontrole waarschijnlijker is. Deze bevindingis in
overeenstemmingmet de hypothese datin aandelenmet een hogereliquiditeit,institutionele be-
leggersminder geneigd zijnom deel te nemenin het toezicht, omdat het voor hen gemakkelij-
keris om hun positiete verkopenwanneerze geconfronteerd worden metnegatief nieuws. Daar-
naastvinden wedat de kans dat managerseen acquisitie afblazen stijgt naarmate de liquiditeit
van het aandeel vande overnemende partij laag is en de acquisitie slechtwordt ontvangen-
door de markt.Dit resultaatsuggereert dat institutionele beleggersmanagersonder druk zetten
in plaats vanhet verkopen vanhunaandeel in deonderneming. In de laatstestudiein dit proef-
schrift, hoofdstuk 3, neem ik eenandere kijk opagency kosten.In plaats vanhet bestuderen van
demechanismen dieex-ante worden gebruikt omdeze kostente beperken,onderzoek ik hoebe-
drijvenhun beslissingenaan passen wanneerereen verandering plaats vindt indeagency kosten-
voor het verkrijgen vanexternefinanciering.Ik vind dat bedrijven diegebruik maken van deobli-
gatiemarkt, investeringen in kapitaal enin bedrijfsovernamesaanzienlijk verminderen, vooral
als de ondernemingeen hoger kredietrisicoheeft.Deze resultaten zijn in lijnmet de hypothese-
dat bedrijvenhun investeringsbeslissingenaanpassen aande mindergeïnformeerdebeleggers om
zeaan te moedigen omde schulden van de onderneming aante houdentegen gunstige voorwaar-
den. Bovendien blijktde intentie omagency kostenvan deschuld te verlagen uit de bevindin-
gen dat bedrijvendie gebruik maken vanobligatiemarktminder geneigd zijn omconvenantente
schenden,het niveau van deuitkeringenaan de aandeelhouderste verminderen enkasmiddelente
verhogen.
Kortom, dit proefschrift toont dat fricties in de toegang tot externe financiering, in de
vorm van informatie-asymmetrie en agency kosten, een reëel effect hebbenop bedrijfsinveste-
ring. Het laat ook zien dat sommige mechanismen, zoals het vrijwillig openbaar maken van
informatie en controle door institutionele aandeelhouders, effectief zijn in het verminderen
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van de impact van agency kosten op de waarde van de onderneming. Eenbeter begrip van de
problemenbetreffende de toegang tot externe financiering en de mogelijke oplossingen staan
centraal in het debat over de wijze waarop hetfinancierings-eninvesteringsbeleidmoet worden
aangestuurd. Door middel van financiering voor investeringen en innovatie kan uiteindelijk
economische groei tot stand komen.
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Resumo em Português
(Summary in Portuguese)
Frequentemente, as empresas não dispõem dos recursos internos necessários para financiar
todas as oportunidades de investimento que têm à sua disposição. Uma das funções mais
importantes dos mercados financeiros é alocar recursos, que não são utilizados por outros
agentes económicos, às empresas que melhor uso lhe poderão dar, possibilitando investimento
produtivo. Se os mercados funcionassem sem fricções, os recursos seriam disponibilizados
para todos os projectos de investimento que tivessem um valor actual líquido positivo, e não
seria financiado qualquer projecto que destruísse valor. Contudo, existem problemas de in-
formação e de incentivos nos mercados financeiros que podem restringir a capacidade de os
mesmos alocarem capital de uma maneira eficiente, afectando, como consequência, o cres-
cimento económico. Estes problemas têm a sua origem na separação entre a propriedade e
o controlo na empresa, o que frequentemente proporciona, à parte em controlo, um nível de
informação superior ao da parte que é proprietária, mas que também reduz os incentivos de
quem exerce o controlo para agir no melhor interesse do proprietário. É portanto de extrema
importância perceber as fricções que existem nos mercados financeiros e os mecanismos que
podem ser utilizados para reduzir o impactos das mesmas no que respeita ao financiamento
das empresas. A redução do impacto destas fricções permite uma melhor alocação de capital
e poderá resultar num crescimento económico mais elevado.
No primeiro capítulo desta tese estudamos um mecanismo que pode ser usado para re-
duzir o desequilíbrio na informação possuída pelo gestor de uma empresa cotada em bolsa
em relação aos accionistas: a revelação voluntária de informação privilegiada. Mais concreta-
mente, examinamos as razões que levam os gestores a revelar estimativas de sinergias quando
anunciam uma fusão ou aquisição. Mostramos que os gestores têm uma maior propensão para
revelar estas estimativas quando possuem informação mais fidedigna e quando o risco de liti-
gação é mais baixo. Também reportamos que a revelação é mais comum quando a aquisição é
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financiada com capitais próprios, o que sugere que os gestores usam a revelação de informa-
ção para reduzir os receios de risco moral da parte dos investidores. Esta hipótese apoia-se no
facto de o preço das acções do adquirente beneficiar do anúncio das sinergias.
No segundo capítulo tiramos uma vez mais partido da disponibilidade de informação re-
lativa aos anúncios de aquisições de empresas e estudamos a importância de incentivos na
relação entre participações institucionais e o valor da empresa. Aquisições de empresas são
eventos caracterizados por uma grande assimetria de informação entre os gestores e os acci-
onistas, e são frequentemente vistas como um exemplo de risco moral. Assim sendo, são um
cenário adequado para testar a eficácia de mecanismos que diminuem os custos de agência.
Mostramos que a liquidez das acções da empresa adquirente tem uma relação negativa com
os retornos originados com o anúncio da aquisição, especialmente nos casos em que é mais
provável que instituições que possuem acções da empresa invistam na obtenção de informação
privada. Este resultado é consistente com a hipótese de que, em empresas com maior liquidez
das acções, a probabilidade que instituições supervisionem os gestores é inferior, pois é mais
fácil para estas instituições vender a sua posição accionista quando confrontadas com notí-
cias negativas sobre a empresa. Além disso, a probabilidade de uma aquisição ser cancelada
pelos gestores ou de o CEO ser substituído é mais alta quando a aquisição foi mal recebida
pelo mercado, mas só nas empresas que têm acções menos líquidas; isto é consistente com,
neste tipo de empresas, as instituições pressionarem os gestores em vez de venderem as suas
posições. Finalmente, observamos que, após a fusão, a mudança na performance operacional
das empresas com acções menos líquidas apresenta uma melhoria em relação à mudança na
performance operacional das empresas com acções mais líquidas.
O último artigo desta tese, capítulo 3, parte de uma perspectiva diferente em relação aos
custos de agência. Em vez de estudar os mecanismos que são usados ex-ante para diminuir
estes custos, analiso como as empresas ajustam as suas decisões quando são sujeitas a uma
alteração nos custos de agência relacionados com a obtenção de financiamento externo. Re-
correndo a um painel de empresas dos Estados Unidos, verifico que as empresas que usam
o mercado obrigacionista reduzem significativamente o seu nível de investimento em despe-
sas de capital e em aquisicões de empresas, especialmente quando têm um risco de crédito
mais elevado. Estes resultados são consistentes com a hipótese de que as empresas ajustam as
suas decisões de investimento de maneira a incentivar os investidores nos mercados públicos,
que estão menos bem informados, a comprar as suas obrigações em termos mais favoráveis.
Como evidência adicional da intenção de reduzir os custos de agência da dívida, as empre-
sas que utilizam o mercado obrigacionista tornam-se mais cumpridoras das convenantes da
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dívida, reduzem o nível de pagamentos aos accionistas, e aumentam as reservas de numerário.
Em resumo, esta tese apresenta evidência de que as fricções no acesso a financiamento
externo, sob a forma de assimetria de informação e de custos de agência, têm um impacto real
no investimento das empresas. Também mostra que alguns mecanismos, tais como a revelação
voluntária de informação ou a supervisão por parte de instituições, são efectivos na redução do
impacto dos custos de agência no valor das empresas. Um conhecimento mais profundo dos
problemas que surgem com o recurso a financiamento externo e das suas potenciais soluções é
vital para o debate relativo ao desenho de políticas que são eficazes na redução das dificuldades
experienciadas por empresas no acesso a financiamento para investimento e inovação, que são,
em última análise, os impulsionadores do crescimento económico.
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Often firms lack the necessary internal resources to pursue all profitable investment
opportunities at their disposal. One of the most important roles of financial markets is to
allocate resources from different economic agents to the firms that will better employ
them, thereby enabling productive investment to take place. However, there are
informational and incentive-related problems in financial markets that result in agency
costs. These costs can hinder the efficient allocation of capital across the economy and, as
a result, can impact economic growth. This thesis examines the mechanisms that investors
and managers use to reduce the agency costs of outside financing and the impact of such
costs on firms’ investment decisions and value. The first chapter shows that the voluntary
disclosure of information can help overcoming the informational asymmetry between
managers and investors. The second chapter provides evidence that institutional
ownership of firms can improve firm decisions and increase firm value when coupled with
the appropriate incentives. In particular, we show that stock illiquidity is a key incentive in
this setting. The last chapter examines the impact of accessing the public debt market on
corporate investment. The findings support the hypothesis that firms adjust their
investment decisions to offset an increase in agency costs, which in turn enables them to
access outside financing on more favorable terms. 
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